“We’re full”:
Capacity, Finitude, and British Landscapes, 1945-1979

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The language of urban fullness and finitude has long had an active life in British politics and popular culture. After 1945, however, ideas of the finite, overspilling British city, teeming with inert masses of working-class people, drove the development of paternalistic state urban reconstruction and new town programmes. More infamously, post-war immigration anxieties often used a sinister metaphorical language of flooding and drowning to describe the arrival of people from Commonwealth countries as catastrophic. Despite this shared conceptualisation of British landscapes as finite, embattled, inert spaces, the interrelationships between these ideas of “human floods” have largely been treated separately by historians. This article proposes that these histories can be traced in terms of their shared cultural logic of landscape finitude and capacity, as part of a post-imperial reimagining of heritage and national identity. Through reading representations of post-war immigration and urban overcrowding together, a wider preservationist political logic can be seen entrenching and defending ideas of urban and national finitude against a range of post-imperial ideological and demographic change. Through tracing symbolic representations of borders and population fullness, this paper gestures towards a more integrated history of post-imperial landscape politics and their role in shaping policies and practices of exclusion in post-war Britain.

Introduction
The idea of the human flood, or masses of humans moving across landscapes in ways that are metaphorically described in terms of fluid dynamics, is neither a historically new idea nor is it one which is restricted to British culture. Even so, this idea of mass human movement as likened to the movement of water, which could and should be curbed by imposing finite boundaries, was a dominant political language in Britain throughout the twentieth century. Drawing on a range of political preoccupations including fears of overpopulation and eugenic concerns about dilution or defilement of the national whole, mass human movement across the British landscape has consistently been represented in fluid metaphors. From metaphors of aquatic monstrosity such as “Octopus London” to the post-war state’s concern with pre-emptive “decanting” of “overspill” populations, these metaphors have played a key role in the development of urban planning’s professional language.¹

The language used by urban planning to frame its regulation of human movement and the structuring roles of cities has not only referred to movement within the nation, however, but has been consistently shared with languages used to describe the movement of humans from outside Britain. Migrants from colonised and Commonwealth countries in particular have been described in terms of “influxes” and floods and depicted as dehumanised masses which move like “waves”. Such rhetoric has frequently shared a preoccupation with the ability of particular landscapes to function as containing forms, imposing structure on human floods, and on the malleable forms of heritage and identity.

While some of these shared patterns have been identified by historians, the cultural history of landscape representation, and its generative politics, has been fragmented across subdisciplinary approaches to the study of spaces and meanings in post-war British history. Within these fragmented disciplinary approaches, however, recent cultural histories of urban planning and everyday landscapes have gestured towards more synthetic historical theorisations of landscape politics which interpret this as a key field of research in its own right. Elsewhere, broader cultural analyses of Britain’s relationship to its imperial legacy have emphasised the role of landscape symbolism in articulating and normalising categories of social inclusion and value. Paul Gilroy’s *Postcolonial Melancholia* has argued that post-war cultural fixations on “greatness” and “prestige” have drawn on “the power of the landscape … as the dominant element” in expressing grief about Britain’s “loss” of empire. The generative iterative power of such affective metaphorical languages has been explored in Sara Ahmed’s theorisation of “sticky” racialised metaphors of containment and exclusion, which has highlighted the significance of fluid metaphors in this process. Georgie Wemyss’ historical sociologies of bordering practices have also linked these discursive practices to experiences of space, arguing that the “selective loss of memory about British colonialism” is constructed with reference to the functions of British landscapes, thereby imposing spatialised “hierarchies of belonging” which divert attention from imperial legacies.

This article therefore proposes a historical reading of the cultural representation of landscape forms in political rhetoric, mass media, and popular culture as finite containers which hold fluid, inert masses of people, and also hold malleable and vulnerable social meanings. This approach intends to bring together studies of metaphorical forms, postcolonial social theory, and cultural histories of urban planning and of immigration, in order to trace the shared conceptual framework which underpinned evolving rhetorics of landscape finitude and capacity. Tracing these themes from the formation of the post-war welfare state in 1945 through to the election of the Thatcher government in 1979, this article proposes that evolving language used to articulate ideal forms of landscape has functioned not only to define and emplace national identity narratives, but also to encourage their regulation by the state, through

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controlling the “flows” of human movement within and across borders. The intent is to work towards a historical understanding of the idea of Britain as “full”.

