AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY AND US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA

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DECLARATIONS

This is to certify that:

• The thesis comprises only my original work towards the Ph.D
• Due and appropriate acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used.
• The thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, figures and bibliographies.

Christopher W. Freise

April 2017
ABSTRACT

This study focuses on how and why American grand strategy has impacted bilateral US foreign policy towards Indonesia, and the manner in which particularly American characteristics of strategic culture have infused this dynamic relationship. The overall value placed upon Indonesia within US grand strategic considerations has varied considerably in the post-World II period, as too have particular policies that take Indonesia’s changing role into account. Structural realist approaches fail to fully explain these fluctuations of interest towards Indonesia by the United States, as they were influenced but not determined by changes within the international system. As such, strict structural realist explanations can tell only part of the story.

In order to address shortcomings of the structural realist model, these variations in strategic importance and bilateral policy are considered using a neoclassical realist model in order to consider the unique practice and formulation of American grand strategy. Particular attention is paid to the national security and strategic culture in which such strategies are considered, formulated, and evaluated in order to better understand how such policies are understood and made. Such a framework allows for the consideration of the traditional strengths and weaknesses associated with realist scholarship while supplementing these perspectives with a nuanced and historically-oriented viewpoint that evaluates how particularly American characteristics within the formulation and practice of grand strategy influence the relationship of the United States with Indonesia. Historical and contemporary data are evaluated using Green’s “three-note chord” formulation of American grand strategic thought, highlighting the overlapping concerns of physical security, economic security, and the promotion of values within both overall American grand strategy and US bilateral foreign policy towards Indonesia.

Through the consideration of the influence of traditional and historical characteristics of American grand strategy, namely the particular national strategic culture of the United States, a more comprehensive understanding of Indonesia’s changing role within the overall foreign policy framework of the United States can be found. In doing so, it also confirms the theoretical and practical value offered by neoclassical realism within the broader universe of international relations scholarship. Furthermore, this nuanced examination of American strategic culture allows for an insight into what role Indonesia might play in the future of American grand strategy while also pointing to potential sources of future scholarship.
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I would like to acknowledge the Wurundjeri people, and pay respect to their Elders past and present, whose land provided so many of the resources that allowed this project and myself to progress to this stage.

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Figure 1 - Indonesia

Source: CIA World Factbook
CHAPTER 1:

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

In September 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy received a memo, marked secret, from National Security Council aide Robert Komer. It arrived at a testing time for the Kennedy Administration. Domestically, the vexing issue of civil rights threatened to split the Democratic Party and imperil Kennedy’s fragile political coalition, particularly following the high-profile “Freedom Rides” and resulting backlash through the Deep South over the preceding months. The “baby boom” generation of post-WWII children foretold massive societal, regional, and generational divides on issues of race, relations between the sexes, and eventually the Vietnam War. While his personal approval rating remained high and Democrats controlled both chambers of the US Capitol, Kennedy’s razor-thin victory in the 1960 presidential race invigorated the Republican opposition and masked strong intra-party divides. Kennedy’s physical ailments, including chronic bouts of excruciating back pain, added to the difficulty.

Internationally, the situation facing Kennedy was even more concerning. Less than a month before Komer’s memo, the Berlin Wall was erected in the dark of night, immediately becoming a potent symbol of Cold War division. Fidel Castro, having successfully defeated the disastrous American-supported Bay of Pigs invasion earlier in the year, openly aligned Cuba with the Soviet Union and the Communist cause. Kennedy’s shaky performance in his first meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in June – Kennedy said Khruschev “savaged me” and “beat the hell out of me”, while aide Paul Nitze added it was “just a disaster” – left the Soviet
leadership sensing that the young President could be effectively pressured, if not bullied.\textsuperscript{1} This assessment immediately resulted in a far harder Soviet line on Berlin and was a key factor in the high tension of the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later.\textsuperscript{2} Reflecting topics covered during his meeting with Khruschev, NSC meetings in the months before Komier’s memo consistently covered Europe, regional hotspots, nuclear weapons – and Southeast Asia.

For all the understandable popular attention placed upon Europe, Southeast Asia represented one of the primary sources of international concern for Kennedy and his aides. Kennedy keenly understood American interests being under threat across the region, a sense shared by many others. American diplomacy still struggled to understand and adapt to Chinese actions, regionally and globally, more than a decade after the Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious over the Kuomintang. In Laos, civil war had broken out between Communist nationalists and US-backed royalists groups. In Malaya, local and British forces had only recently suppressed a guerrilla-style Communist insurgency active for over a decade. The Republic of Vietnam, created following the 1954 Geneva Accords, found itself under attack internally via the Viet Cong and externally by Democratic Republic of Vietnam forces. Thailand and the Philippines, both treaty allies of the United States, were considered to be at similar risk for potential Communist infiltration and overthrow.

Not wanting to return the discredited colonial structures of the pre-Second World War era but also deeply concerned about the spread of Communism throughout the region, American foreign policy towards Southeast Asia since 1945 attempted, awkwardly, to balance support for decolonization with backing for non-Communist forces. By 1961, its record could be considered mixed at best, a fact Kennedy and his aides readily acknowledged. As the divide between US- and Soviet-led blocs hardened, maintaining this balance became increasingly untenable, particularly as fears over the susceptibility of newly-independent states in the region to Communist influence multiplied. In his inaugural address Kennedy warned of “far more iron tyranny” should the newer states of Asia and Africa embrace Communism, and

\textsuperscript{1} Frederick Kempe, \textit{Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khruschev, and the most dangerous place on Earth} (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2011), 257-8.
\textsuperscript{2} Extensive details of the meeting and its impact are found in the excellent compilation of Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds., \textit{The Vienna Summit and its importance in international history} (Lantham, MD: Lexington University Press, 2014).
established the Peace Corps weeks into his presidency in order to broaden the appeal of non-Communist economic, political, and social development.³

Kennedy and his aides earnestly debated this and other decolonization-related issues upon entering the White House. Existing policy had attempted to buttress Western-aligned forces with increased amounts of military aid and technocratic training while “modernizing” societies. They placed a great deal of importance on one Southeast Asian country in particular – and Kennedy was only the most recent White House occupant to see it as a lynchpin of the entire region. Though mainland Southeast Asia (and Vietnam in particular) dominates American conceptions of Cold War Southeast Asia today, the viability of the non-communist and Western-aligned Republic of Vietnam was only one of several developments within early Cold War Southeast Asia. Landlocked, poor Laos was considered more symbolic than of genuine geopolitical interest, and even American-allied Thailand or Philippines were considered secondary concerns. Instead, throughout the 1950s and 1960s American strategists and policymakers consistently regarded Indonesia as the region’s most important country and a critical bellwether. Indonesia had been a principal focus of Kennedy’s predecessor Dwight Eisenhower, who had provided weapons and logistical support for a short-lived and ill-fated rebellion opposed to Indonesian President Sukarno’s rule in the late 1950s. Before Eisenhower, Harry Truman had personally intervened to provide high-level American support for settlement of the protracted Indonesian independence effort from the Netherlands, to the enormous disappointment of Dutch leaders.

American engagement with Indonesia was anything but accidental, and certainly strategically justifiable. Indonesia’s immensely important geographical position as a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans immediately conferred a degree of importance upon relations with Jakarta that transcended typical Cold War politics. But the political and symbolic value of Indonesia was nonetheless crucial. Indonesia was one of the few former colonial states to successfully fight a war of independence against a European power, and achieving independence in this manner conferred notable status amongst non-Western states. Sukarno leveraged this role to host the inaugural 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, which led directly to

the creation of the anti-colonial Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and was viewed with considerable suspicion by Washington due to its perceived anti-Western bias. If Sukarno serving as a vocal leader of the NAM was not enough cause for concern, the domestic political strength and organization of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) certainly was: by the early 1960s, it was the most organized political entity in Indonesia and had the largest membership of any Communist Party outside of the Soviet Union and China.4

Up to and including Kennedy’s presidency, American interest in Indonesia rested upon a deep concern based primarily on the global geopolitics rather than Indonesia itself, reflecting the all-encompassing nature of the Cold War. If Indonesia become Communist – potentially through a combination of internal change through the PKI, support from Moscow and/or Beijing, and distrust of Western intentions towards Indonesia – it would likely have enormous implications for the region. In such a scenario, the likelihood of maintaining the alignment of existing anti-Communist governments with the West throughout the region seemed slim at best. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) suggested in late 1961 that “no other country in the region could serve communist military strategy” as much as Indonesia, and should Indonesia join the Communist bloc, it could result in “a chain reaction that would culminate in the eventual relinquishment of the principal US military bases in the Far East.”5 Though Kennedy sought to differentiate his approach to Southeast Asia from his predecessors, the “domino theory” unquestionably remained the dominant paradigm for American regional policy.

Worse still, two highly troubling and volatile situations on the ground threatened to push Indonesia further away from the West: Indonesian President Sukarno’s threats to invade Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian), which the Netherlands continued to occupy after Indonesian independence but Sukarno claimed as an integral part of the Indonesian nation, and the increasingly bold and overt steps taken by Sukarno to use Chinese and Soviet military support to press his claims over the territory. Sukarno was strongly supported by the PKI, the domestic strength and

4 A National Security Council report from late 1960 stated that “[t]here are no completely reliable figures on PKI membership, but it probably numbers at least 1,500,000. PKI claims that it is Indonesia’s largest party are probably correct.” Robert J. McMahon, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: Indonesia, vol. XVII (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), Document 193.
popularity of which complicated decision-making calculus considerably. Should Sukarno unilaterally invade the contested area, as he repeatedly threatened to do, Dutch leaders controversially contemplated invoking Article 5 of the NATO charter. Such a decision would potentially require American military support for Dutch forces under the alliance’s collective defence clause. Any such action would certainly inflame political sentiment within Indonesia, further embolden hardline elements within the PKI, and potentially lead to outright alignment with the Communist bloc. Australia, the United Nations-appointed trustee of the eastern portion of the island and a close US ally, nervously watched the unfolding situation. Indonesia’s central importance to American strategic interests throughout Southeast Asia was explicitly summarized by Komer in his September 11, 1961 memo: “What price [for] holding on to mainland Southeast Asia if we have a hostile Indonesia at its back?”

Forty years to the exact day after Komer asked this rhetorical question, the United States faced a far more immediate crisis of a completely different nature. On September 11, 2001, a small group of violent Islamic extremists hijacked four commercial airplanes, crashing them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a remote field in Pennsylvania. The resulting loss of nearly 3000 lives was the largest on American soil since the Civil War, and the effect of these terrorist acts on the conduct of American foreign policy would be immediate, significant, and far reaching. Within a short period of time, American-led forces would invade Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban government, with the resulting “War on Terror” coming to dominate American foreign policymaking over the next decade and beyond. The impact was immediate, profound, and long-lasting. While the failure to develop a clear and defined organizing strategy for post-Cold War foreign policy had been criticized (and occasionally praised) by many, there was little question that the shock of the 9/11 attacks would have a direct and extensive influence on American foreign policy.

Coincidentally, newly inaugurated Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri had been scheduled to arrive in Washington less than two weeks after the 9/11 attacks. She offered to postpone the official visit amidst the initial chaos of the attacks, but the White House insisted the visit continue as planned – indicating the

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6 Keefer, Document 189 (emphasis added).
importance placed upon hosting the leader of the world’s most populous Muslim nation so soon after the shocking attacks. While the full implications of the “War on Terror” would take time to develop, there was very little doubt that Indonesia would play a significant role in the effort for two major reasons. In addition to containing more Muslims than any other country, Indonesia’s history of religious moderation made for a sharp contrast with the radical and violent ideology of Al Qaeda. At least as importantly, the tremendously sensitive geopolitical location of Indonesia made a compelling case for closer relations with Jakarta, particularly due to the suspected links between Al Qaeda and violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia. This became even more necessary following the terrorist bombings on the Indonesian island of Bali a year later. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama repeatedly and strenuously stressed Indonesia’s importance to American foreign policy following the attacks of 9/11. Despite the rhetorical shift of emphasis away from the “War on Terror” under Obama, Indonesia has if anything grown more central to American foreign policy strategy in the region – perhaps best exemplified in the 2010 announcement of a “Comprehensive Partnership” between the two nations and later in the 2015 declaration of an upgraded “Strategic Partnership”.

These developments do not sit in isolation, and while largely declarations of intention rather than specific strategic or policy actions, they nonetheless represent a continuation of Indonesia’s increasingly significant role in American grand strategy since 9/11. US-Indonesian military ties, a particularly thorny issue due to repeated human rights violations by Indonesian forces, were resumed in the aftermath of the devastating December 2004 tsunami. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, though criticized within the region for not attending the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2007, nonetheless made a particular point of emphasizing Indonesia’s importance to regional stability as the Bush Administration sought to actively pursue closer ties with Jakarta. Her successor, Hillary Clinton, stopped in Indonesia on her first foreign trip to signal Jakarta’s importance to the new Obama Administration and was later followed by Obama himself. And while there is little debate that this growing importance reflects, on some level, concerns within both Administrations over the consequences for regional security of China’s rise, there is also no question that the

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imperatives of other aspects of American grand strategy have come to embrace a
closer and higher-profile relationship with Indonesia over the past decade.

For the majority of the time between these two periods described – with some
notable, limited exceptions – the level of American attention towards Indonesia was
remarkably consistent. The waxing interest levels during the crisis years of early-to-
mid 1960s, the post-9/11 “War on Terror” period, or the more recent “Pacific
rebalancing” towards East Asia have been far more the exception as the rule itself.
For long periods between Sukarno’s fall from power in 1965-6 until the 2001 terrorist
attacks, the dominant characteristic of U.S. foreign policy towards Indonesia was
general indifference – a relatively safe indifference, reflecting both regional stability
and soporific (to external observers) state of Indonesian politics, but indifference
nonetheless. One well-placed scholar, near the end of the Cold War, rightly described
Indonesia as being “invisible” to the United States and “unknown to most
Americans”\(^8\). This has been explained by some scholars as indicative of a “benign
neglect” of Southeast Asia following the Vietnam War, and by others as generally
characteristic of Cold War patron-client relations.\(^9\) While offering some explanatory
value, such rationales are insufficient by themselves to explain the larger implications
posed by this shift in focus. How, and why, did Indonesia go from being considered
the most important country of a region central to US security and foreign policy goals
to being an afterthought (and a distant one at that) for American foreign policymakers
– and then return yet again, in fits and starts, to the strategic spotlight over the most
recent decade?

**Research Question**

This project is designed to address this question, specifically the vastly
changing role of Indonesia within American foreign policy and grand strategy
discussions. To fully appreciate this process of change, one must also consider the
process of American foreign policy more generally, and in particular the impact of
American strategic culture in influencing that process. Does Indonesia’s changing
profile within American foreign policy shed light upon particular characteristics of the
US foreign policy formulation process? How can the significant changes in strategic

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\(^9\) Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, "U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement after
attention paid to Indonesia over time by the United States be explained? Does American grand strategy demonstrate a consistent world-view and approach across differing structural and strategic environments? To what degree have indigenous developments within Indonesia itself driven this process of strategic change and reformulation by the United States, rather than independent strategic assessments made in Washington? Have geopolitical risks and concerns been a more consistent driver of strategic attention towards Indonesia than prospects for advancing established interests and goals of American foreign policy? All of these questions are important subsidiary questions and follow from the primary research question of this project: Does a neoclassical realist model that emphasizes the role of strategic culture in American grand strategy formulation explain the variations within U.S. foreign policy towards Indonesia and its impact on the grand strategy-foreign policy relationship better than a traditional neorealist model?

A central component of this examination rests in determining the relative weighting between bilateral foreign policy towards Indonesia and American grand strategy. Numerous scholars have defined grand strategy in myriad ways, but common to most definitions (and one utilized throughout this project) is a common understanding that grand strategy represents the efforts of state policymakers to achieve desired or preferred foreign policy outcomes through the allocation of available (and scarce) resources.\footnote{As Dueck notes, “[t]he task of identifying and reconciling goals and resources – of making difficult trade-offs and setting priorities in the face of potential resistance – is the essence of strategy.” Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 8.} In this sense, grand strategy represents the “biggest picture possible” approach to foreign policy chosen by a particular state – even if this strategy at times is less “chosen” than “settled upon”. In a world of competing demands for scarce resources – and the global environment quite clearly fits this description – grand strategy, put simply, reflects the preferred allocation of resources by a state to meet competing demands. But seeming simplicity of formulation is far from synonymous with ease (or effectiveness) of practice. Such considerations are not always made explicit or public by policymakers – and even when they are, they are scrutinized, criticized, and endlessly debated. Furthermore, deliberations of this sort are constantly being weighed implicitly in the difficult, conflictual world of foreign policy making, a world in which individuals necessarily incorporate preexisting
biases, experiences, and both ideological and practical blind spots. As Lieber states, "grand strategy is the term used to describe how a country will employ the various tools it possesses – military, economic, political, technological, ideological, and cultural – to protect its overall security, values, and national interests."\(^{11}\) Another viewpoint similarly suggests that "grand strategy involves the prioritization of foreign policy goals, the identification of existing and potential resources, and the selection of a plan or road map that uses those resources to meet those goals."\(^{12}\) Such influences can be, and usually are, both stated and unstated.

In the case of Indonesia, American foreign policy has operated on both the grand strategic level of concern as well as the bilateral level, with substantial variations and intensity over time. Indonesia is not Lichtenstein, but neither has it been consistently discussed with a similar level of importance as the Soviet Union or China. Of course, grand strategy must still be operationalized, and when doing so there is no question that bilateral policy options are a primary tool of both the strategist and the policymaker. What is intended by this study, though, is to gauge when and why Indonesia has simultaneously figured into American grand strategy and how this has impacted bilateral foreign policy, in contrast to periods in which Indonesia has played a more limited role in American strategic considerations. In the latter case, it stands to reason that those concerned primarily with bilateral policy towards Indonesia – for instance Indonesia specialists in the State Department, or midlevel military officers potentially involved in bilateral training exercises – have greater scope to act, unconstrained as they might be by larger strategic considerations that have dominated at other times.\(^{13}\) This has frequently varied – at times widely – in relation to the level of perceived threat posed by Indonesia to American foreign policy goals, as well as potential opportunities for American foreign policy gains. Can sense, to say nothing of clarity, be brought to bear on the reasons behind the dramatic variation in strategic attention paid towards Indonesia?

\(^{12}\) Dueck, 1.
\(^{13}\) This is not to suggest that such individuals do not take strategic considerations into account; often country or region specialists are more concerned about larger implications of bilateral policy than others. It is simply to point out that these individuals have a more direct bureaucratic impact on the final formulation of bilateral policy when the extra layers of grand strategy consideration are absent.
In general terms, Indonesia has played a larger role in American grand strategy when it has been considered more important. Conversely, when Indonesia has been perceived to be less important to the overall goals of the United States, routine matters of foreign policy tend to dominate the balance between American grand strategy and American foreign policy towards Indonesia precisely because of Indonesia’s relative absence from grand strategy discussions. While this can admittedly be a somewhat imprecise (and obvious) designation, it is hardly radical to suggest that states considered to be important to others are likely to see this importance reflected in the grand strategy designs of the latter. This remains true even when allowing for problems of strategic misperceptions, lack of accurate information, and the individual bias inherent in this process. This has been seen throughout the relationship between the United States and Indonesia. But such an obvious claim raises many further questions, not least of which is the rather obvious follow-up question: why has Indonesia’s perceived importance to the United States been subject to so much variation over the period in question?

A relatively straightforward argument has been made about Indonesia’s relative importance within overall US foreign policy, emphasizing the estimation of American interests and relative security by the makers of foreign policy. In this telling, Indonesia becomes more important to US grand strategy when American interests either can be advanced on one hand or they are under one form of threat or another. By contrast, Indonesia is less important in such discussions when American interests are neither perceived to be under threat nor are thought to have a chance to be furthered, due to the previously mentioned case of finite resources being deployed to maximize potential results from a state’s grand strategy. Indonesia’s relative prominence within American grand strategy therefore waxes and wanes as the definition of national interests change and evolve over time, as strategic resources are directed towards or are diverted away from Indonesia. These “national interests” can take on different forms, including the pursuit of power, potential for economic opportunity (or exploitation), ideological solidarity, diplomatic negotiations, political horse trading, and potential threat or conflict. While the argument can be made with greater sophistication than the characterization provided here, such a description
nonetheless typically provides the basis for realist-influenced approaches to foreign policy.¹⁴

There is clearly some truth to this explanation. It is axiomatic that state action is based in large part on the understanding and calculation of national interest – but by the same token, it is also not particularly enlightening as a guide to understanding how and why perceptions of Indonesia within American strategic thought have experienced such change over time. There is little predictive value because, in this explanation, American interests are said to be involved when Indonesia matters more, and not when Indonesia matters less. Such explanations can also veer into a rather facile tautology: Indonesia matters more when American interests are involved, and because Indonesia is more important, American interests are more involved. Such an explanation leaves considerable uncertainty over causality, as well as the determination of the dependent and independent variables to be examined. It is generally left unstated in this formulation whether American interests are considered to be the reason why Indonesia matters more at particular periods of time, or American interests are involved because Indonesia is more important – and even if such one position is explicitly chosen, it is particularly difficult to prove that the other side of the equation is not also true. A particularly shaky foundation upon which an argument is constructed leads, most often, to an unstable argument.

More fundamentally, such an approach frequently fails to consider or define exactly what constitutes or comprises American interests. “Interests” too easily becomes an overarching term, devoid of nuance or deliberate discussion of exactly how these are determined, weighed, or evaluated. Alternatively, when interests as such are defined, ensuing discussions frequently cherry-pick particular aspects of American foreign policy that seem to fit particular perspectives, rather than to use American grand strategy as a starting point to determine how interests are defined, explicitly and implicitly, and how these various elements are weighed. As even a

¹⁴ Whether realism provides a theory of foreign policy is one of the most enduring of international relations scholarship, and one clearly beyond the scope of this research project. Kenneth Waltz has regularly and strenuously argued that it does not, but instead represents a theory of international politics. Various critics have maintained that such a distinction is imprecise, not present, or a function of Waltz’s overemphasis on structural factors. The defining text of the discussion remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) while well-known discussions include Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) and Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
basic analysis of the foreign policy process demonstrates, the evaluation of “interests” remains a fundamentally subjective process. In an imaginary world in which all relevant policymakers shared precisely the same understanding of these interests – a far cry from reality – there would still be considerable debate about whether or not particular interests were under threat or could be advanced at particular times. The difficulty in ascertaining what constitutes “interests” and then determining how such opportunities can and should be acted upon has been central to the conundrums of foreign policy analysis since time immemorial.

An alternative explanation for why Indonesia is considered to be more “important” at different times emphasizes the impact of domestic political factors and context upon foreign policy formulation. Rather than using externally-generated, subjectively interpreted “interests” as a way to justify or explain American perceptions of Indonesia, or base analysis upon structural-level variables like Waltzian neorealists, this approach emphasizes the domestic political processes that both inform and impact upon all policy creation, including that of foreign policy. This approach has been described as an Innenpolitik approach to foreign policy.

Foreign policy, after all, is subject to the same sort of coalition building among those involved in the policymaking process as any other field of public policy, whether based on coercion, negotiation, compellance, or some other strategy. As Rosecrance and Stein argue,

> It is, after all, an elementary observation that domestic factors help to explain departures from systemic equilibrium. Grand strategy is public policy and reflects a nation’s mechanisms for arriving at social choices. Moreover, such strategies typically require the commitment of, extraction, and mobilization of societal resources. That domestic, institutional, political, and economic constraints should matter should hardly be surprising.

Policymakers negotiate, wrangle, persuade, threaten, and cajole other individuals and parts of the policymaking apparatus so that desired policy outcomes are achieved or maintained. While the external environment and perceptions of American “interests” clearly play some role in impacting how these policy choices are framed, debated, and evaluated, ultimately the domestic context is the primary

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16 Rosecrance and Stein, 16.
environment in which these debates occur. Foreign policy, in this explanation, is fundamentally a domestically-driven phenomenon.

Once again, such discussions help provide some of the explanatory value behind foreign policy outcomes, as they reinforce the important point that the foreign policy process of individual nations is not a uniform process, immune from domestic policy-making pressures and influences that neorealist analysis seems to suggest. Nameless, generic states do not make foreign policy; the individuals, organizations, bureaucracies, and others influencing such decisions are responsible for the creation of foreign policy. As a result, the neorealist expectation that states facing similar systemic or structural incentives will (or should) make similar decisions is not necessarily valid. At its core, however, foreign policy is not like other domestic policy-making processes, in the sense that it is fundamentally made in response to external stimuli and forces in a way that domestically-oriented policy is not.

Furthermore, such explanations are more the realm of historians than political scientists due to the limited predictive value provided by ex post facto analysis of foreign policy formulation.