**Decanting the Overspill: Spatial Logics of Post-war Planning, 1945-1968**

Throughout the development of urban planning as a professional discipline, the concept of human movement as fluidity has been integral to conceptualising the nature of planning “problems” and the types of solutions which the discipline provides. The influence of eugenics on the early development of British urban planning has been well explored, particularly with reference to the idea of urban improvement as a method of improving not just quality of life for its population, but the “quality” of that population as well, as measured through health, productivity, and educational achievement. Early urban planning advocates therefore conceptualised their new field of expertise in terms of improving cities through applying scientific principles of regulation and control; these were primarily focused on the regulation of landscape forms, but with the goal of regulating the potential action of people who lived in and on them.

These conceptualisations of bordering and containment developed into a more explicit language of fluidity and regulation during the language of wartime urban planning committees and documents, and emerged as a key and central tool used in the post-war Attlee government reconfiguration of the British state. “Town and Country Planning” policies relied on a conceptualisation of pre-emptive expert intervention and control as a method of constraining and directing the impact of capitalism on the landscape, by providing pre-emptive controlled structures into which population growth and economic growth could be directed. This desire to control the “flow” of human movement across the landscape was embedded in the new language of state-sponsored planning. New town populations were to be “decanted” from overcrowded cities, which were “overspilling” their population. New estates constructed at the edge of existing towns and villages to hold surplus or excessive populations drawn from cities also took the term “overspill” estates. This type of controlled “dispersal” would prevent the slow “trickle” of urban sprawl outward from established cities, or the more drastic “flood”, which would subsume the countryside. At the same time, work to increase the efficiency of existing urban spaces took the form of consolidating housing into higher-densities, including tower blocks, as methods of increasing urban capacity and concentrations.

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British cities were also undergoing transformation through the increasing numbers of migrants arriving from Commonwealth countries after 1948. Peter Fryer’s landmark work *Staying Power*, which drew in part on his journalistic experience covering the arrival of the *SS Empire Windrush* and subsequent arrivals, argued that early phases of migration did not encounter the high levels of hostility and discrimination that would develop towards the late 1950s. This is not to say that these earlier arrivals did not experience discrimination, but rather that the particular forms of discriminatory political rhetoric that became prominent leading up to the 1958 Notting Hill riots took time to develop.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, while there was occasional journalistic reference to the “flow” of migration into Britain, British national print media primarily used terms like “trickle”, “stream” and “flood” to describe migration patterns into other countries, with Australia, Canada and America in particular frequently being described as receiving “heavy flows” and “floods” of refugees following the Second World War. While debates around the number of displaced persons Britain should accept took place, they did not consistently use a negative language of fluidity. Indeed, one 1947 Parliamentary debate used an enriching metaphor of flow, hearing arguments that the “experiment” in full employment, and the declining birthrate, created a need for a “constant inflow” of European migrants who would provide “an infusion of vigorous new blood.” This is not to say that post-war white migrant groups did not experience discrimination or racialisation as “white-Others”, but to note that dehumanising fluidity metaphors were less consistently applied to their movement into Britain at this time.

From this perspective, European refugees could be seen to form a “flood”, but not one which affected Britain. In the immediate post-war period, the fluid movements of populations were primarily found in Britain’s own overcrowded cities in need of “decanting”.

Fluidity language would be increasingly applied to migration from the early 1950s onwards, however, to characterise the cumulative effects of Commonwealth migration as too great for British cities to withstand and therefore requiring “restriction”. The language of “influx” was repeatedly used from late 1954 in *The Times* to characterise Jamaican immigration to Birmingham, with one report characterising this as “an uncontrolled regular intake of immigrants [which] swells the unceasing inflow from the rest of Britain.” Such concern about people “pouring in” was frequently understood with reference to urban planning policies of dispersal, where existing urban

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15 One example of this usage can be found in *The Times*, 4 October 1958, p.6.