A deeper discussion of these respective approaches will occur in later chapters, but at least on the surface there seems to be little common ground between the two approaches described. Clearly, in approaching the nuanced question of Indonesia’s changing importance within American foreign policy, the methodological framework of the research project is of central importance. While both neorealist and Innenpolitik approaches offer some explanatory value, neither adequately explains the wide variations of Indonesia’s significance to American grand strategy and foreign policy by themselves: the most important shifts in American grand strategy towards Indonesia occurred in 1965-6 and in 1998, when little shift in structural power dynamics occurred but instead significant events in Indonesia, not the United States. As such, both realist and Innenpolitik explanations seem to be inadequate, at least in isolation, to explain such variations. Another theoretical approach, however, can be utilized to help explain these developments in a more methodologically and theoretically sound manner. The significant theoretical advances made within the field of neoclassical realism, which incorporates aspects of both realist and Innenpolitik approaches, allows for an intriguing alternative explanation by adding robustness to each theoretical tradition.
Neoclassical Realism

Gideon Rose popularized the term neoclassical realism in his seminal article, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”.¹⁷ Rose suggested that a growing area of scholarship was distinct from traditional, dominant neorealist approaches because while structural level variables provided the initial stimulus for reaction, the actual process of policy formulation was dependent upon domestic level variables. In neorealist terminology, these are referred to as the third level (structural) and second level (unit, or domestic) of analysis, respectively. By combining both levels of analysis into one theory, neoclassical realism therefore represents a distinct approach from existing theories:

[Neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thoughts. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.¹⁸

The impact of the article and related research remain extremely significant. Importantly, neoclassical realism does not specify which domestic-level variables influence the process of foreign policy formulation, but rather posits that there are a number of different domestic-level factors that can explain how states respond to changes in the structural environment. One of the more resilient aspects of this burgeoning field is the flexibility of variables that neoclassical realism allows for incorporation. Rose’s original article reviewed works by several authors that based their analysis of foreign policy first by examining structural-level stimuli but then grounded their conclusions in various unit-level variables.¹⁹ The distinctness of this

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¹⁸ Rose, 146-7.
approach remains in its usage of multiple domestically-based explanations to demonstrate how states responded to these structural-level phenomena, with clear implications for contemporary applicability. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, amongst others, have demonstrated the dynamism of this approach and distinguished it from the traditions of classical and structural realism.20

**Strategic Culture**

One such variable that clearly fits within the neoclassical framework is strategic culture. Scholars of strategic culture argue that, contrary to certain neorealist assumptions, states do not always act in the same manner given a particular set of stimuli or challenges – and therefore neorealist logic may not necessarily apply to states in all circumstances. While the concept itself is hardly a new one, the term “strategic culture” was initially incorporated in a 1977 RAND Corporation report about Soviet behavior regarding nuclear weapons – and how this behaviour may depart from “American-formulated rules of intrawar restraint.” As author Jack Snyder observed,

> Neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, preconception-free game theorists. Soviet and American doctrines have developed in different organizational, historical, and political contexts...As a result, the Soviets and Americans have asked somewhat different questions about the use of nuclear weapons and have developed answers that differ in significant respects....it is enlightening to think of Soviet leaders not just as generic strategists who happen to be playing for the Red team, but politicians and bureaucrats who have developed and been socialized into a strategic culture that is in many ways unique and who have exhibited distinctive stylistic predispositions in their past crisis behavior.21

Scholars have challenged Snyder’s definition of strategic culture from various angles, including rationalist/game-theory perspectives (those assuming the ‘generic strategists’ of nuclear deterrence that Snyder sought to caution) and those seeking greater theoretical and operational clarity than the typical modesty allowed by “cultural” explanations. It also spawned a vibrant internal debate between competing strategic culture perspectives as the field of research developed. It remains the most notable first argument in what has become a crowded field of inquiry following

20 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin P. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
several decades of research and debate. Nonetheless, Snyder’s most significant observation – that when facing similar structural, strategic, or tactical circumstances, those responsible for making national security and foreign policy decisions for individual states may respond differently than those of other states – has proven one of the more uncontroversial aspects of Snyder’s initial report for all but the most dedicated structural realists and provided a template for future discussion. At its heart, this fundamental observation is highly conducive and indeed complementary to the insights of neoclassical realism and allows for the strengths of different theoretical approaches to be incorporated.

Snyder defined strategic culture as the “sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community…share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.” Booth later expanded upon this definition, arguing that strategic culture “refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.” Others have provided more definitions, some of which remain largely in line with Booth’s findings. At the time of Snyder’s report, grand strategy was considered primarily, if not exclusively, the province of military strategists due to both custom and the imminence of Cold War national security imperatives. Evolving definitions of strategic culture and grand strategy will be discussed in greater detail, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, definitions of grand strategy have generally become far more inclusive to incorporate both military and non-military aspects of foreign policy, as suggested in the brief discussion of grand strategy earlier. If the First World War instilled a new importance behind discussions of strategy and the Second World War placed it at the center of national

23 Some realists have explained deviations from the “expected” behaviour of states as deriving from particular cultural explanations. For instance, the importance placed on democracy promotion by the United States (and more generally American exceptionalism) has long rankled realists – even as the persistence of such criticisms speaks to its longevity and continued impact. Of many works, Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008) offers such a perspective.
24 Snyder, 8.
policy discussions, the Cold War and afterwards involved an unmistakable
definitional broadening. As Joffe has noted, “Grand strategy is a design that relates
means, and not just military ones, to ends, and ambitions to outcomes - what must a
nation do in order to get what it wants or keep what it has?”

If discussions of strategy, in the strictest sense, were once confined to the
battlefield(s) of war, they certainly are no longer. Taking this into account, the
“strategic culture” arguments and insights of Snyder and others can be readily applied
to the broader definitions of grand strategy prevalent in the late- and post-Cold War
eras, precisely because of the inherent adaptability in their formulation, deployment,
and conception. Furthermore, in the period from the end of the Second World War
until the present-day – the period examined in this research project, though a longer
timeframe would yield comparable results – American grand strategy has
unquestionably demonstrated particular and recurring characteristics, despite vastly
different structural environments and power projection capabilities of different
varieties. Can such consistency be attributed to particular and/or distinctive
characteristics of the American strategic culture approach towards grand strategy?

It is one hypothesis of this research project that the answer to this question is a
definitive, if qualified, yes. Scholars from a wide range of ideological, theoretical, and
methodological backgrounds have reached many differing conclusions about what the
common characteristics, desirability, and consequences of American grand strategy
have been. These range from the highly praiseworthy to the deeply damning and
everything in between, covering an extremely diverse set of perspectives and
conclusions. Some of these will be discussed and addressed in greater depth in later
chapters, particularly Chapters 6 and 7. The consistency in finding such common
themes, even when doing this results in differing conclusions, suggests a degree of
consistency to American foreign policy that, at the very least, allows methodological
space for strategic culture to be considered as a possible explanation. The differing
conclusions about what the nature and content of this strategic culture represents
allows for multiple explanations. The impact of a particularly American strategic
culture upon the formulation of both “big picture” US grand strategy and bilateral
foreign policy towards Indonesia has had substantial impact upon the observed

26 Josef Joffe, Überpower: the Imperial Temptation of the United States  (New York: W.W. Norton,
2006), 128.
relationship between these two levels of analysis. The characteristics of American strategic culture, as suggested by Green, continue to impact US policy towards Indonesia, with notable deviations from a structural realist model that does not take into account intervening domestic-level variables. As suggested, this represents one of the most significant contributions of neoclassical realist analysis.

The strategic culture of American grand strategy utilized in this study follows from the work of Michael J. Green and others, who have argued persuasively that American grand strategy, during the Cold War and afterwards, has consistently demonstrated three major characteristics: a concern for physical safety, economic security, and the promotion of values considered central to American interests. At different times and under different circumstances, the balance between these three major elements of American grand strategy has been varied, and at times significantly so, but present all the same. While the exact weighting of these different concerns has reflected the pressing concerns of the moment, all three elements have nonetheless been consistently and persistently defining components of American approaches to grand strategy. As Green argues, this consistent presence represents America’s “three-note chord” approach to grand strategy:

A mix of idealism and realism has always driven US foreign policy in East Asia. From the birth of the republic, presidents have returned consistently to the same three-note chord that describes US interests in the Pacific: physical security, economic prosperity, and the promotion of values...while the chord has been the same for over 200 years, at times one of the three notes have drowned out the other two. Nevertheless, the interplay of security, economic and democratic interests in American foreign policy has unfolded with a logic that suggests that the end of the Cold War did not – and will not – lead to a new prioritization of these interests.27

While many other scholars have reached related conclusions, Green’s analysis remains persuasive for its restrained clarity. He clearly does not claim that American grand strategy has flawlessly or evenly balanced these three elements over time. But despite this difficulty in implementation, the formulation of American grand strategy has nonetheless borne aspects of all three elements over time to differing degrees. Given the vastly different structural differences over this period, it stands to reason that an influence upon grand strategy formulation such as strategic culture could be a

contributing factor towards this consistency. This has been described as a three-chord note of American grand strategy, employing aspects of physical security, economic security, and values. It is the hypothesis of this project that the continuing influence of strategic culture on American grand strategy formulation – the everlasting source of the three-chord note described by Green – provides a more resilient and ultimately more accurate explanation for Indonesia’s changing role in American grand strategy considerations than a traditional neorealist explanation. It also provides important explanatory value in addressing the relationship between American grand strategy and U.S. foreign policy towards Indonesia.

**Structure**

In order to address this hypothesis adequately, this research project is organized using the following structure. Following this introduction, the theoretical background and development of grand strategy scholarship will allow for a greater understanding of the scope of this project. This will include a review of relevant sources discussing grand strategy scholarship, particularly as they relate to the research question. It is important to chart the evolution of the term ‘grand strategy’ over the course of the 20th century in order to define in clear terms the scope to this research project. Included in this chapter will be a discussion of the various criticisms of the concept of grand strategy itself, as well as the defining distinctions to be utilized in this project between grand strategy and foreign policy. A discussion of strategic culture and the influence this has on both the formation and implementation of grand strategy will also provide valuable context for this study’s research question.

Having set bounds within the realm of grand strategy scholarship, the following chapter will discuss the evolution of American foreign policy towards Indonesia throughout the Cold War. This will be done in order to provide historical context to the evolution of American foreign policy as well as noting the most significant events in this relationship, which included the tenuous struggle for Indonesian independence and the murky but unquestionably significant events of 1965-6. The United States played a major role in Indonesia’s successful struggle for independence from the Netherlands after World War Two, though the relationship between Jakarta and Washington was far from smooth in the decade that followed. Relations reached a nadir following covert American support for ill-fated rebellions that threatened the territorial integrity of Indonesia in the late 1950s and had hardly
recovered before Sukarno’s policy of escalating tensions (konfrontasi) took hold. Cold War tensions, a rapidly deteriorating political and economic environment in Indonesia, and unmistakable societal fissures eventually led to Suharto’s seizure of power from Sukarno and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party as a political force in 1965-6. While significant events such as the 1975 invasion of East Timor by Indonesian forces would bring considerable attention to Jakarta, post-1965 American foreign policy towards Indonesia rarely rose to the levels of strategic attention it had regularly garnered in the first two decades of the Cold War.

A further chapter will address American foreign policy towards Indonesia following the end of the Cold War and the uneasy transition period that followed Suharto’s fall from power. While Suharto retained a tacit degree of American support through the 1990s, it was nonetheless clear that his hold on power was increasingly under pressure domestically and from Washington. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8 struck Indonesia with devastating intensity, with violent protests eventually culminating in Suharto’s fall from power after over three decades. This critically important event brought American strategic attention once again to Indonesia, for both negative and positive reasons: the rapid and interconnected consequences of economic collapse in an era of globalization, as well as the introduction of Indonesian democracy amidst the reformasi movement. American strategic attention would return immediately to Indonesia following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 for security-related reasons, but Indonesia’s status as an emerging democracy was central to the development of closer bilateral relations during the second term of President George W. Bush and under President Barack Obama. While the rise of China is unquestionably part of the reason for some of this bilateral warming, it fails to fully explain the strategic rationale for Indonesia’s renewed importance in Washington’s eyes.

A final historically-oriented chapter will cover the roughly decade long period that includes the historic election of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the presidency of Barack Obama, who entered office seen as the most Indonesian-friendly president in American history due to the childhood years he spent in Jakarta. It also discusses the preceding second presidential term of George W. Bush, during which important if relatively uncelebrated shifts towards a closer relationship with Indonesia occurred, developments that Obama would later attempt
to build upon. While the two American leaders each brought differing political traits, ideologies, interests, and coalitions to the White House, there was nonetheless a far greater amount of overlap between the two relating to Indonesia than is commonly understood. Such continuity, even at a time of deep partisan division on nearly all matters of domestic and foreign policy, suggests that many of the characteristic traditions of American grand strategy are far less the result of political, ideological, or event-driven opportunism and instead a reflection of long term characteristics common to the strategy process implemented by both.

Having discussed the evolution of American foreign policy towards Indonesia both during and following the Cold War, the following chapter will shift gears to describe the unique and distinctive characteristics of American grand strategy towards East Asia. Despite enormous changes in the international environment since 1945, American grand strategy during this period has retained remarkable consistency, suggesting that the ongoing strategic culture in which American grand strategy is discussed, implemented, and evaluated offers a valuable potential explanation. While aspects of realism (and proponents of “offensive” and “defensive” variants) clearly have some explanatory value, the vastly different structural environments of the Cold War, the 1990s, post-9/11 and today suggests that the consistency of American grand strategy requires an explanation that extends beyond the characteristics of the structural environment. Specifically, the defining elements of American grand strategy that have been so consistently demonstrated stress the importance of physical security, economic security, and values over time. While these aspects are weighted differently based on circumstances, all three components – the three chord note of American grand strategy described by Green – remain ever-present in a variety of forms.

In order to make sense of Indonesia’s changing role in American grand strategy and the manner in which American strategic culture influences this formulation, the next chapter will synthesize the findings of previous chapters and directly address the proposed research question. This will be evaluated in context and in relation to the proposed hypothesis, which is that Indonesia’s changing role within American grand strategy can be better explained by a neoclassical realist model emphasizing American strategic culture than by a strictly structural realist approach. It will evaluate the relative importance of Indonesia’s democratic transition upon
Indonesia’s role in American grand strategy, heavily influenced as it is by Green’s “three-note chord”. It will also discuss how the American-Indonesian relationship has suffered from neglect in the past, and what this might look like in the future. A concluding section summarizes the current state of the American relationship with Indonesia, and where this might head under the respective presidencies of Donald Trump and Joko Widodo, as well as a brief discussion of potential areas of future theoretical, methodological, and country-specific research based upon these findings.

There is little question that recent years have witnessed Indonesia playing a more central role in American grand strategy, even if overall knowledge of the country by the American public remains relatively low. In many ways, this reflects a return to the past on both counts: the importance of Indonesia to American grand strategy during the 1950s and particularly the early 1960s, while retaining the low profile of the late Cold War. This has been attributed to a number of factors, including geopolitical, strategic, economic, and security reasons. Clearly, all of these have played some role, as have the “War on Terror” and Indonesia’s imperfect but nonetheless noteworthy democratic transition. This research project assesses not just factors that have come up episodically within American grand strategy, but more fundamentally examines how these grand strategy formulations reflect deeper aspects of how the United States and its leaders formulate policy. In order to do so, one must appreciate questions related to the “what”, “why”, and “how” of foreign policy strategy development.
CHAPTER 2:

GRAND STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

“No plan extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy.”

-Helmut von Moltke

“Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear.”

-Edmund Burke

As the name suggests, “grand strategy” conceptually represents the most important and fundamental concerns of foreign policy study. Studies of the subject are typically not short on ambition, perhaps necessarily so due to the challenge in encompassing and describing the totality of a nation’s approach to the international environment. In theoretical and practical terms grand strategy has only relatively recently received attention from scholars and policymakers in a comprehensive manner, even if the actual concept and practice of strategically balancing the ends and means of statecraft has predated the existence of states themselves. Indeed, the scholarship surrounding grand strategy seems to be surging and has been increasingly applied to numerous case studies of ancient and more recent history. Necessarily, the vast scope of a nation’s grand strategy is subject to a wide range of influences. The international environment typically remains a critical initial determinant of state behavior, but the various heuristic, material, and other biases inherent within a particular nation’s policy-making elite can have considerable influence and therefore

1 Helmut von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, Daniel Hughes, ed. (Presidio Press, 1995), 92.
3 One example of grand strategy’s recent popularity is former diplomat Charles Hill’s application of a literature-based “Great Books” style approach to the subject. See Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
require deeper consideration. Such constraints, intentional or not, frequently result in important deviations from the strict expectations of neorealist theory.

**Purpose of Chapter**

This chapter attempts to address the following issues. While not inconceivable, the possibility of war between great powers has become comparatively unlikely – certainly when compared to the often conduct of the Cold War diplomacy of the mid and late 20th century, or the many centuries before it. As challenges have changed, the process of strategic choice has evolved accordingly. As a result, the constituent elements of grand strategy have expanded to increasingly include explicitly non-military considerations. While military factors still represent a critically important component of grand strategy, they represent a proportionately smaller share of its overall composition than in the decades following World War II, a development of clear theoretical and practical significance.

Discussions of grand strategy have become a major topic of foreign policy debate in recent years within popular, policy, and academic circles for a host of reasons. The elusiveness of the term’s definition has contributed in part to this, as has the immense difficulty in both defining and implementing such a far-reaching, comprehensive approach to the totality of a nation’s approach to international affairs. So, too, has the changing nature of foreign policy in the decades following the Cold War. Within this chapter, the virtues of a methodological approach based upon the insights of neoclassical realism will be discussed, emphasizing the importance of multi-level analysis when evaluating and determining such broad strategic considerations. Neoclassical realism suggests that while material changes in international politics represent the best initial explanation for explaining why and how states act in the international arena, the manner in which they do is influenced heavily by domestically based variables. These explanations can take many different forms; one such explanatory variable is the culture in which matters of national security are weighed and evaluated. While this culture is neither immutable nor necessarily definitive, the overall context and environment in which such decisions are made are nonetheless significant and require examination. The broad theoretical outlines of grand strategy and strategic culture scholarship – what Quinn, Dueck and others have
described as an approach of “national ideology”⁴ – will be considered with a following chapter to discuss how American grand strategy has taken shape in the Asia-Pacific since the Second World War.

**Grand Strategy**

Amidst the many competing and contradictory impulses facing a country like the United States, the process of formulating – to say nothing of implementing – an overarching strategic approach to a nation’s international relations is a notoriously complicated task. Captive to the sudden unpredictability of events around the world, subject to the vagaries of history and past policies, and highly dependent upon complex systems comprised of autonomous actors and organizations with very different motivations and goals, the notion of composing an all-encompassing approach to national foreign policy can seem quixotic. This is particularly true when von Moltke’s famous maxim regarding “plans” not extending beyond the first encounter with an enemy is considered.

It is certainly true that such exercises are subject to constant examination, based upon the chaotic challenges and particular thinking of the day. The enormous impact of the September 11th attacks upon American foreign policy serve as only one prominent example of the immense and often immediate changes in circumstances that foreign policy planners frequently confront, as well as the considerable impact of individual idiosyncrasies of policymakers. As a superpower with uniquely global interests, the United States has arguably the greatest need for a strategic plan that effectively (and therefore selectively) prioritizes the opportunities and challenges of the international environment. Tactical contingencies abound, but it is strategy that attempts to make sense of the competing demands on state resources, attention, and priorities. Weighing such considerations is the business of statesmanship; implementing them requires using the tools of statecraft.⁵ That the formulation and implementation of national strategies is a complicated, difficult task hardly serves as an excuse for avoiding such efforts. The growing use of “war gaming” exercises – which does not necessarily involve actual simulations of “war” but rather particularly

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⁴ For instance, see Adam Quinn, *US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine* (London: Routledge, 2010) and Dueck, 15-16.

⁵ Statecraft is the “use of assets or the resources and tools (economic, military, intelligence, media) that a state has to pursue its interests and to affect the behavior of others, whether friendly or hostile…It involves making sound assessments and understanding where and on what issues the is being challenged and can counter a threat or create a potential opportunity or take advantage of one.” Dennis Ross, *Statecraft* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007), p. x.
designed scenarios intended to promote and test strategic decision making and policy alternatives – at numerous levels of public, private, and military institutions attests to the understood importance of developing such strategic thinking and skill sets.

As discussed, individuals at all levels often define the term grand strategy quite differently – well before prescriptions of policy are taken into account. The transition from a largely military-oriented basis to a more inclusive definition focused on the wide array of statecraft tools available to leaders has been one of the more significant developments in recent international politics, but with this diversity have come even greater conceptual challenges. The basic idea behind the concept, however, remains relatively simple. Grand strategy, as Posen suggests, involves “a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself”. Similarly, to cite another commonly-used definition, the “full package of domestic and international policies designed to increase national power and security” has for nearly all states broadened as states tend to have a variety of goals – both militarily-based, as traditional definitions of grand strategy would assume, but also those requiring a far more expansive definition of “security” than existed during the Cold War or before it.

For the purposes of this study, a relatively straightforward model of grand strategy development is used that emphasizes the role of the executive branch in determining and implementing American grand strategy. Where distinct intra-executive rivalries exist – such as between the Departments of State and Defense, for instance – they will be discussed, but the model focuses largely upon the executive branch as the ultimate arbiter of strategy. Exclusive consideration of the executive is not appropriate in all cases, and the unitary executive formulation assumed by many is belied by innumerable examples of frequently crippling bureaucratic rivalries between Administration figures, and often within specific agencies or departments. The wide variety of influences both inside and outside the executive branch on grand strategy, as with other aspects of the foreign policymaking process, has been well established

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7 Christensen, 7
8 Accounts of bureaucratic conflict (with or without the White House’s involvement) have filled countless tomes and memoirs. President Gerald Ford offered a perceptive insight to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger amidst State and Defense Department disagreements over the controversial SALT treaty. Referring to Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger, he told Kissinger “Jim’s fight is not with you but with me. He thinks I am stupid, and he believes you are running me, which he resents. This conflict will not end until I either fire Jim or make him believe he is running me.” Peter W. Rodman, *Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2009), 88.
by numerous scholars and studies. Similarly, the notion of the “national security executive” should be understood as somewhat of a theoretical simplification of what is frequently a complex bureaucratic organization composed of actors often with quite different incentives, perspectives, and procedures.

Alternative policy models do exist, such as those driven by bureaucratic politics or the particular political circumstances and motivations of individual leaders. Nonetheless, a relatively generalized, executive-centred approach to foreign and strategic policy offers several inescapable advantages. In the case of the United States, the President remains the most obvious, public, and influential agenda-setter within modern American politics regardless of personal standing. This is truer on issues of foreign policy than in any other realm – the office’s occupant is referred to as the Commander in Chief for a reason. Secondly, the use of the presidential bully pulpit and the growth of the executive branch throughout the 20th century have allowed effective scope for presidents to set strategy rhetorically while also allowing substantial bureaucratic latitude and means to implement it: even when the attendant challenges of managing that bureaucracy are considered, the chief administrator of the “national security state” maintains enormous latitude. Thirdly, through the explicit powers of the Constitution, the implicit understandings inherent within the modern presidency, and as the nation’s only nationally-elected official, the President’s unique mandate allows the opportunity to surpass any other single institution in determining the nation’s interactions with and approach to the rest of the world. Congress, which historically has played a significant role in the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs, maintains an important political and statutory role in this process. But it remains a secondary one in matters of foreign policy generally, and even more so when it comes to large-scale strategy. Blocking, modifying, or opposing a Presidential agenda

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9 Schweller uses a neoclassical realist framework to examine examples of “underbalancing” against potentially hostile powers. He attributes this in part to domestic political factors that limit the policy options and implementation abilities of the executive branch. See Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 46-68.

10 Though many have discussed aspects of the development of the “national security state”, Friedberg is noteworthy for his analysis of the particularly American political characteristics of its development in the early Cold War. See Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
necessarily remains a far more modest and targeted Congressional preoccupation than actively setting forth and implementing viable alternatives.\footnote{Legislatures can effectively promote, obstruct, and influence foreign policy initiatives depending on the circumstances; in the American case, Congress’s most powerful tools are the appropriations process and oversight responsibilities. Two recent examples include the withdrawal of Congressional funding to Nicaraguan rebels (followed by a funding ban via the Boland Amendments) in the 1980s over strenuous Reagan Administration objections and Congress’s refusal to appropriate money for the United Nations in the late 1990s due to the perceived reluctance of the United Nations to reform. Both are discussed in Bert A. Rockman, "Reinventing What for Whom? President and Congress in the Making of Foreign Policy," \textit{Presidential Studies Quarterly} 30, no. 1 (2000): 133-54. Such actions rarely rise to the level of effectively setting grand strategy designs, or even effectively obstruct executive branch preferences. Institutionally and culturally, the Congress is not well established, positioned, inclined, or organized to do so. Many have noted this; commentary from a former leading Congressional participant can be found in Lee H. Hamilton and Jordan Tama, \textit{A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress} (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002).}

Generally, grand strategy is assumed to play a primary role in a state’s national and international profile. States have finite resources at their disposal; the manner in which these resources are mobilized and deployed therefore is necessarily an important marker of a state’s intentions and goals. Just as important are those resources and issues excluded from this process. While the development of grand strategy is unflatteringly compared to sausage-making – with many different (and diverse) inputs leading to a final product unrecognizable to the original ingredients, through not an especially attractive process – even a conscious non-decision on grand strategy represents a certain prioritization of state resources, albeit one that may be prone to drift and lack direction.\footnote{Samuel Berger, National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton (and later Ambassador to Afghanistan under President Obama), cited this criticism of grand strategy, preferring to “worry about today today and tomorrow tomorrow” and suggesting that “most ‘grand strategies’ are were after-the-fact rationales for ad hoc decisions”. Berger claimed to have been misquoted. R.W. Apple, "A Domestic Sort with International Worries," \textit{New York Times}, Aug 25 1999, A1. In explaining the lack of Congressionally-mandated National Security Strategy documents under President Obama, National Security Advisor Susan Rice similarly commented that long-term strategy documents “would have been overtaken by events two weeks later”. Mark Lander, "Obama Could Replace Aides Bruised by a Cascade of Crises," \textit{ibid.}, Oct 29 2014.} While some have challenged the coherent composition of a grand strategy as unrealistic or even inadvisable,\footnote{Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?,” \textit{International Security} 25, no. 2 (2000).} there is little doubt that the process of ordering and applying of national means to fit particular challenges or reflect the preferences of policymakers is an extremely important process to study. Ideally, it allows for a studied consideration of the how and why of state actions in the international environment.

While not the first to attempt such an effort, the Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz was responsible for the most significant early modern contributions to
what became known as grand strategy. Describing war as “nothing but the
continuation of state policy by other means”\textsuperscript{14}, Clausewitz sought to ground the
tactical aims of warfare in a larger political context. Leaders, be they generals or
politicians, must be capable of balancing the short-term (tactical) situation against the
larger strategic goals they seek to advance, lest the immediacy of the moment cause a
fracturing of long-term perspective. At the same time, however, Clausewitz had a
specific audience in mind – namely, the military elite, rather than their putative
political masters. Open to wide interpretation, Clausewitz’s ideas on the linkage
between military strategy and tactics would become extremely influential following
his death and represent one of the clearest early efforts to evaluate the priorities of the
state with the resources available. Strachan has described Clausewitz’s approach to
strategy:

\begin{quote}
Strategy was ‘the use of engagement for the object of the war’...Its focus was
the conduct of a campaign with a theatre of war, not the overall purpose of the
war, and it was therefore a matter for generals, not politicians...Strategy was
what gave fighting significance; it exploited success on the battlefield and it
created the conditions for the next battle, while victory itself was gained
through combat and therefore was a matter of tactics.'\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Grand strategy would retain a primarily martial basis throughout the first half
of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as the growing complexity of “total warfare” in the First and
Second World Wars emphasized primarily civilian considerations like societal
morale, economic production, and propaganda that stretched beyond the reach of
military leaders.\textsuperscript{16} The advent of mechanized infantry and air power gave greater
importance to the practice of logistics. The difficult act of balancing the military and
political aims of warfare – and the frequent overlap between the two – resulted in
strategic considerations being stretched beyond the confines of the battlefield. British
military commentator Captain Basil Liddell Hart, writing in the aftermath of the First
World War, criticized Clausewitz’s advocacy of “absolute” warfare and concluded the
slavish adoption of the Prussian’s ideas bore considerable responsibility for the
tragedies of the First World War. Hart, in \textit{The British Way in Warfare}, advocated an

Emphasis original.
\textsuperscript{15} Hew Strachan, \textit{Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography} (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 2008), 106-7..
\textsuperscript{16} Of course, numerous historical examples that emphasise the non-fighting aspects of warfare exist;
one quip, popularly attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, suggested that “an army marches on its
stomach”, emphasizing the need to take such logistical considerations into account when considering
military options. A popular take on the relationship between food supply and Napoleon’s tactics is
“indirect approach” towards warfare that would later influence the development of German *blitzkrieg* tactics of World War II.\(^{17}\)

This should not be overstated: such considerations influenced military conflict since ancient times. What changed was the explicit process by which such factors were evaluated. At base, it is important to remember that considerations of grand strategy were developed, implemented, and evaluated through a mostly military prism. Hart emphasized the link between the conduct of war and the nature of the desired peace, something he argued Britain’s leaders during World War One had failed to appreciate. These still reflected an outcome based in war itself. Others, including Edward Mead Earle, saw a broader purpose behind grand strategy. He defined strategy as “the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation – or a coalition of nations – including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”\(^{18}\) In doing so, Earle “massively extended the realm of enquiry about ‘grand strategy’ to encompass national policies in peacetime as well as wartime.”\(^{19}\)

Grand strategy during the Cold War continued this trend. The eventual development of enormous nuclear arsenals by the United States and the Soviet Union served, in different ways, to simultaneously broaden and diminish the scope of grand strategy concerns. While containment, the guiding (if flexibly applied and interpreted) principle of American Cold War foreign policy, prescribed non-military means for success, the overriding dangers posed by a Soviet attack (nuclear or conventional) remained a primary consideration. In a vindication of Clausewitz, the political implications of the nuclear weapons threat took on new value. Game theory, a field of economics that developed throughout the 1950s and emphasized the iterative approach and logic of strategic calculations, became closely linked to considerations of security and strategy. The reality of the bipolar standoff meant that grand strategy remained a principally military concern, as political goals were largely subsumed within the fundamental and nonnegotiable imperative of avoiding nuclear war at all costs – and should it occur, “winning” was non-negotiable. In game theory terms, this represented the very definition of a zero-sum game.

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Following the gradual resolution of Europe’s “German problem” after World War II – continued partition between East and West Germany within their respective military blocs, with neither German state in possession of nuclear weapons – the chance of direct conflict involving nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States diminished, while never vanishing.\(^{20}\) Tensions rose notably on several occasions and nuclear conflict remained a possibility throughout the Cold War, though the gravity and significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to serve as a salutary warning to both Washington and Moscow of the immense dangers posed by nuclear arsenals that remained on a hair trigger. The reality of the nuclear superpower state meant that nuclear strategic planning would remain a consideration for military planners and grand strategists alike, but Kennedy’s doctrine of “flexible response” was one example of attempted de-escalation even before the crisis over missiles based in Cuba. As the strategic and tactical arsenals available to leaders grew, so did the scope of grand strategy. Though these immense means were still militarily-oriented, the desired ends were increasingly political goals that grew beyond the purview and remit of military leaders for the very reason that actual usage of such weapons necessarily involved unacceptable, unimaginable costs under any circumstances. The likelihood of mutually assured destruction and nuclear holocaust should nuclear weapons be used broadened the tools available to American leaders as grand strategy was considered, as the abstract logic of nuclear strategy rendered itself obsolete. The space allocated for non-military means within national strategy grew precisely because of the incomprehensible destruction military confrontation entailed.

This continued throughout the Cold War, if somewhat irregularly.\(^{21}\) International challenges in the later years of the Cold War increasingly stretched beyond the confines of military security as the nuclear arsenals of Washington and Moscow had long surpassed any feasible (planned) use in all but the most outlandish


\(^{21}\) Citing declassified documents, Hoffman has detailed the Soviet program to automatically launch retaliatory nuclear weapons if Soviet leadership was disabled or incapacitated: a so-called “Dead Hand” or “Doomsday” launch capacity, reminiscent of Kubrick’s film “Dr. Strangelove”. A nightmarish test of that system occurred in 1983 at a time of particularly high tension, when Soviet early-warning satellites mistakenly reported incoming nuclear weapons from the United States. The ranking Soviet missile technician, Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, disobeyed standing orders and refused to launch countermeasures after deciding the warnings were false alarms. See David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: the Untold Story of the Cold War arms race and its Dangerous Legacy* (New York: Doubleday, 2009).
scenarios. Military considerations and decisions had developed an importance far beyond the battlefield – which itself became outdated as the “nuclear triad” of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), nuclear-armed submarines, and strategic bombers grew capable of striking anywhere on the globe. The 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods global financial architecture, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, US-Japan trade tensions in the late 1970s and 1980s – to name three examples – all reflected structural shortcomings in the practice of US military strategy, in part because they were removed from more traditional considerations of grand strategy. The collective impact, nonetheless, was immense. They also reflected the increasingly “interdisciplinary” nature of many global challenges as economic and political considerations became intertwined with security issues. The scope of grand strategy, unsurprisingly, once again stretched.

The most important reason that grand strategy has grown substantially beyond its original basis in military and security policy relates to the unlikelihood of war between great powers. It is relevant to note that Clausewitz’s theorizing on strategy grew out of the devastating collective experience of the Napoleonic Wars. During the latter part of the Cold War, and to a far greater degree following the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the probability of open warfare between the Soviet Union and the United States was relatively low (with a few notable exceptions), itself a reflection of the unimaginable destruction any such war would likely involve. Had grand strategy continued to reflect only a narrow base in military theory, there would still be some (if fleeting) value in continuing the exercise. But it would hardly reflect the linkage between all ends and means that serves as the basis for grand strategy today.

Recent scholarship has largely accepted and promoted this definitional broadening to include increasingly non-military means. Critics have duly noted that this has come at some cost to the intellectual and practical coherence of the term, as the tools of grand strategy have expanded to the point of including many more means at a nation’s disposal. As such, the wide array of choices available to statesmen in the

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22 Vietnam War expenditures caused a balance of payments crisis that led to the abandonment of the gold standard by Washington in 1971; the OPEC boycott was triggered to punish the United States for its support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War; and trade tensions with Japan reflected unresolved questions of burden-sharing and the post-war security umbrella, as well as structural trade issues.

23 Writing in 1946, Bernard Brodie expressed this poignantly: “thus far, the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.” As quoted in Kennedy, 179.
modern global environment has stretched and redefined previous practice. The challenge is organizing these tools in the pursuit of one or more strategic considerations, whether consciously or not. One must recall that Clausewitz’s intention was to do the very same thing on no less modest a scale, but in an immediate post-Napoleonic context. The most relevant difference involves the external environment, a key consideration for any strategist. Clausewitz had in mind an environment in which strategic aims must be balanced amidst Great Power competition and open warfare. The modern strategist faces a similar challenge on a broad scale, but with the principal difference being the prevention of Great Power warfare in the first instance. While this is significant, competition between nations and the difficult weighing of options available to a state is hardly a thing of the past. The tools and vocabulary of grand strategy have changed, but in most other ways Clausewitz would not be out of place in the modern world of grand strategy considerations that he did much to foster.

**National Strategic Culture**

Nations clearly have distinct, varying, and frequently contradictory goals within the international environment and global order. The predominance of American military strength and American power more generally has been alternatively a cause for celebration, caution, consternation, and condemnation. The “Global War on Terror” precipitated a wide range of conclusions and actions, with many believing the effort is more about sustaining US military might or, alternatively, constituted an American-led “crusade” against Islam rather than the prevention of further attacks. During the Cold War, even amidst the supposedly collegial councils of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a wide range of views (and subsequent diplomatic conflicts) emerged between putative allies about the nature of the Soviet threat and the desired strategic response to it – and given the stakes at play, serious doubts regularly emerged about the alliance’s future throughout the Cold War. Continued existence today belies a seemingly harmonious existence and history.

Realists broadly posit that these varying perspectives are reflective of differences within and amongst the material strength of nations. Military and economic considerations motivate nations to maximize their own security. In a highly competitive world in which national survival is both paramount and not positively guaranteed, the elusive search for security is the predominant concern of national
leaders. Rational, detached decision-making based upon the international environment dominates – or, at the very least, should dominate. The predominant characteristic of the realist international environment is the absence of a central authority, defined by Waltz as an ongoing state of “anarchy” that became codified in the Westphalian Peace of 1648.  

In the absence of such an authority, states inevitably act to maximize their own security – and in doing so, achieve a degree of moral standing. A recurring problem is that states can be prone to misinterpret this security-maximizing behaviour by other states as threatening, and therefore attempt to increase their own security in light of such developments. As both states repeat this process, the result is the classically defined “security dilemma” in which security-enhancing measures create a positive feedback loop of escalation and instability.  

Realism in its various forms remains a key paradigm for viewing the international environment, particularly as it relates to “revisionist” and “status quo” powers. Indeed, “the dominant approach to the study of international relations and also to grand strategy has largely been that of structural realism.”  

An important consideration, however, must include how such decisions are made, which itself leads to the question of who actually makes decisions of grand strategy and statecraft. Elusively defined factors such as “security” mean different things to different people, and always have, in both theory and in practice – a point emphasized by Edmund Burke in his commentary on the French Revolution cited earlier. As individuals, leaders are subject to the wide influence of experiences, identity, personal history, and other idiosyncratic factors – as well as different models of rational decision-making. Still, actors responsible for national security strategy frequently draw upon a common pool of perceptions, biases, and various factors that determine the terms of debate and outcomes. John Maynard Keynes offered a formulation of ideational influence:

*The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood.*

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24 Waltz, .

25 This principle has been cast as “Thucydides’s Trap” by historian and strategist Graham Allison, citing the Greek historian’s assessment of the Peloponnesian War: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” The Atlantic, Sep 25 2015.

26 Rosecrance and Stein, 6.

27 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) offers three “images”, or levels, of analysis. Structural realism refers to the “third image”, or the interaction between states. Domestic factors are part of the “second image” and, in Waltz’s view, irrelevant to the structure of the international order.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribblers of a few years back.28

This common pool of influences provides an important socialization function in developing and determining a nation’s particular national security culture, which can vary widely between regions, organizations, and nations. While it is important to note that such cultures are only guides to decision-making and regularly change significantly over time, it is nonetheless important to consider the role played by a nation’s security culture in influencing and shaping the goals of its national security. Such goals are enormously important, as they represent the desired ends of grand strategy itself. The context and environment in which these goals – as well as the means to reach them – are determined can (and do) vary widely between nations. This results in widely varied idiosyncratic national strategic cultures.

The notion of national strategic cultures and the study of their impact is a relatively new field of study within international relations theory,29 though the concept of different cultures reflecting and aiming to implement different strategic aims has been a part of historical analysis since at least the time of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and other ancient writers. As previously stated, Snyder’s introduction of “strategic culture” into the decision-making lexicon had enormous impact – and like many intellectual innovations, many quickly wondered why such questions had not been asked with greater intensity before. Snyder’s implicit criticism of the manner in which Soviet decision-making and strategy were understood by US strategists, which invariably seemed to assume decisions were made along similar lines (and used similar means) to those of the United States, spoke to a larger procedural issue: it was not just that Soviet nuclear strategy might differ in consequential ways that could lead to catastrophic misunderstandings, but that the culture of the environment in which it


29 As Booth, one of the preeminent scholars of strategic culture, points out in “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed”: “The notion that different nations have distinctive ways of thinking and behaving on war and peace issues has been long understood, but it has rarely if ever been exposed to systematic scholarly examination. By the second half of the 1970s, the time was long overdue for such an examination.” Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. *Strategic Power: US/USSR* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990), 121.
was created and practiced influenced the final product. He argued that an appreciation of Soviet decision-making processes were made were key to understanding Soviet behaviour:

*It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique 'strategic culture'. Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of 'culture' rather than mere 'policy'. Of course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture.*

Since Snyder’s coining of the term, strategic culture has received considerable scholarly and policy attention. Studies and theories of “strategic culture” and “national security culture” have proliferated. In this process, the terms and definitions used to define strategic culture have varied considerably. Ken Booth puts forth the following definition:

*The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat of force. A strategic culture is persistent over time, but neither particular elements nor a particular culture as a whole are immutable...the strategic culture of a nation derives from its history, geography, and political culture, and it represents the aggregations of the attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the most influential voice: these may be, depending on the nation, the political establishment, and/or public opinion.*

While it is important to note the significant contributions of strategic culture scholarship to the study of strategy, it is also critical to note the modesty required in this area. Strategic cultures may shape a state’s strategic outlook and behaviour, but few scholars suggest they singularly determine it. Decisions – whether concerning national priorities, the allocation of resources, or balancing diverse and varied security needs – are the result of many diverse factors, and a systemic approach to prioritization necessarily is the result of complex internal and external negotiation. Snyder himself has described strategic culture explanations as a “blunt instrument” and “an explanation of last resort”. To use strategic culture as a strict mechanistic determinant of behaviour or outcomes risks committing similar crimes as game theory

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30 Snyder, v, as quoted in Booth and Trood, 363. (emphasis added).
31 Booth, 121.
or structural realism by causally linking complicated outcomes on a single variable – and a frequently ill-defined one at that. Nowhere is this true than for decisions made on as vast and diffuse a scale as grand strategy.

Strategic culture can also change significantly over time. The dominant strategic culture within Germany, for instance, changed enormously between 1940 and 1990. Studies of Soviet strategic culture, which frequently mention the relevance of chronic insecurity as an important factor in understanding “aggressive” Russian strategies, do not fully explain the decision of national leaders like Gorbachev to allow the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, even as they provide greater insight into more recent Russian diplomacy under Vladimir Putin.33 The proliferation of research concerning strategic culture in the decades since Snyder’s introduction of the phrase has resulted in many such examples of development and change in strategic culture – reflecting both internal and external factors on numerous levels.34

Cultural factors are particularly relevant to the construction of strategy because of the manner in which they complement and contribute to another major influence on grand strategy – domestic politics. Within mainstream international relations scholarship, culture and domestic politics frequently fall into rather clichéd “chicken and egg”-style debates over which has greater influence or precedes the other. On one hand, the structures and influences of domestic politics are themselves representations of culture. But it is axiomatic that these same political structures impact the very culture upon which they are, in part, founded and based. Attempts to prioritize or privilege one over the other seem to be an exercise of theoretical rather than practical interest, given the clear and demonstrable linkage between both. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to suggest the two are inextricably bound, and attempts to study one or the other in isolation invites theoretical blind-spots and research rabbit holes. While this comes at the cost of some conceptual clarity, the negative consequences of pursuing one to the exclusion or sacrifice of the other require as much.

33 Jeffrey Legro’s work on the manner in which grand strategies evolve and change over time due to ideational development is particularly relevant. See Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Neoclassical Realism

“Domestic politics” is admittedly a broad and potentially ill-defined variable, representing a vast range of influences and factors. Socioeconomic considerations, political and economic ideology, political structures, and partisan politics are only a few of the more commonly cited variables. Proponents of citing such factors point out that taking account of domestic variables is both sensible and necessary, particularly in open, complex modern societies. How and why these factors impact upon the formulation of grand strategy, and foreign policy more generally, represents another question altogether. While such domestic-level variables are frequently used to explain individual case studies, they often struggle to offer much predictive value. In essence, they invert the preferences of structural realists, valuing domestic rather than structural factors – with similarly limited results. Peering into the “black box” of domestic politics to determine the preferences of domestic actors is limited by the particulars of individual situations. As such, the ability to test or disprove the influence of these factors is limited. Innenpolitik (domestic political) factors are also limited in a comparative context: “[t]he chief problem with Innenpolitik theories is that pure unit-level explanations have difficulty accounting for why states with similar domestic systems often act differently in the foreign policy sphere and why dissimilar states in similar situations act alike.”

Realist theory, particularly the structuralist tradition developed and popularized by Waltz, is generally dismissive of such internal factors, instead primarily valuing factors external to the particulars of individual states. These include relative power levels and, perhaps most significantly, the relative position of a state in the balance of power; domestic variables are most notable for explaining “mistakes” and departures from realist expectations. Intellectually, this has considerable relevance: while factors internal to a state may influence how that state reacts to the international environment, it is still an external response to external stimuli that is being formulated. It stands to reason – and the preponderance of historical evidence indicates – that the single most relevant factor in determining a state’s external orientation is that state’s position relative to other states. Innenpolitik theorists have had some success in explaining state action ex post facto using domestically-oriented variables, but the changing pressures and constraints of the international environment retain greater predictive and explanatory value when it comes to strategic

35 Rose, 148.
formulations of foreign policy. It is one reason why domestically-oriented explanations fall more frequently within the realm of the historian than the political scientist.

Recent scholarship in the field of neoclassical realism attempts to bridge this gap between rival paradigms. While the international environment and the relative material standing of states is the starting point of analysis, as in traditional Waltzian neorealist theory, an important modification occurs before a predicted answer is put forth. Rather than having reified “states” act in response to threats, pressures, and opportunities for gain in the international environment, it is acknowledged that leaders and elites within these states are the ultimate decision makers. As such, they are subject to a wide range of domestic influences – including, perhaps most importantly, varying perceptions of the situation and potential desired responses. Unitary “states” don’t make mistakes or seize opportunities in foreign policy; people do, ultimately in the form of political elites and leaders. Rose offers the following description of neoclassical realism:

Neoclassical realists argue that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy; they note, in Thucydides' formula, that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Yet they point out that there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior. Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being. This means that over the short to medium term countries' foreign policies may not necessarily track objective material power trends closely or continuously.36

The domestic context in which leaders and foreign policy elites make decisions – in the form of formulating strategy, grand or otherwise, or perhaps more mundane tasks of statecraft – thus becomes enormously significant, particularly within democratic societies in which feedback loops are readily available. By grounding the actions of states in response to the external material environment, while acknowledging that domestic circumstances offer a wide range of policy or strategic considerations, neoclassical realism offers the advantages of both realist rigor and an appreciation of the influence that intervening domestically-based variables can have. This represents an opportunity to utilize the best of both theoretical worlds and move

36 Rose, 152.
past the stale, distracting debates of theoretical one-upmanship in which *innenpolitikers* and structuralist realists regularly take part.

Table 1: Structural and Neoclassical Realism.\textsuperscript{37}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>View of International System</th>
<th>Unit-level Analysis</th>
<th>Underlying Causal Logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Realism</strong></td>
<td>Deductive reasoning; hypothesis testing using qualitative, some quantitative models</td>
<td>Very Important; inherently competitive and uncertain</td>
<td>Undifferentiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neoclassical Realism</strong></td>
<td>Deductive reasoning; hypothesis testing using qualitative, usually individualized models</td>
<td>Important; implications of anarchy are variable and sometimes opaque to decision-makers</td>
<td>Differentiated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The culture of strategic decision-making within a state is one such intervening variable, and a highly salient one at that. It has been well established by critics of realism that states, and the leaders that constitute the decision-making apparatus of them, do not always act the way they “should” according to realist *diktat*.\textsuperscript{38} This has been attributed to a number of diverse factors. A common theme of neoclassical realist research, and indeed a fundamental tenet of neoclassical realist theory, asserts that this can be understood through understanding the nature of the intervening domestic variables. The full menu of policy responses accorded to leaders by neorealists is, in fact, far more limited in practice due to domestically-derived constraints – whether those constraints are opportunistic or threat-based in nature.

Similarly, as scholars of strategic culture have demonstrated, national leaders are comparably constrained in their formulation of strategy. The idea of leaders

\textsuperscript{37} Adapted from Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 20.

\textsuperscript{38} Schweller’s work on the misperceptions of power leading to leaders’ strategic mistakes is particularly noteworthy. See previously cited works.
having a completely free hand in which any and all potential strategies are weighed, irrespective of the prevalent strategic culture, is largely an idealized misrepresentation. Ideology, identity, common experiences, and political factors – in short, the primary components and determinants of strategic culture – are likely to shape the considerations of strategic planners, as are the stubborn facts of the particular situation. Strategic culture can be overcome – it is a policy influence, not a determinant, and by its nature is a highly fluid consideration. However, it is far more likely to play a role of influence in explaining strategic choices than not. While there are historical examples of leaders successfully pursuing radical breaks with the prevailing strategic culture, successfully implemented approaches to strategy tend to be far more in line with long-standing cultural influences than not.39

**American Strategic Culture**

What basic contours shape national strategic cultures? Studies of national strategic cultures have proliferated since 1990, reflecting the maturation of key concepts developed in the latter half of the 1970s. China’s strategic culture has been of particular interest, reflecting the closed nature of Chinese political life, the unprecedented growth of Chinese geopolitical and economic power in recent decades, and the continuing influence of the Middle Kingdom’s long history upon modern Chinese thought. Scholars of China in particular have debated the distinctiveness and impact of particularly Chinese decision-making, philosophy, and international outlook.40 Descriptions of the cultures of other nations, and even attempts to describe strategic cultures spanning entire regions, have proliferated as strategic culture becomes a more established explanatory tradition.41

Surprisingly for the world’s most powerful state, the strategic culture of the United States in matters of foreign policy has not been a major source of scholarship, aside from mostly critical perspectives. While the “American way of war” has been considered at some length, with a few notable exceptions the formulation of American

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foreign policy has not been examined using the insights of the strategic culture framework. Several possible explanations exist for this. American scholars of international relations, particularly those schooled in the realist tradition, have been wary of engaging in the degree of relativism often required of strategic cultural studies. However, such an explanation would not apply to other theoretical approaches – particularly given the foundational and theoretical overlap between strategic culture and constructivist theory. The popularity of quantitative approaches to social science are also relevant, as the influence of strategic culture tends to be inherently subjective. Strategic culture runs counter, in theory and practice, to a generation of Cold War strategic planners socialized in the use of game theory and statistical analysis of power. The enormous absolute and relative power of the United States provided seductive logic to the idea that the United States is somehow immune to the biases of strategic culture due to the plethora of policy options available to it. This gap has only relatively recently been seriously noted and addressed by scholars.

It also speaks to the methodological comfort and the nature of the relevant source material to be interrogated that historians have provided the bulk of academic scholarship in this multidisciplinary field relative to social and political scientists, though this gap is narrowing as important debates over neoclassical realist and strategic culture scholarship develop. In particular, historian Walter Russell Mead has highlighted the value of utilizing an explicitly nation-specific approach to American foreign policy formulation and practice. Along with others like Walter S. McDougall, he has commented at length on the specifically American approach to foreign policy and emphasized the manner in which American foreign policy reflects the varied facets of domestic politics. In itself, this is hardly a particularly controversial or even noteworthy suggestion. But Mead has noted the ahistorical approach frequently applied to the study of American foreign policy, boldly stating that “[o]nly in the United States can there be found a wholesale and casual dismissal of the continuities that have shaped our foreign policy in the past.” In Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, Mead describes the history of

43 The “quantifiability” of strategic culture has been a major point of debate. For a critical appraisal, see Christopher P. Twomey, "Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 29, no. 2 (2008): 338-57.
American foreign policy as comprising four distinct traditions. These traditions “have reflected contrasting and sometimes complementary ways of looking at domestic policy as well”, reinforcing the linkage between the two. Mead suggests that these traditions – Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian – have been present throughout American history, from the Republic’s founding to the present day:

...Hamiltonians regard a strong alliance between the national government and big business as the key both to domestic stability and to effective action abroad, and they have long focused on the nation’s need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms. Wilsonians believe that the United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading democratic value throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law. Jeffersonians hold that American foreign policy should be less concerned about spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home; they have historically been skeptical about Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies that involve the United States with unsavory allies abroad or that increase the risks of war. Finally, a large populist school I call Jacksonian believes that the most important goal of the U.S. government in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical security and the economic well being of the American people.45

Significantly, however, Mead does not argue that domestic politics is what determines U.S. foreign policy, as Innenpolitikers would claim; instead, he finds that the particular, and frequently contradictory, components of the United States’ approach to matters of foreign policy can be understood as the reaction of these approaches to the challenges and opportunities of the international environment. But American foreign policy is ultimately a function of American politics, which itself reflects qualities of the American populace and electorate. This requires a firm understanding of the history of American foreign policy: “The grand strategy of the United States is something that we fundamentally have to infer from the record of what we have done in the past”.46 As such, his research is sympathetic and indeed highly complementary to the scholarship of both neoclassical realism and strategic culture.

Mead’s work also demonstrates the difficulty in clearly delineating between aspects of strategic culture and the historical approaches to American grand strategy, and with it American history itself.47 To pick a well-known example, assessment of

45 Mead, xvii.
47 Other scholars that have taken up this explanatory challenge (though differing somewhat in emphasis) include Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with
American strategic culture requires acknowledgement of the frequently messianic aspects of America’s approach to world affairs, particularly as it relates to the internal governance structures of other states. Indeed, this represents one of the most commonly noted (both in praise and criticism) aspects of historical American foreign policy. This can involve invoking the image of a “beacon of hope” and liberty for others; less courteously, it involves dismissively telling others what to do, particularly regarding human rights and democratic norms, even as the U.S. hypocritically falls woefully short of its self-defined standards. A significant strain of American thought has long emphasized the moral duty and responsibility of the United States to be a “shining city upon a hill” and provide inspiration to other nations of the world; in Mead’s words, “Wilsonian beliefs lead to the principle that the support of democracy abroad is not only a moral duty for the United States but a practical imperative as well”, due to the inherently unstable nature of non-representative government, the rarity of intra-democratic warfare, and the benefits conferred by shared values within the international community. Is the heavily Wilsonian accent of US foreign policy a peculiar product of American history, or a particular aspect of American strategic culture – or both?