overcrowding was understood to render cities too overcrowded to take more population.\textsuperscript{20} The rhetoric of influx would be consolidated in media responses to the 1958 Notting Hill riots which described the causes as arising from the presence of West Indian people in London in too great a number, rather than the activities of the white “Teds” who incited the violence.\textsuperscript{21}

The construction of the riots as being due to “racial tensions” posited conflict as deriving from the presence of migrant populations in cities and as leading to violence on otherwise “peaceful streets”.\textsuperscript{22} Andy R. Brown has noted that during the late 1950s and early 1960s, parliamentary discussion of “race tensions” consistently drew on anonymous anecdotes, letters and accounts from constituents; these anecdotes frequently presented local scenes of streets and small towns embattled by rising migrant populations.\textsuperscript{23} A central theme in these early “anecdotes of racism” was the idea that the visible presence of black and Asian migrants on British streets was a symbol of declining national status, where “the arrival and mixing of inferiors [sic]” was viewed as a disruption of a racial world order.\textsuperscript{24} This reversal of colonial order was explicitly used as a framing device in a 1955 BBC programme \textit{Has Britain a Colour Bar?}, which opened with the claim that “we have a Colonial problem on our hands, but it’s a Colonial problem with a difference. Instead of being thousands of miles away and worrying other people, it’s right here, on the spot, worrying us”.\textsuperscript{25} The significance of the appearance of streets changing “right here”, through the changing appearance of people who lived on them, was thereby inscribed as having a direct causal linkage to declining colonial power.\textsuperscript{26}

Such conflation of broadly defined urban change with national “decline” was widespread in political journalism and popular culture at this time and would escalate during the early 1960s. This has been identified as a peak in what Jim Tomlinson has theorised as “declinism”; that is, the ideological privileging of relative economic decline as the primary method of understanding contemporary politics.\textsuperscript{27} This period saw an escalating diagnostic tendency in journalism and cultural analysis, framed in


\textsuperscript{21} One notable exception was the \textit{Economist}’s argument that “firm measures were needed – against roughs not immigrants”. \textit{Economist}, 6 September 1958, p.713. Cf. “Racial Fights In London”, \textit{The Times}, 1 September 1958, p.8; “Coloured Men Warned”, \textit{The Times}, 1 November 1958, p.3.

\textsuperscript{22} “Should we let them keep pouring in?”, \textit{Daily Mail}, 2 September 1958, p.4; “Coloured Influx May be Slowed”, \textit{Daily Mail}, 8 September 1958, p.5; “Keep down coloured influx says Tory”, \textit{Daily Mail}, 30 October 1958, p.7.


terms of a moralistic search for “what’s wrong with Britain.” A central trope in much of the “state of the nation” political journalism published during this time was the inclusion of extended subjective, grief-laden responses to landscape change, which interpret these changes as reflecting absolute imperial decline. Malcolm Muggeridge’s frequently quoted 1963 essay for Encounter, for example, expressed grief at lost national status through disdain for American cultural influence, changing aesthetics of urban design, and technological change, all understood as divergences from a greater past, and legible through the appearance of the nation’s streets, through which change formed a “pellucid […] flow.” The notion of British streets polluted by American cultural influence was a common trope in journalistic criticisms of popular culture, with anxieties particularly focusing on its potential to be passively “absorbed” by vulnerable populations, particularly working-class and/or young people. The conflation of American culture with suburban consumerism, interpreted as a dystopian signifier of cultural malaise, can be seen in the widespread adoption of Ian Nairn’s term “subtopia” by journalists more broadly critiquing “the values of suburban living” as fundamentally foreign. The pollution of cities by foreign culture was a theme in popular cultural representations of British cultural decline. Novels such as Late Call and The Adaptable Man depicted post-war new towns and “overspill” estates as symbolic of wider cultural “influxes” marking the defeat of a traditional culture. This theme has also been analysed as shaping Agatha Christie’s novels of this period, where post-imperial decline is frequently explicitly causally linked to visible markers of social change.

Such mapping together of immigration, dispersal politics, modernist urban planning, and wider cultural changes into a singular rhetoric of national status and vitality was partly facilitated through a shared language of fluidity and flow. The idea of the border of the nation as a bulwark against human floods constructs proactive regulation as a necessity to preserve and protect a vulnerable social and spatial order. These regulatory languages both rely on dehumanising masses of people by likening them to inert fluids,
and positing elite expert intervention and control as absolute and necessary tools of containment.