In reality, this represents a distinction without much of a difference. Practically, they represent two sides of the same coin – or even the same side of the coin, viewed through a different lens. Strategic culture is a powerful explanatory variable precisely because it provides explanatory space to the historical experiences of a nation and the common national myths that result from that history, however biased. The biases and assumptions in strategic outlook that studies of strategic culture aim to highlight are based in part on how a nation’s understanding of its own history inevitably influences current foreign policy decisions – and how best to handle current and future policy environments, which serves as the starting point for strategic

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48 Such criticisms are most often based in two approaches – a mainly realist perspective that generally finds the American emphasis on issues like human rights a distraction from issues of power distribution in the international system, and a generally left-wing perspective that finds such efforts to be hypocritical and an intentional (or cynical) distraction from long-standing domestic inequities. Critics from both perspectives are notably represented within the American political spectrum.

planning. Mead and scholars of strategic culture like Booth emphasize a crucial, common point: foreign policy, and with it concepts of grand strategy, has a history to it. It does not appear fully formed or appear out of whole cloth. Seemingly radical breaks in grand strategy, with strikingly few exceptions, still carry with them some historical basis, precedent, or experience. History and culture, for better or for worse and whether consciously or not, heavily influence contemporaneous decision-making as strategies are continued, reformed, reaffirmed, and challenged. To imagine decision-making as immune from the larger framework of societal influence, in which history and culture factor prominently, is both naïve and dangerous: naïve, in that dismisses the inescapably human element of decision-making, and dangerous, in that it consciously attempts to remove the democratic element of decision-making within representative societies such as the United States. What is past is prologue, indeed.

**Grand Strategy as framework**

The transition from a largely military-oriented basis to a more inclusive definition focused on the wide array of statecraft tools available to leaders has been one of the most significant theoretical developments in recent international politics, even before actual policy prescriptions are taken into account. As Posen suggests, grand strategy involves “a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself”\(^{51}\), and as such the increasingly varied ways in which security came to be defined over the 20th century would also necessarily broaden the scope of grand strategy. Similarly, to cite another commonly-used definition, the “full package of domestic and international policies designed to increase national power and security”\(^ {52}\) has for nearly all states broadened as states tend to have a variety of goals – both traditional notions based in militarily-oriented concepts security, but also those requiring a far more expansive definition of “security” than existed during the Cold War or before it. Climate change and sustainability-related issues represent areas that are increasingly discussed in grand strategic terms compared to decades past.\(^ {53}\) In turn, this diversity has generated one of the most consistent arguments against “doing” grand strategy, namely the intellectual incoherence of the term itself. This

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\(^{51}\) Posen, 13.

\(^{52}\) Christensen, 7.

diversification can be understood as a major meta-theme in grand strategy discussions over the past century.

Generally, for all the associated inherent challenges, grand strategy is assumed to play a direct and primary dominant role in the makeup of a state’s national and international profile. While alternatives exist, the model of grand strategy used throughout takes as a given that states have a finite amount of resources at their disposal, and the manner in which these resources are mobilized stands as an important, if flawed and incomplete, marker of a state’s goals.\textsuperscript{54} While scholars and practitioners alike have justifiably raised important challenges to the utility of composing (or even considering in a comprehensive manner) “grand strategy”, it is necessary to consider the rather obvious alternative – particularly in light of the innumerable biases inherent within foreign policy practice suggested by strategic culture and neoclassical realist analysis, and the basic viewing of historical experience more broadly.

Planning and strategy documents are important not only as markers of policy and intentions, but also as frequently imperfect representatives of a process. The fact that this process is difficult, messy, and often contradictory hardly negates its presence or importance. Ordering priorities, weighing impacts of potential actions, reflecting upon forecasts and predictions, and ultimately taking action regarding particular issues – and conversely, not directing resources to a particular set of issues when available – represent the central core of foreign policy analysis. The process of ordering and applying of national power to fit particular challenges that reflect the preferences of policy-makers, as much as the particular or specific means deployed, and is a critically important process to study in its own right. This is before the impact this causal chain of events has upon the real world is considered. This remains the case whether the challenge is immediate or more long-term, and whether state action is defined as the end-product of preferences or intentions.\textsuperscript{55} It should come as little surprise that such issues have long motivated those concerned with all aspects of foreign policy and international politics. The study of this process allows for careful consideration of the how and why of state actions within the international

\textsuperscript{54} Betts, 46-9.
environment; these in turn inevitably reference and call upon timeless and existential questions that have long preoccupied humanity.

It is in this context that U.S. foreign policy towards Indonesia will be examined, with particular reference to the role that Indonesia has played within the strategic framework described. The following chapter examines a five-decade period of considerable diversity in which Indonesia varied considerably in importance to American grand strategy. Local events within Indonesia included the successful fight for independence, a period of tremendous societal instability with enormous consequences in the 1960s, the seeming political stagnation of the later Cold War period, and the uncertain transition period of the 1990s. Given this range of experience, the form taken by American foreign policy and decisions made by its architects during this tumultuous time is profoundly important.
CHAPTER 3:

US FOREIGN POLICY AND INDONESIA, 1945-1997

“Curiously enough, the most crucial issue at the moment in our struggle with the Kremlin is probably the problem of Indonesia.”

-George F. Kennan to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, 17 December 1948

Few countries have experienced as significant swings in American strategic attention during the Cold War as Indonesia. Considered to be the most pivotal nation in Southeast Asia for nearly all of the two decades following 1945, the last two decades of the Cold War were noteworthy for the strategic neglect and indifference with which Indonesia was treated. For much of this period, American foreign policy regularly reflected an inability or unwillingness by Washington to fully appreciate Jakarta’s view of the world – most notably during Sukarno’s mercurial rule. While certain episodes within this period may be classified as successes, American Cold War foreign policy towards Indonesia was generally prone to drift and reactive in nature. At its worst, it had hugely unsettling political, social, and human impacts on Indonesia’s government and populace. While much of this, particularly during Sukarno’s reign, can be understood as a consequence of Cold War thinking, it can hardly fully absolve policy-makers of blame for the failure to successfully implement policy to more positive effect.

Throughout the 1920s, American foreign policy toward the archipelago had largely been confined to economic diplomacy, particularly in the plentiful rubber plantations and in oil extraction, and generally reflected long-standing, condescending

racial attitudes towards the local and Dutch populations. As the devastation of the
Great Depression took an increasingly dire toll upon the American economy
throughout the 1930s, elite and public opinion in the United States shifted to oppose
colonialism’s most notable excesses, including in the Dutch East Indies. Japanese
expansionism and exploitation of economic insecurity throughout Asia increasingly
worried American policymakers, who “no longer trumpeted Dutch colonial
management as a model of ingenuity”, while influential media outlets such as The
New York Times published disparaging critiques of Dutch rule. While Roosevelt
reserved his harshest criticisms for French colonial rule in Southeast Asia, the
implication was clear for the Dutch – particularly following Washington’s bipartisan
1934 decision to grant full independence to the Philippines within a decade. American
diplomats noted with concern the Dutch tendency, in their view, to conflate
nationalism with communism – a persistent charge made throughout the colonial
world and later leveled at US policymakers throughout the Cold War.

Allied planning for the future of Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia began in
earnest as the Second World War neared conclusion. While Roosevelt’s principles
and those of the Atlantic Charter ran counter to the resumption of direct European rule
throughout Asia and Africa, the destruction of pre-war economic structures and
society threatened the ability of America’s allies to rebuild Western Europe. As it
became clear that the Allied wartime alliance would lead to one defined by tension
between rival American and Soviet-led political blocs, European recovery remained a
critically important, central foreign policy goal. The European perspective and close
personal relationships with allies that had defined much of the American war
experience meant that American anti-colonial sentiments, however genuinely felt,
were afforded secondary importance due to the immediate necessity of rebuilding
Western Europe.

Like many colonial relationships, an enormous gulf in economic and political
power defined the pre-war relationship between the Dutch and their indigenous
subjects. In addition to the substantial psychological toll exacted by colonialism, the
economic relationship constituted one of the most exploitative ones throughout the

2 Gouda and Zaalberg, 84, 87.
world. A small group of Dutch administrators controlled nearly all levers of political power, a situation that generated considerable resentment amongst the growing numbers of the native elite. While opposition to Dutch rule grew throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the disruptions caused by Japanese rule and global nature of World War II greatly accelerated and empowered the independence movement. Japanese rule over the East Indies was marked by severe brutality, an economic relationship hardly less oppressive than that of the Dutch, and widespread local opposition. Crucially, however, due to manpower shortages and a concerted effort to capitalize upon anti-Dutch sentiment, Tokyo entrusted power to native elites that had been systematically marginalized and exploited by the Dutch. Japanese military dominance destroyed the image of authority and domination that had been a vital component of European rule. Despite the brutalities of Japanese rule, Sukarno caustically noted that “humiliating defeat was inflicted on our superior and almighty white masters by an Asian race. It’s no wonder our people hail them [the Japanese] as liberators.” These experiences further politicized a populace ripe with anti-Dutch sentiment, and the establishment of local militias would further advance the cause of independence in Indonesia and across Asia.

As Japanese forces withdrew from Southeast Asia in late 1945, responsibility for disarming Japanese troops and enforcing local political control fell to the United Kingdom. Primarily interested in reasserting control over its colonies from the Indian subcontinent across to the Malayan peninsula, British control of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) was intended as a stopgap measure to fill the void left by continued

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3 Sutan Syahrir, a founding member of the Indonesian independence movement, spoke directly to this duality: “For me, the West signifies a forceful, dynamic and active life. It is a sort of Faust that I admire, and I am convinced that only by a utilization of this dynamism of the West can the East be released from its slavery and subjugation…the cause behind our people’s weakness is also really an unusual virtue, namely its almost limitless tolerance and its extraordinary adaptability.” Sutan Syahrir, Out of Exile trans. Charles Wolf (New York: J. Day, 1949), 179 and 89.

4 “The fall of Singapore – the citadel of British imperial power – and the subsequent Japanese takeover of all the British, French, American, and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia in one grand sweep in early 1942 convinced many Asians that European colonialism was on its last leg, whatever the outcome of the war. In spite of the general image of Japan in Asia as a colonial oppressor in the worst style of the Europeans, there were among some nationalists the somewhat naïve idea that Japan would grant independence to the colonies if it won the war against the West.” Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 87.


Dutch weakness. It was a no-win situation: “the British at one time or another found themselves suspected by the Indonesians of reinstalling the Dutch and by the Dutch of wishing to add Indonesia to the British Empire. For the British and many others it was a nightmare.” The arrangement seemed superficially attractive to Washington: American troops were thinly spread throughout the Pacific theatre, the UK was clearly a trusted wartime ally, and London was thought to have a strong (if self-interested) grasp of regional politics. Though still crippled from the war’s devastation, Dutch leaders made abundantly clear they intended to resume complete control of NEI ante bellum. Initially, Truman Administration officials anticipated only marginal opposition to the resumption of Dutch rule in Indonesia.

Reality proved far more complex, providing American leaders with predictable dilemmas. The empowerment of local elites under Japanese rule and widespread resentment at the massive inequities of pre-war Dutch rule contributed heavily towards the growing independence movement, culminating in the August 17, 1945 declaration of Indonesian independence by Sukarno – a “whiz-bang demagogue”, according to an American war correspondent. After attempting to control the deteriorating security situation amidst growing local opposition to continued European rule of any variety, British troops withdrew in November 1946 and handed over nominal control of the archipelago to the Dutch. While generally sympathetic to the independence of former colonies – in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt had declared “respect [for] the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they live” despite Churchill’s (prescient) misgivings – the reconstruction of European society remained the overriding principle of American postwar policy. The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, would eventually send $13 billion in American economic and technical assistance to

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8 After a brief greeting, the proclamation was remarkably brief by Sukarno’s loquacious standards: “We the Indonesian people hereby proclaim the independence of Indonesia. Matters concerning the transfer of power, etc., will be carried out in a conscientious manner and as speedily as possible.” The declaration followed the kidnapping of Sukarno by nationalist activists eager to press the issue of independence immediately after Japan’s Aug. 15 surrender. Spector, 171-73; Gouda and Zaalberg, 119-22.

Europe.\textsuperscript{10} This served multiple goals: it provided markets for American goods, undermined local support for totalitarianism and Western European Communist parties, and entrenched Western Europe in the nascent American-led international order. The imperatives of realist self-interest and idealism that inspired the Marshall Plan itself would intersect, and conflict, throughout this period – and was particularly evident in the intertwined issues of Dutch recovery and Indonesian independence.

The Truman Administration initially remained aloof from the burgeoning conflict between the Dutch and independence-minded nationalists. The final European country to be freed from Nazi rule, the Netherlands clearly viewed restoration of colonial rule as a crucial component of post-war recovery. Faced with a difficult decision between contradicting broad anti-colonial sentiment and risking the stability of a major policy cornerstone, the Truman Administration played for time. But the overwhelming bias of the State Department towards rebuilding Europe, coupled with the dearth of detailed, direct knowledge of the distant Indonesian archipelago, resulted in a heavy bias towards the Dutch – as did racial attitudes that frequently emphasized the “child-like” and “primitive” nature of native Indonesians.\textsuperscript{11}

Nonetheless, de facto American support for Dutch rule began to waver in important ways, particularly over fears that confronting Communism could be adversely affected by the continued harsh repression by the Dutch of the newly declared Indonesian Republic. This included suppressing all forms of support for independence and jailing prominent figures like Sukarno, Sutan Syahrir, and Mohammed Hatta, a move that bolstered their standing amongst the populace further. Negotiations over the archipelago’s final status culminated in the November 1946 Linggarjati Agreement, which detailed creating an “an independent, federal United States of Indonesia (USI) and a Netherlands-Indonesia Union (NIU) to be headed by the Dutch monarch” – but crucially failed to outline Indonesia’s final status within the NIU.\textsuperscript{12} Ambiguity on key outstanding issues and the mutually exclusive outcomes


\textsuperscript{11} Heavily influenced by Kennan, Truman initially deemed the anti-colonial movements in Asia to be an annoying “sideshow” and tacitly supported resumption of colonial rule. In his famous “X” essay, Kennan predicted the Soviet Union would inundate “every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power”, further emphasizing the Eurocentric outlook of the immediate post-WWII era. Quoted in Gouda and Zaalberg, 119-22.

\textsuperscript{12} Gouda and Zaalberg, 25, 29.
sought by each party resulted in a Dutch-initiated “police action” nine months late that effectively abrogated the agreement.

Concerned over potential Soviet exploitation of the sensitive issue at the United Nations, the United States moved quickly to reestablish a cease-fire and continue further discussions over Indonesia’s final status. In doing so, Washington actively blocked the direct participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for fear of Soviet involvement. When a resolution did finally pass the UNSC, in August 1947, it established a Committee of Good Offices (GOC) with members including proxies for each belligerent (Australia in the case of Indonesia, Belgium for the Netherlands) and the United States. In January 1948 the GOC negotiated the Renville Agreement, though as with previous agreements the situation on the ground proved unsustainable. Following numerous threats to unilaterally abrogate Renville, in December 1948 the Dutch initiated a second “police action”, effectively destroying the GOC framework and infuriating American policy-makers such as American GOC representative Coert du Bois. Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall expressed concerns that outright rejection of the UN-sponsored GOC process would damage the nascent organization’s credibility. The yawning gap between the two allies was apparent – as was the American viewpoint of Dutch leaders as the primary obstacle to final resolution.

The political fallout that followed the Dutch police actions provided new momentum towards a final settlement. While Dutch forces pushed Republican forces back and captured major population centres, including Yogyakarta, effective Dutch control of these areas remained elusive. In Washington, support within Congress for suspending Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands gathered support – particularly amongst conservative factions already skeptical of Truman’s international aid

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13 The Australian government was particularly forceful in raising Indonesian independence at the United Nations, in large part due to a lack of faith in Dutch efforts to effectively stem regional instability.

14 Acting Secretary of State Dean Rusk, writing to Ambassador to the UN Phillip Jessup, was blunt. “Dutch action Indonesia seems to us as direct encouragement to spread of Communism in Southern Asia…Dutch handling Indonesian situation [sic] has been lamentable…jeopardy thereby presented to US cooperation Western Europe on such matters as ERP and Atlantic Pact, or on [the] UN system for maintenance of peace. We have no desire to condone or wink at Dutch action Indonesia.” John G. Reid and David H. Stauffer, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948: The Far East and Australasia, vol. VI (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), Doc. 452
This opposition was generally grounded in economic terms, though the unmistakable expansion of the “welfare state” imagined by Marshall Plan reconstruction aid in Europe provided an ideological basis for opposition for such programs domestically. Indonesian leaders impressed outsiders with their negotiating flexibility while US doubts increased over the Dutch government’s ability to establish effective political and military control over the archipelago. Fears of a prolonged guerrilla struggle, the potential for Soviet influence in the region, and the continued ambivalence many Americans had about assisting in an overtly colonial project multiplied and contributed to intense American frustration with the Dutch. US leaders were aware of the leverage Marshall Plan aid provided, and though clearly reluctant to use all means at their disposal, they were not above reminding their Dutch counterparts of this power dynamic as necessary.

American foreign policy towards NEI/Indonesia, then, shifted considerably over a short period of time as policymakers lost faith in the Dutch as liberal, fair-minded brokers. It also came as American leaders increasingly viewed the NEI as a strategic asset in its own right, rather than strictly through the prism of European security concerns. Furthermore, as the threat of Communist expansion in Western Europe receded somewhat, Washington demonstrated less willingness to tolerate Dutch tactics. While domestic pressure within the United States can be credited with some change in policy, it had become increasingly clear that Dutch and American strategic goals were irreconcilable. Dutch efforts to create a heavily federalized “United States of Indonesia” was derided by many as a thinly-veiled “divide and rule” strategy that threatened the economic and political stability sought by Washington.

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15 One of the foremost critics of Dutch action, Sen. Owen Brewster, suggested suspending all Marshall Plan funds to the Netherlands and further questioned whether NATO could exist with Dutch participation, due to the requirement for members to “resolve international disputes peacefully and in accordance with the UN Charter”. See Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 65.


17 Anglo-Dutch relations also suffered considerably during this period over the Indonesia issue. See William Mallinson, From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO, and European Integration (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2010).

18 This reflected multiple factors. Continued political instability was severely hindering economic development of the NEI and its reintegration into the global economy, as well as the growing strength of Mao’s Soviet-supported Chinese Communist Party.
With American mediation, in August 1949 agreement was reached on major issues of sovereignty, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, the inheritance of debt, the economic relationship between the two, and other final issues – with one notable exception. Irreconcilable differences over West Irian’s final status were deferred for one year. The Republic of the United States of Indonesia, which within the year would become the Republic of Indonesia, was formally declared independent on December 27, 1949.

Despite Washington’s significant role in its eventual success, the United States’ inconsistent support for the independence movement strained relations with Indonesia’s new leadership. While some American policymakers remarked about what they deemed a lack of gratitude from Indonesian leaders, American involvement was primarily due to frustration with Dutch action over 1948-9 and the changing nature of the global geopolitical equation rather than a principled stand in favour of decolonization and Indonesian independence.

Frustrated diplomacy over West Irian, concern over Indonesian political instability, and fears over Jakarta’s susceptibility to Communist influence continued for the remainder of Truman’s presidency and into the Eisenhower Administration. American leaders struggled to form a coherent, comprehensive, or forward-looking policy towards Jakarta despite Indonesia’s self-evident importance. The Chinese Communist Party’s victory over American-supported Nationalist forces in the Chinese Civil War strongly influenced Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and profoundly impacted American policy towards Indonesia.

Continued political instability and a strong showing by the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI) in provincial elections caused Dulles to instruct incoming Ambassador to Indonesia Hugh S. Cumming in late 1953 that he “should not tie himself to Indonesian territorial integrity if that meant losing the entire country to Communism.” If the PKI effectively controlled an area of Indonesia, the United States should maintain support for anti-Communist forces, even if this resulted in Indonesia’s territorial dissolution. It was an extraordinary statement, coming only a few years after considerable American pressure had contributed to the very independence that Dulles seemed to casually question.

19 Reflecting the leading roles they both played in the Indonesian independence movement, Sukarno and Hatta served as Indonesia’s first President and Prime Minister, respectively.

20 Quoted in Roadnight, 65-66.
The status of West Irian dominated Indonesian political discourse and remained a powerful nationalist issue before and after independence. Eisenhower continued Truman’s “neutrality” on the volatile issue and emphasized direct Dutch-Indonesian dialogue, which in practice meant continued Dutch sovereignty over the region. Still concerned that Soviet support for Indonesia’s position could create political difficulties for the West, Eisenhower stifled attempts to directly address the issue in the United Nations. “Neutrality” remained an attempt to balance the specific geopolitical needs of Western allies with a generalized sympathy towards anti-colonialism. Australian leaders feared the destabilizing effects of Indonesian control of the western half of the New Guinea, the eastern half of which was ruled by Australia. The United Kingdom, wary of Sukarno’s nationalistic rhetoric, also worried for its colonial holdings along the Malayan Peninsula and Borneo. Both allies actively lobbied Washington to take a harder line on West Irian and towards Sukarno. Such appeals found some support within the State Department, which favored continued Dutch control as the best way to protect American interests and balance the requirements of alliance and collective security.

Dutch-Indonesian relations, of which West Irian represented the most important issue, fractured the Indonesian polity and contributed to the fall of multiple Indonesian governments. The PKI also demonstrated increased support at a time of growing apprehension over Indonesia’s future political path. PKI leaders were particularly aggressive on the West Irian issue, and continued indecisiveness by Washington undercut support for those moderates advocating a peaceful, negotiated settlement. President Sukarno compared the issue to “a gun at the head” of Indonesia. As the most dominant individual in Indonesian politics, Sukarno’s nationalistic appeals had considerable resonance. Compounding this, the lack of specialist knowledge about Indonesia and the Euro-centric approach of Washington contributed to a widespread lack of appreciation of the issue’s emotional and domestic political salience. Simultaneously, American insistence that Jakarta take a more resolutely anti-Communist stance further tested relations.

American policymakers viewed Sukarno’s growing international profile with suspicion, as he became an important proponent of the “neutralist” critique gaining

21 Roadnight, 106.
traction amongst many newly independent former colonies. “Neutralism” reached its foremost expression in April 1955 at the Asian-African Conference in the Indonesian city of Bandung. While American allies such as Japan, Thailand, and Pakistan attended the Conference, Eisenhower viewed the Conference (and the Non-Aligned Movement it later spawned) as dangerous due to its efforts to chart a middle path between Western powers and the Communist bloc. For neither the first nor the last time, Sukarno’s high-profile position as a leading proponent of Third World solidarity challenged American assumptions about policy development towards the developing world. Were newly independent states best left to their own devices (and potential Communist subversion), or partners to be actively courted by the United States? What form might this relationship take? More critically, what if the goals, viewpoints, and political positioning driving this potential relationship diverged due to local, regional, or global factors?

The Permesta/PRRI rebellion

Widespread distrust of Sukarno’s ambiguous stance towards the PKI and Communism and his seemingly authoritarian tendencies dominated the Eisenhower Administration’s view of Indonesia. His often-flamboyant personality did not endear him to more reserved American interlocutors. American efforts to include Indonesia in US-centric regional security organizations like the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) were rebuffed. There was further disconnect between Sukarno’s strongly moralistic language about the importance of West Irian to Indonesia’s integrity and Dulles’s largely Manichean view of Communism and the

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22 The Conference emphasized the need for continued and rapid decolonization around the globe, a greater role for the world’s developing nations in ensuring global peace, and closer political, economic, and cultural solidarity amongst the Third World. See Gardner, 118; Westad, 99-103; See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: the Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008).

23 So too, it seems, did aspects of Sukarno’s personal behavior. Sukarno’s playboy reputation also did little to endear him to the devout Dulles. “All three US Ambassadors to Jakarta, between 1953 and 1961, were also convinced that Sukarno’s [personal] behaviour was a consideration in policy-making at the highest levels.” Roadnight, 190.

24 Given continued tension over West Irian and his strong personal beliefs concerning non-alignment, Sukarno’s “unwillingness to join SEATO was hardly a surprise.” Roadnight, 123.

25 A 1956 trip by Sukarno to the United States brought the issue into stark relief. When pressed about Indonesia’s role in promoting Cold War neutrality, “the Indonesian President countered by asking Dulles why the US felt able to question Indonesian neutrality whilst taking a similar approach to the dispute over West Irian.” The answer, according to Dulles, was that he “drew a distinction between matters of profound moral import and those that were strictly political.” See Roadnight, 123, 75.
By the mid-1950s Sukarno had begun to overtly balance the organizational abilities of the PKI against the political and institutional strength of the Indonesian military. Several complex factors were involved: “Sukarno needed the PKI because he lacked a mass political organization of his own; the PKI relied on Sukarno for protection against the army…Sukarno used the army to counterbalance the PKI, the army supported Sukarno as the only person capable of holding the far-flung and diverse parts of Indonesia together.” The major question facing American policy-makers over much of the next decade was the degree to which Sukarno’s use of the PKI was a function of political opportunism, nationalism, or genuine sympathy for Communism. Friction with Sukarno over tacit support for the PKI following elections in 1955 led to the resignation a year later of Mohammed Hatta as Vice President – one of the few national figures who rivalled Sukarno’s national profile or popularity – and contributed further to the foreboding sense of crisis.

By 1957, Indonesian political life demonstrated deep paralysis and polarization, further exacerbated by Hatta’s resignation and deadlock over the issue of PKI inclusion in the cabinet. Citing endemic instability and the “Western” nature of the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno suspended Parliament. Declaring Western-style democracy ill-suited for Indonesia, he introduced “Guided Democracy” based upon the tenets of nationalism, religion, and Communism. The Eisenhower Administration feared that the additional support offered by Moscow and Beijing...
meant the PKI might be invited to share power, particularly after another strong PKI showing in local elections. American policy increasingly shifted from covertly supporting anti-Communist parties like the Masjumi, an umbrella grouping of various moderate Muslim political parties, towards more active efforts to confront Sukarno and the PKI. The primary question, however, remained what form these efforts could or should take. Domestic opposition to the PKI’s growing strength in Java was focused primarily in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Simmering resentments related to “Javanization” under Guided Democracy drew considerable opposition amongst some non-Javanese, and centralizing military reforms under Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nasution conflicted with the agendas of some regional military commanders. Local military chiefs declared martial law on Sulawesi in March 1957, issuing the Permeesta charter and calling for greater federalism within the Indonesian state.

Chaotic economic conditions worsened following Sukarno’s December 1957 decision to seize Dutch property and force Dutch nationals to leave Indonesia. After the conditions in an ultimatum based on the Permeesta charter went unmet in early 1958, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) was declared. The Jakarta government moved to suppress the revolt, which it effectively did over the first half of 1958 as it pressed the military’s overwhelming aerial superiority, substantial advantages in professionalism, and the rather confused nature of American and Western policy.