From Floods to “Crisis”, 1962-1970
Sheila Patterson’s anthropological study of West Indian migration to London, published in 1963 and widely available in an abridged Penguin paperback form in 1965, suggested that despite an initial “sense of strangeness […] on first seeing large numbers of coloured people in the streets” during the late 1940s, that “today this feeling is gone”.34 She concluded that “coloured people [sic] have become an accepted part of the British urban landscape, if not yet of the community”.35 This claim, already optimistic at the time of its publication, would be challenged by the drastic escalation of political languages of exclusion during the remainder of the decade. By the time of Patterson’s writing, the 1962 Immigration Act had been passed with the explicit intent of curtailing the overall numbers of Commonwealth migrants, drawing in part on the prevailing political sense that the presence of black and Asian Commonwealth migrants in British cities was itself a cause of “racial tension”.36 The Act was intended by the Conservative Party as a way of restricting the “influx” of migration.37 By 1965, however, the increasing number of applicants under the new voucher scheme aroused the concern of the newly-elected Labour government, whose White Paper on Immigration from the Commonwealth of that year explicitly used fluidity rhetoric to frame the task of “contro[l]ing the entry of immigrants so that it does not outrun Britain’s capacity to absorb them”.38 While the Wilson government passed the 1965 Race Relations Act ostensibly to restrict the rise of “racialism”, the political weaponisation of immigration, using the language of a finite and embattled landscape, continued to escalate over the course of the decade.

A key event in this process was the speech made by Conservative MP Enoch Powell to a Conservative Association on 20 April 1968, which has become known as the “Rivers of Blood” speech.39 This speech has been widely analysed in terms of its rhetorical construction, and as the first articulation of a “new racism”, functioning as “a break in the epistemology of contemporary racism” after which new articulations became possible.40 What is crucial for the purposes of this article, however, is the way in which Powell’s speech, like others he had given before it to less media attention, deliberately invoked an established, spatialised network of metaphors of fluid movement over landscapes. This drew on existing antipathies and fears, while overlaying further apocalyptic, violent imagery that conceptualised the stakes in terms of survival and “blood”, as a “speculative prophecy” of what would be to come.41

37 Smith and Marmo, Race, Gender and the Body, pp.29-30; 47-48.
38 HMSO, Immigration from the Commonwealth (London, 1965), p.6. For discussion of the complex historiographical debates around the Smethwick by-election’s role in this process, see Smith, British Communism and the Politics of Race, pp.75-78.
39 The most extensive exploration of the context and contents of this speech can be found in Camilla Schofield, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge, 2013), pp.206-263.
41 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, p.112.
Powell’s language describing immigration was one of “inflow” which he argued needed to be replaced by “outflow”. The anecdote of the elderly woman, menaced by immigrants who “moved in […] one house after another” along her street, posits an oppressive streetscape where “flows” of faceless migrants contain and trap embattled white residents.42 This highlights the way in which ideas of urban change spatialised a racist narrative of embattlement, through the description of the woman who had “lost her husband and both her sons in the war” only to see her “quiet street [become] a place of noise and confusion”. In this context, Powell’s claim that he seemed to see “the River Tiber foaming with much blood” draws on the language of streets overrun with depersonalised masses of people, and overlays this with explicitly threatening imagery which combines flows of water with the abject flow of blood.43 The framework of personal anecdotes of polluted and embattled streets had been well established at this point, as had the idea of human floods catastrophically overrunning the bounded containers of urban space. “Rivers of Blood” effectively synthesised these rhetorics and added an extreme and violent inflection to the fluidity language. It used these to make explicit calls to action to strengthen the containment of a vulnerable Englishness against catastrophic consequences.