31 An August 1957 NSC meeting focused on Indonesia after the provincial elections. CIA head Allen Dulles was highly pessimistic, starkly stating that “Sukarno had gone past the point of no return”; Eisenhower stated that “[t]he best course of action would be to hold all Indonesia in the Free World. The next best option would be to hold Sumatra if Java goes Communist.” A month later, an intergovernmental group declared that anti-Communist rebels opposed to the government should be supported, though the exact form of this assistance was not resolved. Later that month, the United States formally recognized the Federation of Malaya, further infuriating Sukarno. “Record of 333rd NSC Meeting”, as quoted in J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (London: Allen Lane, 1972).

32 Encouraged by Sukarno, Nasution was largely responsible for the military reforms designed to centralize and professionalize the military forces. Some officers opposed this on grounds of military authority and/or centralization of power concerns; others preferred the status quo opportunity to control lucrative smuggling routes. The centralizing reforms were part of Sukarno’s larger political project under “Guided Democracy”. See Crouch, 50-1 discusses this period thoroughly.

33 While the terms “PRRI rebellion”, “Permeesta rebellion”, and “Outer Island Rebellion” each carry slightly different connotations, they refer to the same conflict; in this context they are used synonymously.

34 Writing on 30 July 1958, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson told Dulles that there is no evidence “to demonstrate that the dissident movement can exert any leverage on Djakarta. On the contrary, their continued activities result in greater economic and fiscal chaos, which serves the purposes of the communists…” Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-
American, British, and Australian support for the insurgency continued despite the rebels’ increasingly dire situation throughout 1958. Foreign military aid for the PRRI rebels was routed via Singapore, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and became more overt as rebel forces continued to lose ground. This included the use of the CIA’s private airline, Civil Air Transport, to help negate the aerial advantage enjoyed by government forces. Over early 1958, recognizing the futility of the situation, Dulles decided to push for a cease fire, instructing US Embassy staff to approach Gen. Nasution (or Prime Minister Djuanda) regarding a potential cease fire. Before this approach was made, however, CIA pilot Allen Pope was shot down over Ambon. Documentation quickly disproved Washington’s claim that Pope was an independent “soldier of fortune” rather than a CIA employee. Direct American support for the rebels – increasingly obvious and long known by Jakarta – was no longer deniable or tenable. Coupled with the rebels’ tenuous position and increasing unease in London and Canberra, the Pope incident forced a more conciliatory approach rather than the hard line exemplified by the Dulles brothers over the previous 24 months. Sukarno delayed Pope’s trial for a further nineteen months while simultaneously threatening to expose Washington’s involvement in the conflict. (Pope was eventually released for repatriation in 1962.) Belatedly, Washington was “forced to admit what newly installed Ambassador Howard Jones had been arguing all along, that the United States was fueling a civil war between two anti-Communist factions of the same military.” The effort had been shambolic. Jones credited Sukarno for his handling of the delicate

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1965: Britain, the United States, and the Creation of Malaysia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 11. A meeting several days later to discuss the memorandum endorsed Robertson’s suggestion of “token military aid” to Indonesia and greater engagement with Nasution.


37 Conboy and Morrison, 82-91, 112-19.

38 Pope’s release was not without drama. With Pope sentenced to death, the CIA considered various plans to free him, including bribing jail guards, having Pope lifted out of jail by a passing plane (“Operation Coldfeet”, using the experimental “Skyhook” device popularized in the 2008 film *The Dark Knight*), and escaping while visiting a dentist outside of jail. In the end, diplomacy proved most effective. Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 62.

39 Conboy and Morrison, 155-65.
situation, in particular his efforts to prevent the potentially volatile reaction of Indonesian public opinion from spiralling out of control against the US.\textsuperscript{40}

While major tensions remained, the PRRI rebellion’s abject failure strengthened the PKI’s political position and forced renewed engagement efforts with Sukarno.\textsuperscript{41} An intelligence estimate in August 1958 declared that events of the previous year had “greatly strengthened the position of the Indonesian Communists” – a constant if understandable preoccupation of Washington – and that if the 1959 elections were held as originally planned, the PKI would “probably emerge as the largest party in Indonesia and be in a strong position to demand cabinet representation.”\textsuperscript{42} An uneasy rapprochement between Sukarno and Eisenhower was eventually reached, with modest increases in direct aid and military ties between Jakarta and Washington. Dulles’ resignation as Secretary of State less than a year later removed a point of personal tension. Indonesian frustration with a lack of resolution over West Irian and Washington’s perceived bias towards the Dutch would eventually be dealt with directly by Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy. Kennedy brought renewed dedication to resolving the West Irian dispute, recognizing that it remained a major irritant in US-Indonesian relations at a time of growing American concern over Communist expansion throughout Southeast Asia. Fearing the continued damage the issue caused, NSC aide Robert Komer stated, “the real issue is not a piece of colonial debris but Indonesia itself.”\textsuperscript{43}

The PKI had the largest membership of any Communist party in the world outside China and the Soviet Union, and maintained enormous influence domestically thanks in part to the strongly nationalistic stance it had taken during the PRRI rebellion and over West Irian. Nonetheless, tensions between the PKI and the

\textsuperscript{40} According to Jones, “Indonesians maintained that the delay was to let Indonesian tempers cool down, and privately admitted that the PKI would have a field day if Pope were tried while the whole matter was fresh in the minds of the public. Certainly from the standpoint of the American government, an early public trial of Pope would not have helped matters.” Quoted in Bradley R. Simpson, \textit{Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968} (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 34.

\textsuperscript{41} In addition to taking a strong stance in favor of Sukarno and the central government, PKI claims of direct American support for the PRRI added to their own credibility while diminishing that of their political opponents. This, coupled with the West Irian situation, allowed the PKI to rally nationalist support.

\textsuperscript{42} Kahin and Kahin, 181.

 Indonesian military became increasingly public.\textsuperscript{44} The Soviet Union indulged Sukarno’s lavish military and economic aid requests to the tune of $750 million from 1956-62 just as concerns in the White House and Congress about Indonesia’s future reached its nadir.\textsuperscript{45} In a brief for the Kennedy Administration, Ambassador Jones claimed:

\textit{The U.S. has been seriously challenged in Indonesia by the Communist bloc for the first time since the nation was freed from the colonial domination of the Dutch...Slightly less than a year ago, the USSR apparently reached the conclusion that it could not afford to have the largest Asian Communist Party outside the China mainland go down the drain...Perhaps most effective of all, he [Khrushchev] paid attention to Sukarno.\textsuperscript{46}}

Heeding Jones’s advice, Kennedy made an immediate effort to build a positive personal relationship with Sukarno.\textsuperscript{47} He also committed to giving West Irian renewed attention, even while continuing the uneasy path of American “neutrality” in deference to Dutch wishes. Sukarno turned up the pressure throughout 1961, denouncing the Dutch presence and directing Indonesian troops to begin a low-level insurgency campaign.\textsuperscript{48} Rejecting the Dutch proposal of a plebiscite to determine final sovereignty and brazenly threatening a full-scale invasion in late 1961 and early 1962, Sukarno succeeded in forcing deeper American involvement in the combustible issue.\textsuperscript{49} Following a February 1962 trip to Indonesia by Robert Kennedy, Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed to continued bilateral negotiations with American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker as mediator.\textsuperscript{50}

American policy was marked at the time by substantial bureaucratic rivalries and tension, most notably between the National Security Council (NSC) and the State

\textsuperscript{44}“During the second half of 1960, the Indonesian military banned PKI activities in several sensitive regions, in open defiance of Sukarno. The U.S. embassy no longer spoke of an alignment between Sukarno and the army but of an impending clash.” Howard B. Schaffer, \textit{Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk} (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 97.
\textsuperscript{45}Gardner, 164.
\textsuperscript{46}Quoted in Simpson, 34.
\textsuperscript{47}Upon learning that Sukarno would be in the United States in April 1961, Kennedy “broke with tradition and met him at the airport. Before lunch, Kennedy showed Sukarno the new presidential helicopter on the White House lawn and asked whether he would like one. Sukarno was delighted...This was the personal attention Sukarno craved.” Gardner, 173.
\textsuperscript{48}Gardner, 175.
\textsuperscript{50}R.E. Elson, \textit{Suharto: A Political Biography} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 80-87.\textsuperscript{.}}
Department. Secretary of State Dean Rusk favoured the Dutch proposal of a plebiscite of West Irian voters to determine future status, while the NSC tended to support Indonesia’s offer of a United Nations trusteeship under Jakarta’s control. The acrimonious bureaucratic battle carried on throughout 1961 and 1962. The NSC claimed that Rusk and other State Department officials risked radicalizing Indonesian opinion through American “neutrality” for an unsustainable situation that would likely result in eventual Indonesian control anyway. In turn, State accused the NSC of sacrificing the interests of a NATO ally in favour of a mercurial autocrat increasingly dependent upon Communist support while also denying the West Irian people the opportunity to determine their fate. The regional security implications were vast and worrisome to American allies. Both perspectives struggled to influence changing conditions on the ground, even as numerous memos from both sides of the debate spoke to the ongoing damage to American strategic goals. Growing instability elsewhere in Southeast Asia – particularly Vietnam and Laos – reinforced the imperative of avoiding open conflict with either Indonesia or the Netherlands.

After Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns rejected his initial compromise proposal, Bunker forced threatened to publicly disclose the proposal’s contents. With the Dutch having forsaken any territorial claim and holding out mostly for the face-saving measures such as an open plebiscite to determine West Irian’s future, the proposal served as the final framework. Despite strong arguments about the precedent the agreement would set and the emboldening effect it might have upon Sukarno, the initial proposal served as a framework for eventual agreement. The Dutch were humiliated. The final agreement of August 1962 transferred administration to a temporary U.N. body that prepared it for Indonesian takeover as soon as May 1, 1963, while also allowing for a full plebiscite to be held no later than 1969.53

The Kennedy Administration hoped the agreement would generate positive momentum for increased support for foreign aid packages and represent a renewed

51 Having recently overseen major blunders in Indonesia and Cuba, the CIA seems to have lost some of its previous interest in extra-diplomatic measures – which was shared by Director Allen Dulles
52 Luns’ language indicated the issue’s importance to the Netherlands: “We are greatly hurt and dismayed that, without prior consultation with us, you have seen fit to give these proposals to the Indonesians. The stand taken by the U.S. government is that of appeasement in flat contradiction to what you and I stand for. It has not been a fair deal we have had from you.” Quoted in Schaffer, 89-110.
53 Gardner, 177.
commitment to Jakarta. More broadly, Kennedy sought to address the widespread poverty and fractured politics common to many Third World nations through a renewed emphasis on economic development and by emphasizing “modern” structures within society. Frequently, this involved strengthening the role of the military, one of the few institutions considered “modern” in many recently decolonized states. Despite Washington’s recent support for the rebels, policymakers shifted to deepen engagement with the Indonesian military as a means of balancing against the PKI’s growing strength. From Washington’s viewpoint, Sukarno’s leftward tilt in recent years could be addressed head-on with new aid and development programs, with a goal of stabilizing the political situation and addressing the increasingly desperate economic crisis caused by years of economic mismanagement. Given the substantial and growing strength of the PKI – particularly on Java – aid would be directed at organs of government that were more clearly anti- (or at least non-) Communist in orientation. In the tumultuous context of Indonesian politics, this primarily meant the military.

Eager to build upon the pivotal American role in addressing the West Irian issue, Kennedy and his aides sought to implement the ideas of modernization and development emphasized by Kennedy during his campaign. Due to overriding conceptions of modernization theory and lingering distrust of Sukarno, the military was considered the most effective organ through which aid and development support should flow – even as Kennedy publicly advocated high-profile, civilian-oriented development projects via the newly-created Peace Corps. In addition to being one of the few “modern” institutions within the Indonesian state, such a program also allowed for greater coordination with and influence from Washington on important security issues, including the potential for Communist expansion, compared to the more indirect “hearts and minds” campaign imagined by the Peace Corps and supported by Kennedy’s more liberal internationalist advisers. For Washington, the most important aspect of support for the military involved bolstering the army’s role as an anti-Communist force, due to pervading mistrust of Sukarno’s intentions and the ongoing difficulty Washington faced in regular Congressional appropriation battles over Indonesian aid. As conflict in Vietnam gathered increasing amounts of attention,

Indonesia’s importance – and particularly domestic anti-communist elements such as the military – took on even greater importance.\(^{55}\)

**Konfrontasi**

As the West Irian negotiations concluded, Sukarno turned his attention to another major regional issue. Following the suppression of a 1956 Communist-led rebellion on the Malayan peninsula, the United Kingdom prepared for the inevitable independence of its remaining colonial holdings in Southeast Asia. The Malayan Federation declared independence in 1957; in addition to comprising former British holdings on the Malayan peninsula, the new state incorporated Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Borneo – largely to ensure the support of native elites and an overall ethnic Malay majority. Following the debacle of the Suez Crisis a year earlier, British leaders had little choice but to help facilitate independence along terms as compatible with British interests as possible under the circumstances. Sukarno bitterly opposed the Federation’s creation (and its successor state, Malaysia) and sought to undermine it through aggressive, occasionally combative diplomacy known as *konfrontasi* (“confrontation”).\(^{56}\) Sukarno also remained keenly aware of the material support supplied to PRRI rebels via the Malayan peninsula in the late 1950s.\(^{57}\) While the policy should be understood as a reaction to regional dynamics, it is critical to note Sukarno’s personal influence upon *konfrontasi*’s formulation, implementation, and impact. His centrality to Indonesian political life and his uncompromising views on decolonization played a dominant role in the policy’s development, as did the acrimonious personal rivalry between Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s first leader. With American interests in Southeast Asia already under threat in Indochina, Washington and its allies were reluctant to see any additional regional

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55 Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, writing shortly after Sukarno’s fall from power, “The reversal of the Communist Tide in the great country of Indonesia [is] an event that will probably rank along with the Vietnamese war as perhaps the most historic turning point in Asia this decade.” Quoted in John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’État in Indonesia* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 16.

56 Malaysia succeeded the Federation of Malaya in 1963, and would eventually expel Singapore from the Federation in 1965. For ease of reading, Malaysia will be used to indicate both pre- and post-1963 iterations.

tension. The prospect of a konfrontasi-sparked regional war was a major concern for Washington and allies in Canberra, the Hague, and London.\textsuperscript{58}

The efforts to destabilize Malaysia through confrontation would lead to open conflict and considerable concern throughout Washington and amongst Western allies over the future direction of Sukarno’s rule and regional security implications. The economic plight of the country, already severe, would suffer yet further as konfrontasi came to dominate Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesian political and economic life, having been buffeted in recent years by deep and regular tension with the Dutch (including the seizure of Dutch property and expulsion of Dutch citizens in 1957), the West New Guinea issue, the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, and the growing conflict between the military and the PKI, would suffer yet further under the polarizing effect of Sukarno’s initiative. Sukarno, rather than viewing British withdrawal from Southeast Asia as a positive development, interpreted Malaysian independence as a Western plot to surround Indonesia and empower a new regional rival.\textsuperscript{59} There was initial surprise within Washington at the depth and the intensity of Jakarta’s response to Malaysia, which continued as developmental economic aid packages were discussed in order to support the Indonesian economy. At the same time, however, Sukarno increasingly focused his rhetorical and political attention to Malaysia while simultaneously driving support for Indonesia’s ongoing “revolution”. Sceptics in the U.S. Congress, already doubtful about the Kennedy’s considerable increase in foreign aid packages, deemed the Administration negligent, if not reckless, in proposing such a significant increase for a self-styled “revolutionary” who openly challenged American interests in the region while threatening war with the closest of American allies, the United Kingdom.

\textit{Sukarno was a poster child for those conservative and nationalist opponents of the New Frontier approach to foreign aid...He was a self-proclaimed socialist and nationalist who thumbed his nose at the West, disparaged private property and attacked foreign capital, favored state-led development, accepted aid from the USSR and China, and sought to dominate the region, colonize his

\textsuperscript{58} On the wider context, see Jones, 1212.

\textsuperscript{59} One alternative, controversial viewpoint highlights the role of Anglo-American intelligence agents, economic interests, and diplomacy over Brunei in provoking Sukarno’s konfrontasi declaration, as well as the ideological constraints and assumptions of “modernization theory” within American foreign and social science policy. See Michael E. Latham, \textit{Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era} (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
neighbors, and drive out Western influence – seemingly with the Administration’s help.  

This profile became significant in discussions with Congress over funding of Kennedy’s foreign aid packages, leading to lower levels of aid than Kennedy or his aides requested. This funding gap, as well as geopolitical opportunism, coincided with Sukarno’s increasing reliance upon Soviet and Chinese support, which formed a self-perpetuating cycle that seemed to indicate the mercurial Sukarno’s intentions to lead Indonesia towards Communism. His aggressiveness in pressing konfrontasi occurred at the same time that negotiations over access to Indonesian oil by American firms, a key aspect of US commercial policy and a crucial bellwether of Sukarno’s attitude towards foreign investment and engagement with Western powers generally, broke down over several issues to predictable alarm in Washington.

Border clashes with Malaysia in Borneo, continued political upheaval in Indonesia, and increasing stridency by Sukarno marked 1963. The following year brought a major escalation of konfrontasi, and with it a further shift to the left within typically volatile Indonesian politics. With the backing of the United States and the United Kingdom, Malaysia was granted a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, to which a furious Sukarno responded to by withdrawing Indonesia from the world body. Armed incursions by regular Indonesian troops occurred on the Malayan Peninsula, leading to direct conflict between Indonesian and Malaysian troops, with support provided by British and Australian troops. The prospect of a wider regional conflict remained a distinct possibility.

Following Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, the Johnson Administration viewed the deteriorating situation with increasing concern. Sukarno continued to rely upon the PKI and stake out an increasingly anti-Western stance, exemplified by his call for a “Conference of Newly Emerging Forces” composed of recently independent socialist states and his identification with the “Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Beiping-Pyongyang axis”, which he described as a “natural axis forged

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61 President Johnson also found aid difficult to support in light of Sukarno’s aggressive posture towards Malaysia: “I don’t think we should encourage this guy [Sukarno] to do what he is doing there. And I think that any assistance just shows weakness on our part.” Johnson also indicated he was told he “ought to be impeached if I approve” aid to Indonesia. Simpson, 95.
by the course of history”. As political tensions rose, Johnson and his aides sought alternatives to Sukarno that would allow for continued engagement within Indonesia – a task complicated by the harassment, and eventual expulsion, of Peace Corps and US Information Service employees. Kennedy’s largely accommodationist approach to Indonesia continued under Johnson and became a target of Congressional criticism as the bilateral relationship teetered precariously. Sukarno defiantly gave it a final push, angrily declaring in March 1964 that the US should “go to hell with your aid”. This prompted a severe, immediate response from important Congressional figures: Sen. Birch Bayh described Sukarno as “arrogant, insulting, incompetent, and unstable”, while Rep. William Broomfield accused the new Johnson Administration of “mollycoddling this minor-league Hitler.” In light of the unmistakable radicalization occurring at all levels of Indonesian society, Sukarno’s increasingly inflammatory and nationalistic rhetoric, and the widespread economic chaos gripping the country, in the middle of 1964 Sukarno declared the coming year the “Year of Living Dangerously”.

**September 30th Movement and Reaction**

It would prove highly dangerous, though not in the manner in which Sukarno had predicted. Johnson put US-Indonesian relations in a “deep freeze”, in part because of the political heat that continued economic aid to Indonesia might attract in an election year. Sukarno’s base of support, drawn from the opposing forces of the PKI and the largely anti-Communist military, demonstrated clear signs of fracture. Sukarno’s hospitalization in August added a temporal element to the pressures and uncertainty of the situation. On September 30, 1965, in circumstances that remain extremely murky and heavily debated to this day, a group of leftist army officers kidnapped and killed six army generals and took steps to install a revolutionary council, seemingly as part of a larger power play to eliminate elements of the army high command. The alleged involvement of the PKI led to a counter-coup headed by Major General Suharto, head of the army’s Strategic Reserve Command, which

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quickly routed the small forces marshalled in support of the group, which became known at the Gestapo movement. Amid the confusion, the PKI’s official newspaper confusedly suggested the coup and counter-coup reflected internal army politics, even as while PKI leaders supported the effort while distancing themselves from playing an active role.66

While aware that the unmistakable tension between the army and the PKI was clearly unsustainable and likely coming to a breaking point, the U.S. was nonetheless caught by surprise by the officers’ coup, and the uncertainty about events in Jakarta further compounded the volatile situation.67 In the aftermath of the coup attempt, a massive and brutal purge of PKI members and both alleged and real supporters was initiated. Estimates of those killed in the brutal explosion of violence that followed vary enormously, though figures of between 250,000 and one million are generally accepted – an enormous range, speaking to the vast ambiguity still surrounding the events. The CIA described the events as “one of the ghastliest and most concentrated blood lettings” in the twentieth century, while one scholar has described the circumstances surrounding the coup as a “pretext for mass murder”.68 It remains amongst the most highly charged and emotional issues in contemporary Indonesian politics, with considerable resonance to this day. As with many events of such magnitude, the related politics of historical memory remain nuanced, contested, and highly susceptible to manipulation.

Like the events themselves, the role of the United States during this volatile period is highly contested and difficult to discern. The American embassy in Jakarta is known to have prepared lists of PKI members and distributed them to the army, and

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66 Reflecting on the work of Anderson and McVey, Roosa’s discussion surrounding the Oct. 2 Harian Rakjat publication, both in its confused contents and who authorized it, speaks to the immense confusion over the fast-evolving events. See Roosa, 170-5 and Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1971).

67 One contributing factor to this was the limited presence of American observers, including a reduction in embassy staff, following the rise in anti-American rhetoric since Sukarno’s March 1964 “Go to hell” speech. Fearing a potential PKI-led attack on the US Embassy, Rusk also instructed Green to keep no more than one month’s worth of cable traffic on hand. CIA station chief Hugh Tovar stated, “I was stunned. At the time we did not know what had happened.” Brands, 791, 95-800.

therefore played some role in the resulting campaign of mass murder that followed. Simultaneously, it worried whether the Indonesia military would adequately leverage the PKI’s claimed involvement in the initial killings to press its political advantage.

The depth of American involvement and prior knowledge, whether actively or passively pursued, will likely never be fully settled with accuracy or complete satisfaction: the involvement, actions, and political alignment of even direct participants remain far too ambiguous in the fluid events, both then and now, and even the most damning analysis of American involvement suggests at least one layer of removal. But on at least one level it remains somewhat beside the point. It is clear from the record of the bloodletting that followed was a result of long-standing fissures and pressures within and amongst Indonesian society. Whatever the level of American involvement, there is a strong case to be made that the brutal campaign against the PKI and its suspected sympathizers had a strong likelihood of occurring anyway, regardless of whether the American embassy provided some lists of high-level PKI members to the army or ardently anti-Communist organizations that did most of the killing.

The scale of the killings, following years of deep political polarization, suggests that Indonesian dynamics shaped the tragic events far more than the United States ever could have, particularly given the limits of American influence in Indonesia at the time. Nonetheless, later claims that the US diplomatic and intelligence communities did not fully understand or appreciate the scale of the murders are difficult to reconcile with the contemporary documentary record that cites

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69 Though the lists of PKI membership numbered in the small thousands and were compiled primarily via publicly available information, there are indications that some basic knowledge of the chaotic and brutal campaign was known contemporaneously to American embassy and in Washington, if not necessarily in advance. The extent of this knowledge, like much about the coup, remains unclear. See Roosa, .

70 Speaking nearly two weeks after the initial events of September 30, Secretary of State Rusk indicated that as the army’s campaign against the PKI gathered speed and intensity, “if [the] army’s willingness to follow through against the PKI is in any way contingent upon or subject to influence by U.S., we do not wish [to] miss opportunity for U.S. action.” Quoted in Gardner, 213-29.

71 Following a 1990 Washington Post article entitled “U.S. Officials’ Lists Aided Indonesia Bloodbath in 60’s”, Robert J. Martens, a political officer in the Embassy at the time, wrote a clarifying letter to the editor. “It is true that I passed names of the PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-Communist forces during the six months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of Sukarno…the real point, however, is that the names I gave were based entirely – I repeat entirely – on the Indonesia Communist press and were available to anyone.” Keefer, FRUS, 1964-1968: Vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, Doc. 185.. For an alternative viewpoint that emphasizes American culpability and involvement, see Simpson, 182.
numerous accounts of massacres in chilling detail, even if the specific events were well outside their control or complete understanding.72

The purges and mass killings proved to some of the most pivotal events in Indonesia’s existence, heightened by the substantial ambiguity that still surround these events. After a tense period of power struggles, Suharto had effectively sidelined Sukarno by early 1966, and in the process became Indonesia’s second president. This roughly six month period was full of uncertainty – keenly felt in Washington – about the eventual outcome of the power struggle.73 Once policymakers felt comfortable with Suharto’s anti-Communist intentions, they took a degree of comfort in Suharto’s direction. The decimation of the PKI, “perhaps the greatest setback for Communism in the Third World in the 1960s”, also “destroyed the political balance of power, dramatically undermining Sukarno and removing the only mass-based alternative to army rule.”74

Following the decade or more of major concerns over Sukarno’s radicalism and Indonesia’s potential move towards communism, the new government’s anti-Communist orientation was greeted warmly in Washington.75 It also brought hope that with the PKI under attack, cooperation with the military “may allow unprecedented opportunities for us to begin to influence people and events, as the military begin to understand problems and dilemmas in which they find themselves.”76 The growing American presence in Vietnam served as both justification and further underscored the importance to Washington of having Indonesia remain firmly anti-Communist. Washington, initially reluctant to show too strong a hand for fear of disrupting a delicate situation that seemed to be a positive situation, would eventually agree to major aid deals once Suharto’s anti-Communist orientation was beyond doubt. While it would take some time for the coup’s aftermath to play out fully and the army was initially reluctant to take on Sukarno, within 6 months of the events of October 1,

72 Simpson, 180-94.
73 Ambassador Marshall Green emphasized this uncertainty and the need for the United States to exercise caution. He wrote to Washington that he “should stay away from both Sukarno and Nasution” and “continue to maintain a quiet, reserved posture with respect to Indonesia.” Quoted in Roosa, 176-201.
74 Westad, 185; Simpson, 172.
75 Seven months before, Ambassador Jones had presciently suggested “an unsuccessful coup attempt by the PKI might be the effective development to start a reversal of political trends in Indonesia.” Quoted in Roosa, 176.
76 Quoted in Simpson, 173.
Suharto had assumed the majority of Sukarno’s power, banned the now-decimated PKI, and filled his freshly-declared “New Order” government with anti-Communist loyalists while purging Sukarno hold-overs. Sukarno was eventually stripped of remaining power, living under house arrest until his death in 1970.