Crisis, Droughts and Swamps, 1970-1978

While Powell was dismissed from the Shadow Cabinet by Conservative Party leader Edward Heath after this speech, it notoriously emboldened the language with which racism and anti-immigration views could be expressed.44 In addition to this, it also created a precedent for apocalyptic political rhetoric regarding national vitality and survival, which Edward Heath would help to escalate further during his prime ministership from 1970. As the post-war global macroeconomic Bretton Woods settlement was becoming increasingly precarious, the Heath government responded with a series of short-termist economic policies that greatly fuelled inflation, combined with explicitly punitive trade union policies which exacerbated their impact.45 In responding to these economic challenges, Heath’s tendency to characterise isolated economic challenges in militant terms of embattlement and national defense, such as during the 1972-73 Miners’ Strike and the three-day-week, drew heavily on the established traditions of declinist political culture in the early 1960s, but by directing it at events in the present, helped foreshorten the trajectory of decline into one of contemporary crisis.46

This tendency to understand the impacts of short term economic challenges, and of longer-term trends in social change, as not only part of a long decline but as symbolising an imminent crisis of survival, would escalate still further during the aftermath of the Labour government’s receipt of an IMF loan in 1976 in order to

43 The reading of abjection in the context of immigration is derived from Imogen Tyler, Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (London, 2013), p.27.
stabilise sterling values. The state of the nation, as if Britain was facing a potentially terminal imminent crisis, was a prominent theme in political rhetoric, media representations, and as a theme in popular culture during the mid-1970s. This political escalation has been well analysed more broadly elsewhere, particularly with reference to the way in which the apocalyptic tone of these fears diverged substantially from the economic realities faced by the British state. Even so, however, this cultural experience of crisis is particularly significant because of the way it functioned as a heightened expression of affective responses to changing ideas of national identity, which "mapped together" a range of post-1945 changes to British domestic and international politics, social norms, aesthetics and demography, into a singular antipathy to the fact of change itself.

Part of this evolution in the rhetoric of landscape involved contrasting concepts of urban hollowness or emptiness to that of fullness and overcrowding. During this period, cities such as London were no longer described as overcrowded and in need of "overspill" to avoid flooding the countryside with sprawl. Rather, after the impact of the IMF-imposed austerity had hit, new towns in particular were criticised in this period for having been too extravagant in "draining" inner cities of population and of government funding, leaving them "hollow" and in decline. The concept of "inner city decline" or "crisis" most often described a lack of government funding, and while Department of Environment investigations showed that new town programmes had not been funded at the expense of inner-city policy, this causal link continued to be made in media coverage. Compounding this was the finding that population projections made in the South East Study in 1961, which had formed the basis for the expansion of new town and overspill programmes throughout that decade, had not been borne out and therefore dispersal programmes had led to a greater population decline over time. A related use of this rhetoric of "inner city decline" was in euphemistic, racialised terms, which linked the "draining" of white working class populations to the "influxes" of Commonwealth immigration. The relative understanding of white populations being "decanted", only to be "replaced" by migrants, posits a continuity of flows of human movement into and out of the same urban containers; however the presence of immigrant populations was an "inflow" that was understood as foreign and as causally associated with declining imperial status. Even though decades of anxious policies had focused on the need to "decant" and "disperse" populations from inner cities, their very success was now being framed as having created a drought, which in turn had opened more space in British cities for immigrant populations to flow into.

The "hollow" city was a theme taken up by more apocalyptic political readings of political crisis that used this idea of the cities drained of meaning as well as population.

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47 Joe Moran, “‘Stand Up and Be Counted’: Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular Memory”, History Workshop Journal, no. 70 (2010), p.177.
50 Hall et al., Policing the Crisis.
53 “In Confidence: Cost Effectiveness of New Towns”, in Milton Keynes Development Corporation papers (Milton Keynes City Discovery Centre, 1976); Saumarez Smith, “The Inner City Crisis”.
Within this framework, the idea of national heritage as a jewel, a commodity or precious resource contained within particular landscape formations was a common theme — one primarily expressed in terms of its being squandered, lost or eroded. Some of this type of coverage focused on Britain being “drained” through interactions with global economic forces such as the IMF and the EEC, who were described in the Financial Times in 1975 as “drain[ing] away […] Britain’s lifeblood”.56 Two frequently analysed cultural representations of mid-1970s crisis culture, Margaret Drabble’s novel The Ice Age and Hughie Green’s political outburst on the ITV light entertainment programme Opportunity Knocks, both used these languages of national heritage as a commodity or “semi-precious stone” that had been “overspent” through the government’s concession to foreign powers in the form of the IMF loan, leaving the nation emptied of its binding heritage.57 Preservationist campaigns for urban heritage in this period drew on similar frameworks of social meaning as locked within vulnerable landscape forms, with both rural and urban heritage preservation using language of finitude and crisis to justify protection of their chosen sites.58 In coverage of these campaigns, the inability of post-war planned landscapes to contain meaning was a central theme, with their sterility and emptiness explicitly contrasted with the richness of unchanged historic buildings and rural landscapes, which had accumulated generations of social resonances.59

More explicitly left-wing critiques of state planning also emphasised the experience of “slum clearance”, “deindustrialisation” and demographic changes to the form of cities as having eroded the foundations of a sense of identity for white working-class communities. The erosion of “heritage” through dispersal of working class-housing was central to the influential 1960s studies by Peter Willmott and Michael Young, and similar themes were explored in the 1970s journalism of Jeremy Seabrook.60 Seabrook’s work for New Society and New Statesman throughout the 1970s consistently argued that changes in the urban fabric of industrial cities and towns drove experiences of social disconnection amongst white working-class people, which in turn drove them to the absolute rhetoric of the National Front.61 This causal linkage between economic and political disenfranchisement and changing urban demographics was proposed in other broader critiques of Britain’s “declining” industrial power during the late 1970s, including more explicitly right-wing condemnations of the “loss” of industry as a metric of defeat.62

57 Margaret Drabble, The Ice Age (Harmondsworth, 1977), p.215; Turner, Crisis? What Crisis?, pp.54, 104; Moran, “Stand Up and Be Counted”.
Such critiques of post-war paternalism and the rate of social change often presented a causal link between landscape change, existential threat, and adoption of far-right exclusionary identity politics without critique, even where the politics themselves were presented as undesirable. One key example of a critical synthesis of the above themes which nonetheless implicitly reinforced their framework was the 1976 play *Strawberry Fields* by Stephen Poliakoff.63 *Strawberry Fields* is set at roadside motorway sites and service stations, new historical forms that accompanied the growth of Britain’s motorways, rolled out from 1959.64 The main characters are members of a group presented as a conservationist National Front, whose ideology is focused on the maintenance of “historic” boundaries between rural and urban life, and between ethnic groups, as markers of purity and prestige. A final monologue posits that “[if you] scrape back the grass” of an English field, the bones of cumulative previous generations can be seen under the soil; this vitalist reading of national cohesion reads landscape as a mystical bridge between past and present, while the sterile motorway resists such accumulation of meaning.65 This rhetoric is presented as organically deriving from a sense of disconnection from social bonds through witnessing swift urban change, both through the transformation of forms and through post-war immigration. This establishes the premise on a singular narrative of visible difference: where any and all change to Britain’s post-1945 status, or to an ideal of “greatness” however defined, is experienced as grief and loss. This highlights how the political left also reproduced languages of scarcity and overspent landscape finitude, which necessarily drew on racialised and closed heritage and identity narratives.

This well-established framework of understanding national boundaries as a finite container informed Margaret Thatcher’s 1978 Granada TV interview, where she alleged that “people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture”.66 Her phrasing not only very closely mirrored the use of fluidity metaphors from Powell’s 1968 speech, but also mirrored the absolute rhetoric of the nation being subsumed and even eradicated by an external flood. Again, while political and media criticisms of Thatcher’s rhetoric focused on the choice of fluidity metaphor and its implicit violence, there was little criticism of its underlying principle that Britain’s finite containment of an absolute, singular identity risked being lost and subsumed by immigration.67

In “The Great Moving Right Show”, published in 1979, Stuart Hall argued that:

‘Powellism’ won […] because of the magical short-circuits which [it] was able to establish between race and immigration control and the images of the nation, the British people and the destruction of ‘our culture, our way of life’.68

While this connection was made in “Rivers of Blood”, this article has shown that by centering the concept of landscape as a containing force, that Powell drew on a longer rhetorical history, and this continuity helped render it a form of “common sense” which Thatcher was able to draw upon in 1978.69 By grieving the experience of change itself,

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67 For example, Commission for Racial Equality chairman David Lane refuted the language of swamping by emphasising that the numbers were declining, not that swamping was something which could occur. “Immigration Going Down, Says Lane”, *Financial Times*, 3 March 1978, p.8.
generalised critiques of post-war change shared a language of catastrophic flooding, heritage containment, continuity and loss with the far right, and used it in similar ways to characterise the dissolution of social bonds and the failure to reconstitute new ones. The pervasiveness of this language suggests it functioned more deeply than aesthetics, but referred to a shared, racialised understanding of how landscapes actually functioned relative to human movement, and acted as containing forces for a closed, finite and singular national identity that could only experience change as a threat.