In addition to his anti-Communist credentials, Suharto attempted to reverse the dire economic situation facing Indonesia and focus upon internal development following Sukarno’s outspoken, activist foreign policy. Where Sukarno attempted to succeed without the support of the West, Suharto actively engaged it in order to reach political, economic, and development goals. Konfrontasi was brought to an end, and an austere economic package recommended by the International Monetary Fund was agreed to. Legislation to increase foreign direct investment - an extraordinarily contentious issue during Sukarno’s last years in power, which had seen large-scale appropriation and harassment of foreign enterprise by Indonesia – further indicated the willingness of the New Order to reestablish ties with the West, which after considerable discussion resulted in a resumption of direct economic and military aid. Washington welcomed this, as well as the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, the organization was based upon the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of fellow members. As such, it served as a direct repudiation of konfrontasi and a move designed to further demonstrate the new course of Indonesian diplomacy to outside observers, the most important of which was the United States.

In practice, despite members insisting that the organization was to resist both Communist and Western interference in regional affairs, it was clear that ASEAN’s external orientation favoured the West and the organization intended to prevent external support for indigenous Communist parties, as seen throughout Indochina. While celebrating this drastic change in Indonesia’s external orientation, Washington was also pleased at Jakarta’s desire to play a nascent role in the developing regional order – vital given the ongoing difficulty facing American troops in Vietnam and the growing possibility of an eventual Communist takeover, aided by Soviet and Chinese support. “By 1968 it was clear to the U.S. and Indonesian governments that their basic fears and goals converged in most important respects. Both viewed communism and
the poverty on which it fed as the primary threats to its interests. Both saw economic development and political stability as a key defense.\footnote{Simpson, 172.}

Through the prism of Cold War politics – and in the late 1960s, unavoidable pressure over involvement in Vietnam – the stability offered by Suharto’s New Order was something Washington quickly embraced and only reluctantly criticized, if at all.\footnote{David F. Schmitz, \textit{The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 52-6.} Both Richard Nixon and his opponent in 1968’s Presidential election, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, emphasized Indonesia’s importance and contribution to regional security while explicitly linking American involvement in Vietnam to positive local developments in Indonesia.\footnote{Nixon was particularly effusive in linking Indonesia’s importance to U.S. policy in Vietnam. American commitment to Vietnam “provided a shield behind which the [Indonesian] anti-Communist forces found the courage and capacity to stage their counter-coup and, at the final moment, rescue their country from the Chinese orbit...without the American commitment to Viet Nam, Asia would be a far different place.” Richard M. Nixon, ”Asia after Viet Nam,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 46, no. 1 (1967): 111.} This was a commonly shared, if contested, viewpoint.\footnote{Following a 1967 trip to Southeast Asia, Humphrey noted in a National Security Council meeting that “Our stakes are very high in Indonesia; as high as those in Japan and India…Our stand in Vietnam has had a collateral effect on developments in Indonesia…it is thought that our presence in Southeast Asia gave confidence to the Indonesians to destroy the Communist Party in Indonesia.” See Keefer, \textit{FRUS, 1964-1968: Vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines}, Doc. 248. Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge argued along similar lines, though CIA Director Richard Helms differed strongly: “we have searched in vain for evidence that the U.S. display of determination in Vietnam directly influenced the outcome of the Indonesian crisis in any significant way.” A CIA Office of Current Intelligence estimate said the coup “appears to have evolved purely from a complex and long-standing domestic political situation” rather than any American actions in Vietnam. Keefer, \textit{FRUS, 1964-1968: Vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines}, Doc. 208.} A National Intelligence Estimate compiled at the end of 1968 praised Suharto as a pragmatic “moderate” intent on addressing the serious economic issues facing Indonesia, in contrast to his predecessor’s “politics of emotion and policies of adventure.”\footnote{Brands, 805.}

Upon entering the White House in early 1969, Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sought to establish a close relationship with Suharto based on stability, whom they saw as a vitally important anti-Communist stalwart in a region at the front lines of the Cold War. As the referendum on the status of West Irian came to a vote in 1969, Washington’s increasingly tenuous position in Vietnam and desire to maintain a positive relationship with the New Order led to an understanding between Nixon and Suharto that the United States would neither interfere with nor protest the
conduct of the referendum. Discussions of how best to economically develop and integrate West Irian into the Indonesian state occurred before the vote itself, as were protests expected from “some African countries” and “certain Communist countries”. Under extremely questionable circumstances and claims of threatened and actual violence towards the West Irian representatives, delegates “voluntarily” voted in regional councils for continued incorporation within Indonesia – which was derisively dubbed the “Act of No Choice” rather than “an act of free choice” as required by the UN due to the alleged intimidation of delegates by the Indonesian military and government officials. Nonetheless, the vote was approved by the United Nations as an act of sufficient self-determination by local residents.

American silence on the West Irian vote can be best understood in the context of wider regional politics as well as the New Order’s desire for greater engagement with the West, a shift in orientation that American policy-makers eagerly supported. At best, this can be described as a necessary relationship-building tradeoff made to the new leadership of a potentially friendly vital regional power; at worst, it represented a horrifically cynical betrayal of American values made at the expense of those subjected to frequently violent Indonesian rule. Unquestionably, the vast natural resources of the island played a part, though economic opportunism represented only one factor of many in play for the United States. As its position in Vietnam worsened, the American relationship with Indonesia deepened, as Washington relied upon Suharto’s resolve (and self-interest) to limit Communist advances in Southeast Asia. Chinese efforts to expand their influence in the region were particularly concerning. As the Western-supported Cambodian government of Lon Nol came under increased Communist pressure internally and from external sources, Indonesia publicly advocating strongly for the neutrality of Cambodia and withdrawal of foreign troops. Suharto was especially concerned about the expanding role played by China within Southeast Asia and grew concerned following the 1972 rapprochement between

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82 In advance of a visit to Indonesia, Kissinger suggested Nixon “should not raise this [West Irian] issue” and to “tell [Suharto] that we understand the problems they face in West Irian but do not believe it is in our interest or that of Indonesia for us to become directly involved.” Keefer, *FRUS, 1964-1968: Vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines*, Doc. 262.
Washington and Beijing. Nonetheless, military and economic cooperation served as the central component of US-Indonesian relationship, with Nixon’s strong support for Suharto’s regime continuing throughout his presidency until his resignation in 1973.

**Post-Vietnam Withdrawal**

In 1974, a successful leftist coup d’état in Lisbon - dubbed the “Carnation Revolution” – resulted in the rapid collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. As Portuguese political authority dissolved, East Timor, a largely forgotten colonial outpost in a strategically sensitive position that shared the island of Timor with Indonesia, threatened to descend into civil war as local parties jockeyed for control. The largest of the parties, Fretilin, advocated independence and, at least according to Indonesian sources, had Communist inclinations. In December 1975 – after informing President Gerald Ford and Kissinger of his intentions, and one day after Ford personally met with Suharto in Jakarta – Suharto ordered the Indonesian army to invade amidst a deteriorating security situation “at the request of the East Timorese people”. Ford and Kissinger made clear they would not oppose the action, requesting only that American-supplied arms not be used in the operation. The resulting civil war, Indonesian repression, and societal dislocation resulted in an estimated 100,000 East Timorese deaths over a 25-year period, though an accurate tally will likely never be known with certainty.85 The 2006 report of East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) declared American “political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation”.86

Concern over the spread of Communism and the disintegrating security situation in Southeast Asia following the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam consumed American attention, as did the effects of Vietnam’s unification two years later. Washington, as well as its Australian allies, agreed with Suharto’s argument about the danger posed by a Communist beachhead, despite ambiguity about the alleged Communist leanings of Fretilin’s leadership in part because of the seeming paucity of alternative options.87 Given the pressures facing the United States around the world and the strong relationship that Suharto had forged with the United

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87 “Chega!”.
States, it was highly unlikely that Washington would endanger a relationship with a close ally like Suharto by challenging Indonesia over East Timor, particularly given Kissinger’s outspoken self-identification with realpolitik considerations.88 Significantly, though, as Congressional authority over foreign policy grew in the aftermath of Vietnam, human rights and concerns over democracy globally increased as well, particularly (though not exclusively) under Democratic control.89 The record of the Indonesian military in both East Timor and West Irian would be challenged, particularly by the United States Congress, which in turn significantly impacted relations between Washington and Jakarta. As the general Cold War consensus that had broadly governed American policy towards the developing world to this stage showed unmistakable signs of fissure, the expression of these divisions over American policy towards Indonesia came to the fore due to the applicability of such larger, values-driven debates to the Washington-Jakarta bilateral relationship.

The deteriorating regional security framework raised concerns for Indonesia, in particular the advances made by Communist forces in Cambodia. Opportunities to shape the still-nascent and unsettled regional security framework existed, however. In the aftermath of Vietnamese reunification, in 1976 ASEAN agreed to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which went further in codifying the largely undefined institutional framework of the organization. Jakarta played a large leadership role in the push, which was well received in Washington. The costs of direct intervention and involvement by the United States in Southeast Asia were demonstrated to be simply unsustainable within the highly polarized post-Vietnam domestic and international political environment, particularly as the bipartisan consensus that had governed the majority of post-World War II foreign policy had been effectively shattered. With American confidence severely wounded following the long nightmare of Vietnam and foreign policy positions under seemingly relentless attack throughout the world, new President Gerald Ford’s attempts to continue his predecessor’s close relationship with

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88 At the time, Kissinger told the U.S. Ambassador David D. Newsom that the United States had “enough problems of greater importance” elsewhere to justify not pressuring or opposing Suharto more on East Timor. Quoted in Donald K. Emmerson, "Invisible Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 2 (1987): 373.
89 Dick Cheney, chief of staff to President Ford and a central figure in the later administrations of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, was disdainful of Congressional involvement of foreign policy at this time. “It wasn’t personal and it wasn’t directed at Ford in that sense. It was institutional in the sense that it was directed at the presidency.” He also called the Ford Presidency “the nadir of the modern presidency in terms of authority and legitimacy.” Rodman, 115-6.
his Indonesian counterpart can be understood as a driving force behind the unwillingness of the United States to push Suharto harder on the East Timor invasion. At the same time, this desire for stability amidst seemingly chaotic global events came under renewed scrutiny and criticism for precisely the same reasons.

One of the most significant developments following the final withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1973 was the broader strategic and logistical disengagement from the region that this brought about within Washington. Following the forceful unification of Vietnam in 1975, Southeast Asia – in many ways the front line of the Cold War for the United States for the preceding three decades – became a secondary geopolitical concern for the United States with striking suddenness. While withdrawal was never complete owing to the myriad American interests in the region – which included concerns over the stability of non-Communist allies, economic diplomacy, continued development of a regional security framework that resisted Communist expansion, and the broader liberalization of authoritarian regimes including Indonesia – the lasting convulsions of war in Indochina, war between China and Vietnam, and the Cambodian civil war attracted attention but little direct involvement by the United States. This represented an enormous change in the modus operandi of American foreign policy since the Second World War; after decades of US engagement predicated upon geopolitical, ideological, and reputational factors of the highest order, many Americans felt justifiably confused about the sudden “forgetting” of an entire region, even as a more indirect (and therefore reflecting relationships with leadership in countries like Indonesia) course was charted.

Entering the White House in 1977, Jimmy Carter sought to place human rights at the core of American foreign policy and more robustly assert the United States as a nation of values rather than simply aggregated interests, in direct contrast to the cold-eyed realpolitik considerations that dominated the Nixon-Kissinger era. At the best of times, it was an uneasy conceptual, tactical and strategic balance with which the

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90 In his inauguration speech, Carter stated that “because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.” Carter later expounded upon this in a speech to the UN, as well as an important address at Notre Dame University in which he decried an “inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined in that fear” and declared “America’s renewed commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.” Wesley Widmaier, Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama: Constructing Crises, Fast and Slow (New York: Routledge, 2015), 73.
devoutly religious Carter struggled, particularly over the issue of consistent application of principles and what such a moralistic focus looked like in practice.\(^91\)

Relations with Indonesia represented a key test case for Carter’s approach, as it had come to typify the difficult balancing act of Cold War politics. Clearly, Carter’s approach did not sit particularly well with Suharto, compounding and reinforcing the distinctly chilly personal relationship between the two leaders. The tension between Indonesia’s role as a valuable anti-Communist stabilizer and the promotion of human rights was hardly unique to Carter, but particularly after the East Timor invasion, Indonesia represented the very embodiment of this dilemma. Vice President Walter Mondale’s 1978 visit to Jakarta focused upon striking this balance, with mixed results.\(^92\) Importantly, calls for a greater focus upon human rights also came from the United States Congress, newly empowered following relative deference to the Executive Branch before and during the Vietnam War.\(^93\) Though not directly applicable to Indonesia, the controversial War Powers Resolution of 1973 exemplified the trend towards greater Congressional involvement and assertiveness in foreign policy.

In addition to placing far greater importance upon human rights than his predecessor, Carter also felt the need to give greater weighting to regions other than Southeast Asia that some felt had been neglected during the long and attention-devouring American involvement in Vietnam.\(^94\) The worldwide economic crises of the late 1970s, the gradual death of Soviet-American détente, and the increased growth of proxy wars in Africa distracted further from the bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, even in this strained environment, as many as 30,000 Indonesian political prisoners were released during Carter’s presidency, most of whom had been

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\(^91\) Of many works to discuss Carter’s shift in focus, see Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986).


\(^94\) While a morality-based foreign policy was an important part of Carter’s election campaign against Ford, popular caricatures of his presidency being focused solely on “human rights” is inaccurate on numerous counts. Simpson has noted the Carter Administration’s particular definition of human rights: emphasizing political prisoners, for instance, of which Indonesia contained the most in the world at the time, while not including East Timorese self-determination in this definition. Simpson, "Denying the 'First Right'," 799-826.
arrested in the anti-PKI purges and the restricted political space of the New Order. Supporters of Carter’s approach, then and now, typically cite such figures as evidence that a values-based approach had both intellectual and practical merit. Others cite the largely free pass that the United States issued the arch anti-Communist (and anti-democratic) Suharto regarding Indonesia’s questionable actions before, during, and after Carter’s time in office.

The controversial policy of détente with the Soviet Union that had defined much of the past decade under Republican and Democratic administrations had largely become a dead letter when Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981. In its place, Reagan sought to aggressively pressure the Soviet Union through supporting anti-Communist regimes throughout the Third World, a policy that necessarily involved questionable tradeoffs with less than savoury regimes. While in earlier times this might have involved a close relationship with an authoritarian anti-Communist like Suharto, the reality of the 1980s was that the Cold War conflict between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China – so defining and destructive over the prior three decades – had largely been settled regarding Southeast Asia, with the result being a generalized downgrade in importance for the entire region. Continued support for Soviet proxies had become too great a financial, political, and reputational cost for Moscow to allow for destabilizing efforts at expansion; Chinese “adventurism”, resolutely opposed by both Washington and Jakarta throughout the 1960s and 1970s had largely ceased to exist as Beijing turned its focus inwards in order to initiate far-reaching domestic economic reforms. The United States, even as it sought to aggressively push back against Soviet-backed governments in Latin America, Africa, and Afghanistan, did not deem Southeast Asia a place to press its perceived advantages or unset either the existing political framework or the direction it seemed to be heading. The Sino-American rapprochement, inaugurated under Nixon and completed under Carter, solidified this understanding and did much to alleviate American concerns about Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia. That ASEAN had become a lead player in settling the Cambodian conflict was a strong indication that the Cold War, at least as it came to Southeast Asia, had settled along relatively well-understood lines by extra-regional powers.

As a result, relations between Indonesia and the United States remained mixed if reasonably stable throughout the 1980s, and generated considerably less drama than the preceding decades. Reagan, having criticized Carter for sacrificing American relations with close allies through a misguided emphasis upon human rights, did not seem a likely candidate to break from Nixon’s policy of maintaining relations with a repressive authoritarian like Suharto in the name of gaining geopolitical advantage over the Soviet Union. Some supporters admitted “that when the Republicans took office in 1981, they had no human rights policy of their own, only a critique of the Democrats.” However, owing to a variety of circumstances, beginning in 1982 the inner circles of the Reagan Administration began placing greater emphasis on democracy promotion. The emergence of the Solidarity movement within Poland had a galvanizing effect upon Administration thinking, as it emphasized both the substantial desire for democracy amongst those deprived of it as well as the inability of the Soviet Union to adequately deal with these passions. While interest in expanding the democratic circle of nations was significant and an end in its own right, there was not necessarily anything new about this. But the opportunity to further undercuts the legitimacy of the Soviet Union itself provided additional justification for pushing the issue, and therefore the need to hold friendly dictators to account became more apparent, even if this was unevenly applied. The establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy created further pressure to advance democratic reform, as did the growing strength of moderates like Secretary of State George Schultz and Vice President George Bush within the Administration that saw the limits that Suharto’s regime placed upon American democracy promotion. Reagan’s appointment of Jeane Kirkpatrick, a staunch neoconservative critic of Carter’s approach, as UN Ambassador ensured that democracy promotion would receive more attention.

Democracy promotion abroad was still only one element within the calculus of foreign policy considerations within the Reagan Administration, and a politically charged if ascendant one at that. Nonetheless, it had real effect within Southeast Asia, most notably in Indonesia’s ASEAN ally, the Philippines. When Filipino autocrat

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96 Smith, 261.
97 Kirkpatrick authored one of the most significant essays related to foreign policy in the 20th century, in which she harshly castigated Carter for the his Administration’s “double standards”, drawing a particular distinction between the ability of authoritarian and totalitarian states to introduce democratic reforms. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships & Double Standards,” *Commentary*, Nov. 1 1979.
Ferdinand Marcos had the leading democratic activist (and longtime political rival) Benigno Aquino assassinated upon Aquino’s return from exile in 1983, worldwide condemnation resulted. Due to Reagan’s reluctance to criticize a fellow anti-Communist ally, the United States received strong criticism for their support of Marcos. The episode and changing balance of power within the Administration in favour of “constructively engaging” regimes to push for greater democratization also initiated changes in policy that eventually, after a blatantly rigged 1985 election, led to the withdrawal of American support and the eventual exile of Marcos. The potential parallels with Suharto’s situation were obvious and unmistakable. So too was the message sent by the Reagan Administration by sending Paul Wolfowitz, an advocate of democracy promotion and key player in Marcos’ ousting, to Jakarta as US Ambassador in 1986 immediately following Marcos’s overthrow. While his later prominence within neoconservative circles created an image of Wolfowitz as a forceful democracy-first advocate (or a cynical hypocrite, depending on the source), Wolfowitz offered a familiar picture of balance in describing the Philippines example some years later:

“If we had said, ‘We are enemies of the Marcos regime. We want to see its demise rather than reform,’ we would have lost all influence in Manila and would have created a situation highly polarized between a regime that had hunkered down and was prepared to do anything to survive and a population at loose ends.”

The potential implications for Indonesia were vast. Questions about the desirability and practicality of pushing for democratic reform did not go away, nor did the difficulty in determining when and how hard to encourage Suharto to move in a

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99 Debatable linkages between egregious violations of human rights and the nature of authoritarian governance had been made long before the overthrow of Marcos, but the correlation brought renewed and unwanted attention to Suharto and the New Order. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree (New York: Routledge, 1996), 90-6.

100 Kissinger, in criticizing policy the handling of Marcos, demonstrated the clear divide within the Republican party between realists like himself and those like Kirkpatrick who viewed the promotion of democracy as part of the larger strategy of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

more democratic direction. Efforts to address the remarkable levels of corruption that had come to define the New Order both in business and in governance were closely associated with democracy promotion due to the highly centralized relationship between political and economic power. Perhaps most significantly, allegations of widespread human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military within West Papua and East Timor justifiably brought considerable negative attention, even though such attention remained largely confined to foreign policy experts and area specialists rather than public opinion. There was support within the US Congress for restricting or even altogether ceasing support for the Indonesia military, efforts which would repeatedly play out as tolerance for Suharto’s excesses waned. The tension between pressuring a close ally in an unpredictable region to reform democratically, while still allowing for the threat of withdrawing support should reforms not be carried through at an adequate pace, had never been an easy equation to solve. The growing importance of the democracy agenda within the American foreign policy- making process, which would gather pace throughout the 1990s, frequently resulted in more problematic questions and moral tradeoffs than unambiguous answers.

The presidency of George H.W. Bush was notable for the relative lack of attention afforded to Indonesia. Simply put, Bush and his closest advisors were far more concerned with immediate issues of far greater fundamental importance than they were the workings of a seemingly stable if unsavoury ally in Jakarta. As the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Soviet Union showed unmistakable signs of teetering, Bush – a pragmatist by temperament who instinctively favoured stability, reinforced by his diplomatic experience – focused its diplomatic efforts in areas other than largely away from Southeast Asia. The Gulf War, which involved careful coalition crafting to counter Saddam Hussein’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait, left little opportunity for further attention to a region that, having been tumultuously involved in the first three decades of the Cold War, had now reached some semblance of regional stability.

Within Indonesia, however, the domestic stability of the New Order was showing unmistakable signs of fracture, internal rot, and discontent. As protests against Suharto’s regime grew, so too did overt repression and attempts to reassert control, spurring further protests and demands for a more open society. A funeral procession by East Timorese independence activists in late 1991 – perhaps the largest and most overt protest against Indonesian rule since 1975 – became a bloodbath once
Indonesian troops fired into the crowd without warning, resulting in the death of approximately 200 individuals. While attention remained focused upon the Middle East and the ongoing collapse of the Soviet Union, American support for the Indonesian military throughout the New Order period came under new criticism. After the Dili massacre, “the issue of human rights in East Timor [became] the single-most contentious issue in US-Indonesian relations”. IMET training, a relatively low-cost but highly prestigious program by which foreign military officers receive training within the United States, was suspended in the aftermath of the massacre in East Timor due in large part to the global outcry following the public showing of an undercover video made during the procession.

The abrupt end to the Cold War caught many by surprise, and it either continued or introduced dynamics that proved to have a major impact upon US-Indonesia relations. As anti-Communism served as the New Order’s raison d’être both domestically and internationally, the collapse of Communism forced Suharto to reevaluate Indonesia’s orientation. The indisputable progress made in poverty reduction and economic growth under the New Order regime, while praised abroad, suffered from the perception of crippling systemic corruption domestically. Islamist-friendly policies designed to co-opt the large, influential, and long-standing Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, brought only brief respite during the 1990s, as increasingly strident calls for greater democratization from a wide spectrum of civil society would prove to be an important political dynamic during this period. Furthermore, following three decades of control, questions of succession became an extremely important consideration.

How, then, can American foreign policy towards Indonesia during the Cold War be best understood? While taking into account the enormous differences in emphasis and approach between Administrations over the nearly five decades of bipolar competition with the Soviet Union, from the last days of the Second World War until the unexpected and abrupt Soviet collapse in 1991, American policy was

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102 “What started the blaze of gunfire at the cemetery? In the Timorese view, intentional counter-subversive provocation. In the Indonesian government’s view, an unacceptable infraction of public order. The initial cause, whatever it was, is less important than the fact of the troops’ sustained fire at pointblank range into an unarmed crowd, without a call to disperse.” Friend estimates the number of “immediate dead, subsequent dead, and the inexplicably missing at around 200”, though other estimates vary widely. Friend, 275.

103 Friend, 275.
determined far more by the personalities and prospects on the Indonesian side of the equation. As such, the fateful circumstances of 1965 and the bloody transition between Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Suharto’s New Order loom large—as of course they do most of all for the people of Indonesia.

Dating to before the Second World War, the Netherland East Indies and later Indonesia loomed large as a nation of both potential opportunity and difficulty for the United States. While American support for Indonesian independence was an important factor in the struggle’s eventual success, this was born at least as much from American frustration with Dutch action and negotiating positions as it was genuine support for the Indonesian cause. The growing power of Sukarno throughout the 1950s, due to his individual charisma as well as chronic, inherent instability within the Indonesian political process, posed a dilemma for Washington: while there was general agreement over Indonesia’s importance to the United States in abstract strategic terms, Sukarno’s outspoken support for the neutralist cause and refusal to take a stronger stance against the growing strength of the PKI complicated American foreign policy substantially. Sukarno’s declaration of “Guided Democracy” convinced the Eisenhower Administration that Sukarno was likely to lead Indonesia further towards Communism, a belief that resulted in Washington’s direct covert support for a short-lived and ultimately highly counter-productive rebellion lead by malcontents based primarily on Sumatra and Sulawesi.

Following the rebellion, with concern still high over the trajectory of Indonesia’s foreign policy, American policy-makers attempted to work through the Indonesian military to establish and reinforce alternatives to Sukarno with negligible success. Having negotiated the successful resolution of the West Irian issue largely in Indonesia’s favor, some in Washington allowed themselves to imagine a new relationship with Indonesia; their hopes were dashed by the destabilizing consequences and economic challenges of konfrontasi. More fundamentally, the viability and likelihood of such a development was dubious at best. As Sukarno moved further to the left and threatened to join the Communist camp, the domestic tension between the PKI and the military proved to be too difficult for even a politician of Sukarno’s ability to handle. Efforts by the PKI to allegedly engineer a purge of the army leadership led to a counter-coup that decimated the PKI in one of the worst episodes of mass killing during the Cold War.
The events of 1965 were far-reaching for the United States, as Suharto made clear his intentions to break from the destabilizing policies of his predecessor and unequivocally align Indonesia with the West. The prospect of a Communist revolt within Indonesia became a near impossibility. The United States relied upon Indonesia as a close ally while the former was involved in the Vietnam War; it was under this backdrop that two of Indonesia’s most controversial actions took place – the 1969 West Irian “Act of Free Choice”, which resulted in Indonesia taking over the province, and the 1975 invasion of East Timor amidst the collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the “threat” of a Communist beachhead being established within the Indonesian archipelago.

Indonesia, despite the remarkable economic progress over several decades of New Order, faced a highly uncertain future at the end of the Cold War. Presidential succession was a particularly touchy subject. While Suharto’s two and a half decade rule had resulted in substantial economic gains, Indonesians from across the political spectrum had grown weary of the controlled and contrived public political space permitted by the New Order regime. By the end of Suharto’s fifth term in office in 1993, Indonesia had become, in the words of an authoritative author of this period, “a nation in waiting”. Having effectively controlled the levers of political and civil space for decades, Suharto faced new challenges in maintaining balance between an increasingly diverse set of societal forces. These included the military, religious leaders and organizations, civil society, and economic and political elites.

Despite the New Order’s heavy restriction on political activity, civil society grew throughout the 1990s, gaining strength as both direct and indirect challenges to Suharto’s long rule proliferated. The immense difficulty in effectively limiting the political activities of over 200 million individuals in an archipelago as diverse as Indonesia’s for nearly three decades bore some responsibility. The end of the Cold War also contributed, as Indonesians witnessed the previously closed societies of Eastern Europe remove heavy restrictions on political speech and dissent. The recasting of the entire framework under which Indonesians understood and engaged with the world caused uncomfortable tension within Indonesian society, and by extension for Suharto and his supporters in Washington. The tremendous growth in
living standards over past decades also created demand for a more open society.  

So too did pressure from international advocates, including the United States, even as Suharto typically managed to deflect direct criticism and effectively outmanoeuvre international critics. In an attempt to address these concerns in a typically controlled manner, Suharto continued to co-opt the growing opposition movement by, among other things, continuing to allow only two officially-sanctioned parties (Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI, and the Muslim-oriented Development Unity Party, or PPP) to contest elections against the regime-dominated Golkar Party. Golkar maintained enormous institutional advantages – including heavy restrictions on the new parties outside of designated election periods and strong, overt links between Golkar and military figures. The surreal nature of the heavily managed “elections” gave many Indonesians the desire for a more open political space – such as when prominent ABRI figures appeared at Golkar rallies wearing yellow, the party’s official colour. A period of relative openness abruptly ended in 1994 with the suspension of the highly regarded news magazines *Tempo, De Tik*, and *Editor*, as well as heavy-handed (and ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to prevent Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Sukarnaputri, from becoming PDI party leader. Rather than demonstrating the strength of the New Order as intended, it was widely interpreted as a desperate attempt to repel the incoming tide of popular opposition.

As a senior military officer before he assumed the presidency, Suharto had a complicated history with military elites. The military’s concept of *dwi fungsi* (“dual function”) controversially ensured a place for the military in the political and

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105 As an example, following the efforts of the Netherlands to tie aid to human rights after the 1991 Dili massacre, Suharto dismantled the Dutch-led Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), founded in 1967 after Suharto took power. “The move was enormously popular and proved to be cost-free. A new aid group, the Consultative Group on Indonesia, was formed with the World Bank at the helm and in July 1992 it allocated Indonesia US$4.94 billion in new grants and low-interest loans, a four per cent rise over the amount approved the year before.” Samantha F. Ravich, *Marketization and Democracy: East Asian Experiences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 165.

106 Golkar never received less than 60% of the vote in Suharto’s five “elections”. Speaking before the 1977 Parliamentary elections – Suharto’s second – highly-regarded Australian journalist David Jenkins said that the major problem facing Golkar was “not so much that [it] will not get enough votes but that it will get too many.” Jenkins was later banned from Indonesia for an unflattering headline suggesting comparisons between the immense corruption of ousted Filipino leader Ferdinand Marcos and Suharto. Quoted in Schwarz, 223; also, Elson, 220, 41; David Jenkins, "After Marcos, now for the Soeharto billions," *Sydney Morning Herald*, Apr 10 1986.
economic realms, in addition to seeking to uphold the integrity of the Indonesian state. In practice, this meant buying off the support of the military through economic, political, and prestige-boosting practices. Suharto sought to prevent the rise of potential rivals through a divide-and-rule policy towards the military, including manipulation of “green” (Islamist) and “red and white” (secular nationalist) factions within the military. As Suharto moved to support policies more in line with Islamist ideals in the 1990s, the “green” faction (closely associated with Suharto’s son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto) gained in favour. But in the complicated machinations of army politics, General Wiranto – standard-bearer of the red and white faction – retained the powerful position of Commander-in-Chief. This was part of a deliberate effort on Suharto’s part to “ensure…that no such consensus would emerge among the top rank of officers. He loaded up the military leadership with officers he considered personally loyal to him and fostered rivalries between two main groups” – Prabowo’s greens and Wiranto’s red and whites. To further complicate matters from the US perspective, Prabowo was seen as somewhat of a “golden boy” (and a potential Suharto successor) by the Pentagon, which remained eager to stay on good terms with an ambitious and quickly rising figure so close to Suharto.

Bill Clinton entered the White House in 1993 with intentions to focus primarily upon pressing domestic issues, befitting both the domestic focus of the campaign and the lack of experience and interest of his key advisors in foreign policy. But as the first President of the post-Cold War era, Clinton faced a particularly challenging international agenda. Notably, this included the ongoing dismantling of the Soviet Union and new freedom for Eastern Europe, in addition to a series of “non-traditional” or “new” security threats, such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia and humanitarian crises in both Haiti and Somalia. Despite this, Clinton’s initial reaction was to maintain his focus on domestic matters. Early missteps and a national

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109 “David Gergen, who had worked in a number of White Houses of different ideological and political bents, thought that under normal circumstances a president spent 60 percent of his time on foreign
security team rife with personal tension did little to change Clinton’s initial domestic focus.

The early foreign policy performance of the Clinton Administration was dismal.\textsuperscript{110} Internal causes were numerous, reflecting personality clashes, a lack of high-level experience in foreign policy, difficulties in getting Clinton’s attention due to his bias towards domestic issues, and an outright aversion to the formation of a coherent grand strategy. The external issues were challenging enough: America was in a new age with new challenges, ones that differed fundamentally and significantly from the security issues of the Cold War. The resounding losses of Clinton’s Democratic Party in the 1994 mid-term elections forced Clinton to focus greater attention on foreign policy due to his inability to pass elements of his domestic agenda.

Within this context, American policy towards Indonesia, and even Southeast Asia more broadly, largely remained one of indifference. Southeast Asia attracted little sustained attention amongst even foreign policy professionals, and while Indonesia ranked as an important country within the region, Northeast Asia attracted the bulk of the Clinton Administration’s attention towards the Asia-Pacific region. North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon program had substantial consequences globally, leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework Agreement. China’s provocative moves in the Taiwan Straits in early 1996 in response to a visa being granted to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui (mid-1995) and then the holding of presidential elections in Taiwan in 1996 drew a strong American response. Trade and currency issues with Japan dominated the economic agenda. Even when Southeast Asian issues did come up, the focus was largely on concerns over regional instability stoked by competing territorial claims within the South China Seas. These claims, potentially rich in oil and gas reserves, also involved China.

American foreign policy towards Indonesia throughout the mid-1990s reflected a combination of this strategic indifference and growing localized concern.

\textsuperscript{110} “The Clinton administration began awkwardly. The president was overloaded, preoccupied with domestic issues. Foreign policy was getting only the most marginal attention; some foreign policy analysts, sensing the short shrift given a number of issues, thought it only a matter of time before the administration stumbled somewhere in the world.” David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals} (New York: Scribner, 2001), 242.
some of which became reflected in American policy. For the most part, however, the United States struggled to determine an effective approach to engage the Suharto regime. While efforts to effectively promote human rights in the bilateral context remained a component of the Administration’s approach, Clinton’s weakened domestic position following the humiliating losses in the 1994 midterm elections left little scope for Clinton to push hard on the issues. (Having campaigned on greater respect for human rights, the United States did censure Indonesia over Jakarta’s treatment of East Timor – the first time the US had done so.) This continued following Clinton’s 1996 reelection, in which it became public that Indonesian businessman James Riady had funneled illegal campaign contributions to Democratic candidates, including Clinton, which added a degree of high sensitivity (and unwanted attention) to the relationship.\footnote{Cindy Shiner, "Riady Denies Ties to Chinese Spy Agency; Clinton Friend Rejects Senate Panel Claims," \textit{Washington Post}, February 28 1998.} While engagement with the Suharto regime remained necessary due to Jakarta’s regional influence, little effort was made by Clinton or the isolationist-inclined Republican Congress to develop the relationship in any meaningful way. Domestic policy and partisan battles relegated foreign policy debates to a distant concern, in part due to the end of the Cold War and the hope that America could, after “winning” the Cold War, finally turn its attention to home. Indonesia barely rated a mention in a field increasingly starved for attention.

This also became reflected in the gradual but important change in what constituted foreign policy. Following the end of the Cold War, traditional military-political understandings of foreign policy were increasingly forced to share the stage with matters such as economic and trade policy. Indeed, several of Clinton’s notable foreign policy successes in his first term reflected this new foreign policy paradigm, including passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the creation of the World Trade Organization. The bailout of Mexico in 1995 demonstrated the increasingly important role that international finance played in the foreign policy of nation-states in a globalizing world.\footnote{Notably in the case of Mexico, Congressional and public opposition to the bailout meant that the Treasury Department unilaterally used the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to provide the bailout. When Congress then restricted the ability of Treasury to do this again, it meant that in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Treasury Department carefully considered Congressional, and particularly Republican, skepticism of the IMF and bailouts before acting.} Treasury officials became increasingly influential figures in foreign policy considerations as “globalization” and trade liberalization became a central component of international relations. Clinton
spotlighted Indonesia as a country with which the United States could boost commercial access for American companies.

By 1996, the increasing pace of economic integration and lowering of trade tariffs had spurred significant growth around the world. The so-called “Asian tigers” – the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia which attracted substantial international investment over the early 1990s – were particularly noteworthy representatives of the tremendous benefits of liberalized trade, even though such benefits frequently reinforced existing divisions within society. The export-led growth model pioneered by Japan in the post-World War II period continued to transform the economies of East Asia, including Indonesia. Despite wide disparities in their individual circumstances, as well as the means by which these countries attempted to reach their goals, a 1993 World Bank report lauded the “Tigers” for the remarkable improvement in per capita GDP that each enjoyed.113 This was particularly significant given the low base from which nearly all of them had started only a few decades earlier. Growing apprehension about the high levels of debt that many commercial banks in the region had taken on soon grew to larger concerns over whether the rapid growth the region had experienced was sustainable. Still, foreign money flowed into the region at a substantial pace, allowing local companies and banks to expand at a significant pace. The implications of this would substantially impact the United States, Indonesia, and the very nature of their relationship.

Throughout the 1990s, there was a strong disconnect between the underlying strategic culture that informed and shaped American grand strategy and the nature of US foreign policy towards Indonesia, particularly the increasingly problematic autocracy and corruption that defined New Order rule throughout the 1990s. While few predicted the speed with which Suharto would eventually fall from power or the underlying fragility of the New Order, warnings signs nonetheless indicated that the seeming stability that provided the basis for American support was less robust than either a surface-level understanding or New Order supporters suggested. Ironically, the economic and security-related pillars of American grand strategy that had defined the US-Indonesian relationship since the mid-1960s would also prove to be proximate

cause of Suharto’s eventual fall from power, which fundamentally recast and redefined the entire relationship.
CHAPTER 4:

US FOREIGN POLICY AND INDONESIA, 1997-2004

“There is no country in the world of such vital importance to the United States that is less understood than Indonesia.”

-U.S. Representative James A. Leach, 18 July 2001

“Crises and deadlocks when they occur have at least this advantage, that they force us to think.”

-Jawaharal Nehru

“Everyone in this game will have to go, sooner or later.”

-Adam Malik

The period of 1997 – 2004 represented a critical period of transition for the Indonesian-US relationship. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 had devastating effects upon Indonesia, and it quickly transitioned from an economic phenomenon to one that directly challenged and eventually dislodged the entire political and social edifice of the governing New Order regime. After three decades in power, Suharto bitterly resented the perceived arrogance of American policies and shift in priorities during the crisis that

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eventually lead to his resignation after three decades in power. In the aftermath, a resounding majority of East Timorese citizens voted for long-sought independence, a result that accompanied considerable violence and destruction in the former Portuguese colony, one of the poorest areas in the world. A few short years later, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 galvanized the Bush Administration to declare the “War on Terror”, an effort viewed with notable ambivalence by most Indonesians and later outright hostility. In facing each set of circumstances, Jakarta and Washington’s differing priorities resulted in a considerable chill in relations and repeated misunderstandings. Domestic politics in each country further complicated and challenged the bilateral relationship, as leaders juggled the evolving demands of the post-Cold War international order in quick succession after decades of relative stability. Nonetheless, for all of the challenges faced by each, by the end of this difficult period the foundation for a renewed and more mature relationship between the two had been established.

**Asian Financial Crisis**

Politics in the United States and Indonesia had reason to be relatively optimistic entering 1997. In his Second Inaugural Address, President Bill Clinton used soaring rhetoric to describe the challenges facing the United States, both domestically and abroad, describing the United States as the “world’s indispensable nation” and declaring that Americans “will stand mighty for peace and freedom and maintain a strong defense against terror and destruction.” While political uncertainty dominated Indonesia’s political future – in particular, how and when presidential succession would occur amidst growing uncertainty and discontent with Suharto’s continued hold on power – the economic outlook nonetheless offered promising results. The Indonesian economy had grown at the impressive annual rate of 7.6% from 1990 to 1995, during which it had attracted over US$25 billion annually in foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1995, Indonesia ran a modest (officially-reported) budget surplus of 0.6% of GDP. A May 1997 report from the World Bank noted that if this growth rate could be sustained, by 2005 Indonesia would be one of the world’s 20 largest economies, with GDP per capita more

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than doubling over the period. Jakarta had set an ambitious goal of eradicating absolute poverty within a decade.⁵

This report proved noteworthy, though hardly in the manner expected. While economies around the world felt the effects of economic turmoil in 1997-8, East Asia bore the brunt of what was to become known as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The seemingly isolated troubles of the Thai economy beginning in early 1997 started a chain of events that, at the height of the AFC, threatened to unwind global trade networks and substantially reshape the geopolitical and economic landscape of the post-WWII era. This occurred at a time when “globalization” had become a buzzword for increased global economic and financial integration with seemingly unlimited promise to raise living standards across the globe. Russia, still struggling to adapt its economy after decades of Communist rule, defaulted on its sovereign debt obligations; last-second interventions to shore up the economies of South Korea and Brazil narrowly prevented similar fates.

But of all the countries impacted by the economic havoc of 1997-8, Indonesia clearly suffered the most direct consequences. Less than a year after the Crisis began and only weeks into his sixth Presidential term, Suharto resigned amidst enormous popular upheaval. Crippling, violent protests included open defiance of the New Order regime by protesters (tacitly allowed with notable ambivalence by security forces), creating conditions for unprecedented social turmoil. Despite preventing the emergence of any broad-based opposition over three decades of authoritarian rule, “the regime fell unexpectedly as a result of the economic collapse sparked by events outside Indonesia”, demonstrating that Suharto’s “patronage-based political system rested on shaky foundations and the ‘miracle economy’ was extremely vulnerable to external ‘shock’.”⁶

The long-debated and volatile subject of Suharto’s “end game” was resolved with sudden forcefulness. The crisis and resulting power transition impacted US-Indonesia relations enormously, but even more fundamentally these events represented an important shift in two fundamental paradigms: the interwoven impact of political, social, and economic

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⁶ Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 20.
challenges in a rapidly globalizing world, and the accelerating strategic reevaluation of Southeast Asia’s, and more specifically Indonesia’s, importance within American foreign policy.

“If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”

Economic growth across the globe flourished following the Cold War, as increasing economic integration and international trade- and investment-friendly regimes proliferated. This was particularly notable in East Asia, home to the so-called “Asian tigers” – a group of rapidly expanding East Asian economies that attracted substantial international investment throughout the 1990s. Following Japan’s economic model of export-driven growth and directed “strategic investment” into particular industries, the economies of East Asia expanded rapidly in the relative stability of the geopolitical environment of the 1990s. By 1996, important economies throughout East Asia – including Indonesia, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan – had all enjoyed annual GDP growth rates in excess of 5% since the decade began. A 1993 World Bank report credited these “Asian Tiger” economies for the region’s remarkable improvement in per capita GDP and resulting decline in poverty.

The model was not without critics. Economist Paul Krugman described the “East Asian miracle” as a myth, the result of temporary and unsustainable increases in economic inputs rather than increased productivity ("perspiration rather than inspiration"). Doubts over the quality of regulatory oversight and reluctance to implement needed economic reforms persisted. Apprehension over debt levels within regional commercial banks grew to larger concerns over whether the rapid growth of recent years was sustainable, as did patterns of “strategic investment” throughout the region into favoured industries that provided ample opportunities for corruption, particularly in countries in which circles of elite political and economic power were closely linked if not one and the same. Still, foreign money flowed into the region; many Asian leaders, as well as investors in the region, “believed that East Asia’s mix of

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7 This quote, colloquially known as “Stein’s Law”, is attributed to former Nixon economic aide Herbert Stein. Tellingly, Stein was citing international balance of payments crises as an example of unsustainable policies leading to inevitable collapse.
8 Birdsall et al., .
authoritarianism and market intervention had created an Asian miracle that would be immune from problems that afflicted Western economies.”

But by early 1997, cracks appeared. Doubts about Thailand’s macroeconomic future and domestic banking sector resulted in a sustained weakening of the Thai baht. On July 2, 1997, Thailand announced it was abandoning the baht’s fixed peg to the US dollar. The result was immediate panic domestically as consumer prices increased and fears of regional “contagion” effect took hold. A $17.4 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) package was hastily distributed to Thailand later that month in return for implementing “austerity measures” that significantly tightened Thailand’s money supply. Investors became concerned that similar vulnerabilities could similarly impact other regional economies.

As “contagion” fears grew, Indonesia was initially considered to be well-prepared to handle the crisis. Indonesia’s macroeconomic indicators appeared healthy compared to its neighbours, and after a relatively modest weakening in mid-July the rupiah mostly stabilized over the next month. The New Order’s impressive economic accomplishments over the previous three decades – after inheriting a “basketcase” economy that exhibited characteristics of a “chronic dropout” under Sukarno – had resulted in a significant increase in per capita living standards and dramatic poverty reduction. This record instilled faith in the international community and served as “confirmation of the principles of [economic] orthodoxy” within Indonesia and amongst its leaders. While many expected some slowing of the Indonesian economy, Suharto

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11 The conditions attached to the loan – a budget surplus, a curb on inflation, and immediate liberalization of the banking sector – are generally thought to have worsened the crisis’s effects rather than improving them, as a more expansionary approach could have softened the already severe consequences of the recession. See Paul Blustein, *The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 371-92.
14 From the period 1965-1990, in terms of real per capita growth of gross national product, Indonesia averaged 4.5%, one of the highest rates in the world - ahead of Thailand and Malaysia, though behind
had seemingly proved an able economic manager in previous crises – notably through empowering American-educated technocrats to stabilize the economy in the chaotic aftermath of Sukarno’s rule, and when a crash in oil prices during the mid 1980s severely impacted Indonesia’s current account balance and budgetary position.15 While presidential succession remained the dominating factor in Indonesian politics and society, as the crisis developed international opinion (including Washington’s) tended to remain focused upon the strategic stability offered by Suharto’s continued rule. Optimistic thinking in Washington also figured that Thailand’s troubles were likely to stay relatively contained, an assessment based partially upon Mexico’s quick recovery from its own financial crisis in 1994-5.16

Such sanguine predictions were woefully misplaced. The economic crisis quickly spread, leading to self-sustaining cycles of panic and devastating political, social, and economic upheaval throughout the region. The Thai baht continued to decline precipitously following its “float” against the dollar. The currencies and stock markets of Malaysia and the Philippines declined significantly, leading Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir to label international financier George Soros a “moron” and advocate an end to the “unnecessary, unproductive, and immoral” act of currency trading. These comments further spooked already skittish international investors, leading to further economic constriction and withdrawal of capital.17 In October, Hong Kong officials briefly raised bank-lending rates to 300% in response to sustained stock market pressure. South Korea grabbed unwanted headlines soon thereafter, announcing in November that

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15 Significantly, Indonesia’s economic recovery in the 1980’s was due in large part to liberalizing reforms that ended particularly egregious monopolies granted to politically well-connected cronies. “One technocrat, only half joking, described Indonesia’s vigorous growth in the period 1989 to 1991 as a ‘curse in disguise’.” Success removed the impetus for further reform of the crony capitalism structures endemic to Indonesia – structures critical to Suharto’s continued rule. Schwarz, 51

16 US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin later admitted “we thought that after [Thailand] dealt with this disruption, with some slowdown leading to fewer imports and increased exports, healthy growth would return. And although we were always cognizant of the risk of financial contagion, we didn’t rate this probability as very high – in part because the Asian region was still so widely viewed as economically strong and attractive to investors.” Robert E. Rubin and Jacob Weisberg, In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington (New York: Random House, 2003), 218.

17 Edward A. Gargan, “Premier of Malaysia Spars with Currency Dealer,” The New York Times, September 22 1997. Soros defended the importance of capital convertibility and describing Mahathir as a “menace to his own country” and a “loose cannon”. Several weeks later Mahathir suggested the crisis could be a Jewish plot to undermine the Malaysian economy.
it would seek IMF assistance to address massive losses in the value of its currency and stock market; a US$57 billion bailout package was arranged to keep the world’s 11th largest economy from bankruptcy. Further financial market pressure led to another $10B in loans to South Korea, which itself was then followed by a January 1998 agreement to convert $24B in private debt to government bonds. Finance companies and banks throughout the region, including some of Japan’s largest, went bankrupt under the weight of non-performing loans spread throughout the region. By all possible measures, the economic carnage across East Asia was immense.

The Indonesian context

Though the spread of Thailand’s difficulties was initially considered unlikely, if such troubles did multiply, warning signs quickly indicated that Indonesia would likely factor significantly in it. Following a short period of stability immediately following Bangkok’s removal of the dollar/baht link – the Jakarta Stock Exchange hit a new high on July 8, 1997 – the rupiah tumbled, leading Indonesia to follow Thailand’s example and float its currency. Rather than have the desired stabilizing effect, this led to critical examinations of Indonesian banks, many of which held unserviceable loans and were considered to be of questionable solvency. Pressure continued to increase upon the Indonesian economy and Suharto’s leadership, leading an initial “precautionary” IMF package to become a full-fledged rescue by October. The crisis moved with immense speed and destruction. Recognizing the importance of investor confidence and decades-long pattern of corruption throughout the Indonesian economy, October’s $43 billion package required a number of key reforms – most notably within the banking sector (such as closing 16 banks considered insolvent), as well as the dismantling of the most egregious state monopolies and examples of crony capitalism. Deutry Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers visited Suharto shortly thereafter, reinforcing the need for Suharto to implement the reforms required to continue receiving IMF support and restore

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18 Though deposit insurance was provided for “small-time” account holders, the IMF’s closing of the banks was one of the most controversial policy prescriptions during the AFC due to the ensuing financial panic. Some figured that if the banks of the “first family” could be forced to close, less politically connected banks had little chance of surviving. A classic bank run resulted, with approximately $2 billion going abroad following the bank closings, further weakening the rupiah. Blustein, 210; Shalendra D. Sharma, The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, Reform, and Recovery (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), 140-56.
international confidence – not-so-subtly reminding him of Washington’s influence in both arenas.\textsuperscript{19} Despite public affirmations of the IMF package’s importance, Suharto displayed little inclination to implement the reforms – Suharto’s son Bambang Trihatmodjo, after being forced to close the over-leveraged Bank Andromeda that he part-owned, he simply bought out another bank and transferred large portions of Andromeda’s balance sheet to it – before, for good measure, suing the Attorney General for slander. A ten-day rest period in December for Suharto following a series of international trips caused the rupiah to plummet further amidst concerns over Suharto’s health and rumours he had suffered a stroke. In January 1998, a wildly unrealistic national budget – premised upon 4% annual growth assumptions, an exchange rate of 4000 IDR/USD (compared to the prevailing rate of over 7000) – directly contradicted previous pledges of reform to the IMF, casting further doubts about Suharto’s commitment or ability to make difficult decisions damaging to his quickly narrowing base of support. Immediately following the budget presentation, the rupiah would fall to 10,000; by mid-January, it reached 15,000 over doubts the IMF would disperse the next portion of aid due to Suharto’s refusal to implement the reforms. A second IMF package signed in January featured a 50-point agreement between the two parties and emphasized further reforms – with IMF Director Michel Camenduss famously standing imperiously over the seemingly humiliated Indonesian President (\textit{figure below}) as Suharto signed the agreement.\textsuperscript{20}

Amid the worsening crisis, Suharto demonstrated little more interest in implementing the conditions of the second rescue package than the first. The granting of valuable monopolies and government contracts to family members and well-connected individuals had created a powerful constituency for maintaining the pre-crisis status quo and therefore inherent resistance to the IMF-mandated reforms. Over the preceding three

\textsuperscript{19} Washington was certainly not the only capital concerned with Indonesia’s increasingly troublesome trajectory. In addition to sending Summers, Clinton personally called Suharto on January 9: “[o]thers who phoned Suharto were Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Australian Prime Minister John Howard. In the middle of January Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad paid a visit to Indonesia. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, also flew to Jakarta to press the case.” Kees Van Dijk, \textit{A Country in Despair: Indonesia Between 1997 and 2000} (Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2002), 97.

\textsuperscript{20} The list of required reforms was extensive; the “package read like the World Bank’s wish list for reforming every rotten, wasteful distortion in the Indonesian economy…” Blustein, 211.
decades, the vast opportunities to dispense patronage to friends and potential foes alike had reinforced Suharto’s centrality in all aspects of Indonesian political and economic life. It was this very network of patronage that the IMF, and by extension the United States, sought to destroy, though by doing so while Suharto’s increasingly desperate regime controlled the reins of power removed any incentive for cooperation amongst the many beneficiaries of the existing New Order. The necessity of decentralizing economic control and long-standing policy differences between economic technocrats and nationalists raised the stakes, and difficulty, of reform. In this sense, the necessity of economic reform was invariably linked to far-reaching political reform, to which Suharto

![Figure 2. Suharto signing the January 1998 reform agreement under the watchful eye of IMF Director Michel Camdessus. Source: Getty Images file photo.](image)

demonstrated even greater resistance.