Conclusion

While this article was being written, a furore was playing out in British politics around the BBC’s decision to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood speech by broadcasting a re-enactment. Much of the criticism of the speech focused on the way in which the politics it encoded were not “over”, but were actively at work in the present; for example, in the way that on the same days as these debates were taking place, UK Home Office officials were investigating and deporting British citizens who had emigrated from the Commonwealth before 1962, due to their failure to meet retrospectively applied documentary requirements under the “hostile environment” policy implemented by the Conservative-Liberal Coalition government in 2010. This policy intended to drastically cut net migration by introducing more punitive and intrusive checks on immigration status, and was also intended to encourage people who lacked full documentary migration paperwork to “self-deport”, a programme which included the deployment of vans throughout British cities that instructed people in Britain “illegally” to “Go Home”. During the unfolding of what is becoming known as the “Windrush scandal”, it was revealed that the UK Border Agency had destroyed extensive amounts of physical records of migration in 2010, including landing cards from the pre-1971 era that were known to have been crucial documentary evidence of these citizens’ right to remain. In this context, the April 2018 revelations that the Home Office was operating under “deportation targets” which staff were paid bonuses for meeting, indicates the extent to which Powell’s notions of “increasing outflow” had become core Conservative Party policy.

The influence of a Powellite vision of Englishness as fundamentally embattled and in need of protection from external floods was particularly effective in a context of artificial scarcity of state funding imposed through Conservative austerity policies after 2010, in that it allowed the political deflection of blame for under-funded public

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72 See sociological analysis of this campaign in Hannah Jones et al., Go Home? The Politics of Immigration Controversies (Manchester, 2017), available at <http://www.oapen.org/view/?docId=625583.xhtml>.
services onto the over-absorptive bodies of immigrants. The political rise of UKIP and the campaign for a referendum on European Union (EU) membership was explicitly conducted in a language of over-absorptive British borders being violated by floods of European migrants and of Middle Eastern refugees. The notion that Britain could be seen to be “full” was part of this; that EU membership and its commitment to free population movement was rendering Britain vulnerable to “floods” of Eastern Europeans and of refugees fleeing through Europe.

This language is not new; it has a long history, built through the reiteration of ideas of an embattled and vulnerable national whole that must be protected from the faceless, inert and polluting forces of populations who are constructed as dehumanised threats. The pervasive nature of fluidity metaphors, and their power, is what makes attunement to their historical development so crucial. This article does not seek to provide a full map of the complex entanglements of these metaphors’ historical development and use over time. It is intended, however, to highlight some trends in how dehumanising metaphors have functioned and been normalised, and to argue for the importance of a fuller historical investigation of their evolution.

In this context, it is useful to consider in closing that the catastrophic, exclusive use of fluid metaphors is not inevitable. One response from 1968 to Powell’s speech, made by a Birmingham Reverend, suggests that far from being a “river of blood”, a more accurate vision of the Midlands’ future would be one nourished by “clean fresh water made up of the many tributaries of mankind”. This views fluidity not as disastrous, but as invigorating; a future-focused vision which sees the possibility for enrichment through change. While weaponised language cannot be simply overridden with alternative constructions, the convivial image of intermingling and cultural nourishment this vision proposes is a valuable counterpoint to the threat of “swamping”. To interrogate and historicise languages of conclusion is partly to render them contingent; and therefore, to point to ways in which things could be otherwise.

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76 Virdee and McGeever, “Racism, Crisis, Brexit”, pp.5-11.
78 “These things just had to be said”, Birmingham Post, 22 April 1968, p.1.
79 Use of “conviviality” here is after Gilroy; see Postcolonial Melancholia, pp.xv, 99-100.
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