Less than a month after the second IMF package, Suharto publicly flirted with the controversial currency board ideas of American academic Steven Hanke, eventually naming him an advisor to his economic council.²¹ In order to address the rupiah’s

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extraordinary loss of value, Hanke proposed establishing a direct link between the rupiah and the dollar – essentially “unfloating” the rupiah and therefore removing the ability of Indonesia’s central bank to print money in a bid to restore international confidence. Hanke’s proposal was strongly opposed by IMF and Washington officials, as it presumably placed the far-reaching austerity and reform measures sought by the international community on the backburner. There were also abundant fears that the plan was a thinly-veiled attempt by Suharto to allow the “first family” to move personal fortunes abroad as soon as the currency stabilized. Following a visit by former U.S. vice president Walter Mondale in March 1998, in which Mondale again emphasized the urgent need for deep reform, Washington’s viewpoint increasingly emphasized Suharto as the principal impediment to crisis’s resolution rather than a stabilizing force. Newly elected to a seventh presidential term shortly after the IMF agreement, Suharto installed the widely-derided “crony cabinet”, which included his eldest daughter (and heir apparent) Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, known as Tutut, as well as timber magnate Mohamed ‘Bob’ Hasan, one of Indonesia’s wealthiest individuals and Suharto’s golf partner. It was an unmistakable rebuke to the international community and a clear statement of Suharto’s intentions to hang on to power no matter what.

After weeks of growing dissent and protests, in April the suspension of fuel subsidies resulted in an immediate 60% increase in petrol prices, further highlighting the stark divide between the wealth enjoyed by well-connected individuals and the disproportionate effects felt by everyday Indonesians. Food shortages caused massive increases in prices; new Social Affairs Minister Tutut imprudently advised Indonesians to eat rabbit if chicken became too expensive. (The comment did not go over well with the Indonesian public.)

An explosion of violence over May 13-15 followed the shooting deaths of four protesters at Trisakti University, as the forceful but largely peaceful protests of the previous months gave way to a convulsion of pent-up anger at the New

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22 She also stoked ethnic tensions by saying that the “rich corporate community – by implication the Chinese – would have to pay up to help the poor…‘We’ll just have to stick up those who can afford it…if they want to run away, well go ahead. But don’t come back here.’” She blamed the failure of her currency-stabilizing “I Love Rupiah” campaign on ethnic Chinese-owned businesses. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), 225. Schwarz, 346
Order regime. The prominent role of ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian economy led to widespread scapegoating and targeted violence amidst the riots, with over 1000 deaths, numerous rapes, and widespread destruction of ethnic Chinese businesses reported. Protesters seized control over the Parliament building on May 18, as rumours rampantly circulated that portions of the military were tacitly aiding aspects of the protest movement in a bid to maintain power following collapse of the increasingly crippled New Order. In this chaotic mix, further rumours circulated that Suharto tacitly allowed the riots as a last-gasp effort to divert popular anger away from the existing order. Amidst near-anarchic conditions in Jakarta, Suharto stepped down from power on May 20, 1998. Vice President B.J. Habibie became Indonesia’s third president.

The crisis neither began nor ended in Indonesia, and had substantial impacts elsewhere in East Asia and the global economy. Economically, Indonesia suffered the deepest and most severe impact, a result of numerous factors that amounted to a “perfect storm”. These included the high levels of cross-investment and the rapidly spreading sense of shared vulnerability amongst regional economies, half-hearted (or non-existent) efforts to address the corrosive effects of long-standing and deep-seated corruption, and the direct impact of international finance, investment, and trade in a rapidly globalizing world. Indonesia shared some of these characteristics with other countries impacted by the crisis; nonetheless, the World Bank reported that “[n]o country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune”. However, the disproportionate effect felt by Indonesia also reflected numerous domestic-specific aspects that amplified the crisis. Weak domestic institutions proved far less robust than previously understood. Furthermore, the pervasive corruption in Indonesian political and economic life – amongst the worst in the world – created increasingly contradictory motivations within the Indonesian bureaucracy and amongst elites, serving

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23 Numerous excellent accounts of Suharto’s fall from power have been published; in addition to those already listed, others include Edward Aspinall, Herb Feith, and Gerry van Klinken, ed. The Last Days of Suharto (Clayton, VIC: Monash Asian Institute, 1999) and Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

24 The World Bank, "Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update," (Washington: The World Bank, 1998), 1. Indonesia’s economic collapse was compared, unflatteringly, to nations at the onset of the Great Depression.
as important proxies for the inescapable larger question of presidential succession. In the end, the New Order collapsed with amazing rapidity less than 11 months after seemingly unrelated difficulties in Thailand “started” the crisis. With the previously “amazing”, “miraculous”, and “remarkable” Indonesian economy in free fall and facing increasingly militant popular dissent, the remaining justification for stifling political openness and obstruction of desperately needed economic reform by the New Order fell apart.

![Graph of Indonesian rupiah per US dollar, Jan 1997 - Dec 2000. Source: TRADINGECONOMICS.com](source: TRADINGECONOMICS.com)

Initially, American foreign policy towards Indonesia throughout this period reflected the reactive nature inherent in any international crisis, particularly one of such widespread scope and unprecedented intensity. Suharto’s succession was long understood as the dominant political issue facing Indonesia, but the complexity of related issues failed to produce coherent strategic vision or policy from Washington. Further complicating policy coordination efforts, the economic nature of the crisis meant the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve played disproportionately large roles relative to more traditional bureaucratic actors such as the State Department; rather than aiding coordination, this led to mixed signals from Washington throughout the crisis through economic policy becoming divorced from the larger, long-term political issues within

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Indonesia. IMF and international community policy recommendations had little chance to succeed given the painful but necessary political sacrifices demanded of Suharto’s regime. With the New Order facing political suicide if the reforms were implemented, Suharto simultaneously undermined the spirit and letter of reforms while continuing to pursue critical IMF assistance. The IMF-required austerity conditions were so unpalatable that Suharto preferred to try his few available (and increasingly unviable) alternatives, such as Hanke’s currency board ideas. His resulting downfall, reflecting the inextricably linked issues of economic reform and political succession, may have been put into motion by the crisis, but there is little doubt that long-stirring domestic factors ultimately decided the New Order’s fate.

The aforementioned lack of policy coordination within the Clinton Administration made full appreciation of the crisis’s severity upon Indonesia and the wider region particularly difficult. Preoccupation with crisis management, poor policy coordination within Washington, and a generalized lack of appreciation of (or knowledge about) Indonesia all contributed to an ineffective response by Washington. A near-complete lack of anticipation within Washington of the crisis further amplified the reactive nature of immediate crisis response, and as the crisis evolved, American policy increasingly moved towards goals more related to discrete political outcomes rather than the more comprehensive goal of minimizing the worst effects of the crisis upon regional

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27 On July 2, 1997, the Indonesian rupiah (IDR) stood at 2435 per US dollar (USD). On September 2, the IDR/USD rate would reach 3000; on December 6, it reached 4000; it would take a mere 48 days for IDR/USD to hit a then-high of 14954 – a six-fold decrease in the IDR’s value over a six month period. Data gathered from http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory.

28 “Not until Clinton’s belated appointment (in mid-1997 after a six month vacancy) of Stanley Roth as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Roth’s forceful advocacy of a more proactive policy toward Indonesia did Clinton attempt to halt the slide.” Nayan Chanda, "A View from Asia (II)," Foreign Policy, Winter 1997/98, 66. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright remained curiously distant throughout the crisis, particularly regarding its impact upon Southeast Asia.
economies. This can best, and most controversially, be seen in American efforts to impose strict reforms on Indonesia that, it was hoped, would address the sclerotic cronyism and immense corruption of the Indonesian economy as a condition for IMF aid.\textsuperscript{29}

Suharto and some supporters claimed that the reforms being forced upon Indonesia actually represented efforts by Western powers, especially the United States, to force him from power – the grim, fatalistic end-game suggested by veteran New Order politician and diplomat Adam Malik many years earlier. It is a claim with some basis, particularly the strongly-held belief amongst senior Treasury officials – including Rubin and Summers – that absent substantial political reforms, the promised economic packages stood little chance of success.\textsuperscript{30} However, such a view substantially underestimates the amount of tension between Treasury officials and their counterparts in more traditional foreign policy areas like the State Department and the NSC, who themselves were particularly concerned about the consequences of having important nations like Thailand and Indonesia potentially descend into chaos. Furthermore, it failed to reflect the inextricable linkage between economic and political power. Treasury officials argued for a hard line on political reforms, while State Department officials emphasized the importance of Indonesian stability in Indonesia due to the lack of a clear (or even desirable) successor to Suharto. Robert Boorstin, a senior advisor to Rubin, summarized the debate: “They thought we were a bunch of ignoramuses poaching on their turf. And we thought they were willing to give any amount of money to anyone under naïve

\textsuperscript{29} Making loans dependent upon reforms – “conditionality” – was attacked across the political spectrum: from the left as a violation of sovereignty (if not worse), and the right as an unnecessary and undesirable extension of the IMF’s remit that would promote “moral hazard”. In addition to the sources listed above, see Martin Feldstein, "Refocusing the IMF," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 77, no. 2 (1998); George P. Schultz, William E. Simon, and Walter B. Wriston, "Who Needs the IMF?," \textit{The Wall Street Journal}, February 3 1998. Also criticized was the dismissal of World Bank and Asian Development Bank advice, both of had significant presences in Indonesia. Ferguson and Rogoff disagreed with this; in Ferguson’s words, “neither Stiglitz nor Krugman offers a convincing account of the East Asian Crisis might have better managed on standard Keynesian lines, with currencies allowed to float and government deficits to rise. Niall Ferguson, \textit{The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World} (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 312Rogoff, .

\textsuperscript{30} Such reforms, had they been implemented, could have resulted in Suharto’s ouster anyway, possibly via military coup or popular outrage – though since Suharto’s effort were so minimal, this represents counterfactual speculation.
assumption that it would actually stabilize the country.” 31 The results reflected an Administration deeply at odds with itself at a time when clear leadership and strategic sensitivity to Indonesia’s situation were necessary. It also reflected a scepticism, and occasionally overt hostility, towards viewing fast-developing events as part of a larger strategic framework. While Nehru’s comment about crises and deadlocks having the advantage of focusing thought rings true, the Administration’s resulting thoughts did not lead to particularly coherent or consistent action.

Clinton seemed far more interested in the domestic implications of his actions (or non-actions) than the impact these would have upon the affected nations. Clinton seems to have spent political capital internationally rather recklessly in an attempt to ration it domestically, supporting the view that “Asia is merely a matter of tactics in his domestic policy wrangles, not of foreign policy strategy” – a situation exacerbated by the ongoing investigation into his relationship with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky. 32 This was further underlined by his remarkable comments at the November 1997 APEC summit, designed to restore economic confidence in the region, in which he optimistically described the convulsions throughout Asia as a “few glitches on the road”. 33 With regional sensitivities still high following Washington’s earlier rejection of a Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund to address the growing crisis, many were shocked at Clinton’s tone-deafness and inability to effectively promote the global economic connectivity he claimed to value so highly. 34

The actions of the United States during the AFC – ad hoc, slow to appreciate the crisis’s severity, and diplomatically gauche – had many contemporary and later critics. In East Asia, the harsh (and arguably counter-productive) conditions required by the IMF were seen by many as an extension of American policy, given Washington’s influence in

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32 Blustein, 229.
33 Chanda.
such discussions. Simultaneously, Washington then allowed a flawed but central international institution like the IMF to bear the brunt of the criticism, a major factor in the loss of domestic political support for future international responses. While Suharto’s strident condemnation of American policy that eventually lead to his downfall had a clear self-interested bias, it was not an uncommon viewpoint within Asia.\footnote{This also misreads American policy – if anything, the United States persisted in the belief that Suharto was central to any recovery longer than either the IMF or the World Bank. Only relatively late in the process – around the naming of the “crony cabinet” – did Washington began considering Suharto more an obstacle than a necessary component to any solution. Schwarz, 351.} The United States was never likely to agree to a massive bailout package, in the face of considerable domestic opposition, without requiring major reforms of the worst excesses of the “Asian miracle” represented by Indonesia. But the lack of political leadership or appreciation of the crisis’s impact upon Asia sentiments nonetheless exposed latent hostility to America’s policy towards Asia.

**Why the AFC Matters**

In the crisis’s aftermath, commentators questioned the overall impact and long-term importance of the crisis. While the initial economic contraction across East Asia was severe, and despite predictions by some that the crisis could represent a decade of lost economic growth in East Asia, overall GDP figures returned to pre-crisis figures within a relatively brief period of time. Combined with the healthy growth of the global economy in succeeding years, proponents of such a view claimed that, while clearly important to the countries involved, the AFC was little more than a financial blip on the much larger screen of international politics, the equivalent of dropping a rock in a smooth pool – enough to cause ripples with lasting effect but not a major threat to the global economy. Furthermore, following the rejection of Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund proposal, the crisis had minimal institutional impact – unlike the reaction to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9 that resulted in the establishment of the “Group of 20” (G20) nations. Critics have argued that the IMF’s reaction to the AFC had as much to do with institutional efforts to renew and expand the Fund’s mandate in a post-Cold War environment as it did with rescuing the economies of Asia.

While superficially attractive, such viewpoints fail to appreciate the true nature of the Asian Financial Crisis’s origin, spread, and impact as harbinger of potentially more
disruptive crises to come. Rather than undercutting the AFC’s importance, the Global Financial Crisis of a decade later served as further confirmation of the serious fault lines in the global economy that had been demonstrated during the AFC. Despite policy missteps, Clinton explicitly (if belatedly) linked economic stability with geopolitical security during his 1998 State of the Union Address. The quick recovery of most of Asia from the AFC belies the danger posed to the entire global economy at the time. This hardly absolves the IMF or individual nations of some responsibility for a failure to appreciate the AFC’s human impact. Instead, it seems more appropriate to conclude that the IMF, as well as the United States, managed to avert a wider meltdown of the global economy not necessarily because of their actions, but in spite of them. One can only speculate on how South Korea’s bankruptcy might have impacted Japan or China; alternatively, a region-wide collapse of Southeast Asian economies would have had immense and potentially irreversible geopolitical and strategic consequences. Blustein describes the period poignantly:

*The danger to wealth, job, and livelihoods is only part of the reason that many...look back on the last summer and autumn of 1998 as one of the darkest they can remember for the world economy since World War II. At times, the events that transpired during this period cast into doubt the progress of Western-style capitalism. The ‘end of history’ proclaimed when the Berlin Wall fell suddenly seemed much less final amid a plethora of signs suggesting that that advancement of free-market ideology, which had appeared so inexorable throughout much of the 1990s, was on the verge of going into reverse.*

Thematically, the AFC was also significant as it represented the first major crisis of the post-Cold War globalization era. While events like the near-bankruptcy of Mexico in 1994-5 foreshadowed the potential consequences of rapidly liberalizing financial flows and was described as “the first crisis of the twenty-first century”, the AFC demonstrated

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36 “…the world’s economies are more and more interconnected and interdependent. Today an economic crisis anywhere can affect economies everywhere...because the turmoil in Asia will have an impact on all the world’s economies, including ours, making that negative impact as small as possible is the right thing to do for America, and the right thing to do for a safer world.” William J. Clinton, Text of President Clinton's 1998 State of the Union Address, 1998. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou98.htm) A 1998 Pentagon report further stated that the “United States views the Asian financial crisis as a core security concern.” U.S. Department of Defense, East Asian Strategy Report 1998, 1998. (http://www.dod.gov/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf)  
37 Blustein, 284.
these risks on a far greater and potentially destructive scale. Even after the economies of East Asia demonstrated early signs of recovery, major crises in Brazil and Russia further undermined confidence. With considerable understatement, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin dryly stated some years later that it “underscored the reality that in an economically integrated world, prosperity in faraway countries can create opportunities elsewhere, but instability in a distant economy can also create uncertainty and instability at home. One country’s success can enrich others, and its mistakes can put them at risk.”

The AFC also continued the process of long-term reevaluation by the United States towards both the economies and geopolitics of East Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. This renewed attention initially reflected largely negative concerns, such as the potential for Indonesia’s “Balkanization”, the immense political turmoil following Suharto’s ouster, and the host of pivotal societal issues left in the New Order’s wake.

The violence that accompanied East Timor’s 1999 vote for independence, much of which involved the Indonesian military and militias with close ties to military channels, raised further major doubts over Indonesia’s future trajectory. From Washington’s perspective, this represented the most serious and uncertain period for American foreign policy towards Indonesian since the immense disorder of the mid 1960s. Over time, however, these doubts increasingly came to reflect positive justifications, focusing on some of the opportunities that closer engagement with Indonesia might allow, as well as ASEAN’s future with a potentially democratic Indonesia at the lead. Future events, including most significantly the terrorist attacks of 9/11, would have an enormous impact upon this process, but without the events and resulting consequences of the AFC, it is difficult to imagine American regional engagement with Southeast Asia, or bilateral attention towards Indonesia, eventually gathering the momentum that it did.

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38 Mexico’s low dollar reserves and political uncertainty, amongst other reasons, led to a major financial crisis (the “Tequila Crisis”) that ultimately resulted in a hastily arranged bailout program, instigated primarily by the United States. This quickly settled the Mexican economy, allowing the Mexican government to pay back the emergency loans in advance of their maturity date. See Blustein, 284 and Frederic S. Mishkin, "Lessons from the Tequila Crisis,” Journal of Banking and Finance 23, no. 10 (1999).

39 Rubin and Weisberg, 214.

In addition to the staggering economic contraction and commensurate rise in poverty, the social and political consequences of Suharto’s downfall were severe. Freed from the heavily restricted political space as Suharto’s hold on power dissolved, protesters sought nothing less than a total dismantling of the New Order regime and immediate introduction of *demokrasi*. The inability of the New Order regime to adjust or reform internally left few options for regime opponents or reform advocates short of overthrowing the ossified regime. Interestingly, Suharto himself does seem to have recognized the gravity of the crisis facing Indonesia, and some efforts to reform the nation politically and economically along the lines demanded by the United States, the IMF, and other powers were made. But officially sanctioned corruption was far too deep, too strong, and too embedded for evolutionary reform.\(^{41}\) The result – Suharto’s resignation amidst violent street protests, much of it targeted at ethnic Chinese as the military largely stood by and allowed it to happen – would add much to the already enormous human costs suffered by Indonesians as a result of the AFC. But it also allowed an emboldened reform movement to gain strength, breaking with Indonesia’s authoritarian past amid optimism that the nation might reach its full potential. Political realities would prove more complicated. These collective events also directly resulted in a new relationship with the United States, though there were still considerable human costs along the way.

**Habibie takes over**

In the immediate aftermath of Suharto’s tumultuous resignation, new President B.J. Habibie sought to stabilize his standing and that of the Indonesian state amidst massive turmoil. He took over a nation undergoing enormous social, economic, and political change. Habibie sought to address this by shifting power towards technocrats that had been marginalized by Suharto’s cronies and establish close links with the international donor community – a reversal of his previous advocacy of “strategic” state

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\(^{41}\) Bruce Gale described the *modus operandi* of the “First Family” as such: “A company is set up with the express purpose of entering an industry that is either closed or partially closed to private business...A license is then obtained from the government, thus greatly increasing the market value of the company. Shares are then sold at a huge premium to foreign investors specializing in the field who have no choice but to buy into the company if they want to invest in the country. After making a substantial profit on the sale of the shares, the founders then sit back and collect dividends as minority shareholders.” Quoted in Phillipe Ries, *Asian Storm: The Economic Crisis Examined* trans. Peter Starr (Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 2000), 147.
investment to spur economic “leapfrogging” in selected industries. Though many protesters were overjoyed to see the end of the New Order, Habibie inspired little enthusiasm personally and could hardly claim much political mandate. His erratic public statements, questionable grasp of economics, and seeming lack of overall vision at a critical juncture further shook the underpinnings of the Indonesian state. Amongst his first actions as president was to defuse a potentially disastrous split within the military leadership between rivals Prabowo and Wiranto, leading to Prabowo and many of his allies being purged from important leadership positions. The economy, still in a , also required immediate attention, as did the still-considerable pressure to reform the electoral system to allow for truly free elections.

Other than his personal lack of political legitimacy, two major issues facing Habibie both related to the traumatic last days of Suharto: the severe treatment of ethnic Chinese during Suharto’s last days, and decades of pervasive corruption endemic to the New Order. The two impacted each other in important ways, with significant political and economic ramifications. Representing approximately 4% of the population, estimates of the ethnic Chinese-controlled portion of the pre-crisis economy ranged from 40-70%. It was in part because of this perceived ‘advantage’ that ethnic Chinese over pribumi (ethnic Malay Indonesians) that led to the campaign of violence, rape and destruction condoned, if not sanctioned, by the Javanese-dominated military in Suharto’s last days. This savage outpouring was a concerted effort, orchestrated in large part by the military and militant Islamists, to make ethnic Chinese “pay” for the relative well-being of their “community” – especially sensitive amidst the severe economic dislocation of the AFC and evocative of the 1965-66 violence. The flight of both financial and human capital

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42 Ries, 147.
43 Though Prabowo would lose the power struggle and be eventually be dismissed (with full pension benefits), Wiranto still faced constraints: his efforts to name an ally, Major General Johny Lumintang, as head of politically important Kostrad command was effectively vetoed by Muslim leaders unhappy with Lumintang’s Christian beliefs. Schwarz, 85-97.
44 Habibie’s pre-presidential economic philosophies – and those of his critics – are well described in Schwarz, 71-97.
45 The methodology in determining such a figure is extremely difficult. Schwarz aims towards the higher numbers, while Hill suggests a total closer towards the lower. Schwarz, 367-71.
46 Significantly, ethnic Chinese across all socio-economic levels were attacked in the May 13-15 riots, indicating motives related to long-simmering ethnic tensions as much as economic grievances. Many poor
abroad in this context was an obvious reaction, suggesting this may have been one of the motivations of those instigating the violence—despite the further social and economic havoc this created. Continued unrest and political uncertainty further limited Indonesia’s ability to attract desperately-needed foreign investment to help stabilize the economy.

Recognized by most—including some important Chinese-Indonesian figures—as a necessary if difficult step, the redistribution of some wealth from ethnic Chinese to *pribumi* hands remains a powerfully controversial issue nearly two decades later.

The most direct factor holding back economic recovery, however, once again related to the enormous levels of corruption that had come to affect every aspect of the Indonesian economy, particularly towards the end of Suharto’s rule. The degree to which Suharto’s network of family and friends, known as the “First Family”, came to control the Indonesian economy was simply extraordinary. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism—*korupsi*, *kolusi*, *nepotisme* or “KKN”—became shorthand for the economic and political dysfunction of the late New Order. Amongst the most egregious—but by no means only—examples of political favours being granted to well-connected insiders involved granting of manufacturing monopolies in important sectors. Suharto’s son Tommy controlled the lucrative production of clove cigarettes, a social staple within Indonesia, while long-time Suharto golfing partner (and briefly, cabinet minister) Mohamad ‘Bob’ Hasan controlled the vital plywood trade—enormously significant given that “Indonesia accounts for some three-quarters of hardwood plywood exports worldwide.”

By preventing competition in these enormously important sectors, the New Order regime was able to line the pockets of its supporters and family members.

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*Chinese resented the business tycoons for perpetuating the popular stereotype of the “greedy Chinese” within Indonesia.*

47 It is not without cause that Suharto was compared to the deposed leader of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos. Estimates of Suharto and his immediate family’s wealth vary wildly, from a few billion dollars up to US$40 billion. Schwarz, 378. In a 1999 cover article, the Asian version of *Time* magazine put this figure at US$15 billion, which led to a lawsuit claiming defamation. John Colmey and David Liebhold, "Suharto, Inc.: The Family Firm," *Time Asia*, May 24 1999.


49 Perhaps the most widely ridiculed and egregious example was Tommy Suharto’s efforts to develop a locally-produced national car, curiously named “Timor”. After receiving a raft of concessions, beneficial tax treatment, and questionable loans, the Timor was a high profile (and extremely expensive) business disaster even before the economic chaos of the AFC. David E. Sanger, "In the Shadow of Scandal, U.S.
substantial pressure on both issues, Habibie would sanction investigations on the anti-Chinese riots as well as Suharto’s personal corruption, only to prevent any real information from coming out from the ensuing examinations. Many of those that stood to be implicated in the campaigns of violence still held positions of power within a military that Habibie desperately needed on his side in order to boost his weak political standing, just as looking too deeply within Suharto’s network of cronies and family members would reveal how widespread the immense corruption amongst the politically powerful elites went. Habibie had little to gain and an immense amount to lose from anything more than a cursory examination of the New Order’s considerable excesses.

American foreign policy towards Indonesia necessarily entered a new era as the defining dilemma of recent Administrations had been resolved with stunning rapidity. With one of the major dilemmas of the past three decades resolved – dealing with Suharto’s succession while supporting the need for immense reform across society – American foreign policy towards Indonesia entered a new era. Optimism would prove to be short-lived, however, as the major changes envisioned by Indonesia’s reformasi advocates following Suharto’s resignation were slow to materialize. While the increasingly emboldened reformasi movement within Indonesia had supporters in Washington, hopes for renewed engagement with Jakarta were largely disappointed as a host of international and domestic events largely distracted US attention from Indonesia. Ongoing NATO military efforts in Kosovo, continued issues regarding Iraq and the Middle East, joint nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and the seemingly never-ending domestic political repercussions related to Clinton’s dealings with Monica Lewinsky – to say nothing of the continued political, economic, and security fallout of the Asian Financial Crisis itself – meant that little, if any, of Clinton’s political capital was used in renewing the US-Indonesia relationship. Even under more advantageous circumstances, few opportunities existed while the politically hamstrung Habibie remained President.


50 On the latter issue of the endemic culture of ‘KKN’ as well as Suharto’s personal role in it, see Kingsbury, 206-13.
Despite initial claims he intended to serve only as a transition president until 1999 elections, before long Habibie began to indicate otherwise: sounding “eerily like Suharto, Habibie said it would be ‘arrogant’ of him to turn down the people’s wishes for him to remain president, if that’s what they wanted.” He was also demonstrated woeful political naïveté, alienating important demographics at nearly every turn. Having opened the public space to political parties and aware of his limited appeal, Habibie set elections for June 1999, even as doubts immediately circulated about whether they would occur as scheduled. Suharto’s resignation led to a period of tumultuous social unrest, as tensions that had been subdued and voices that had been silenced for decades boiled to the surface. For international observers, including in Washington, the prospect of continued separatist, communal, and religious-oriented violence potentially foretold the disintegration of the Indonesian state, which would entail unknown negative consequences. A cross-section of military and political elites gave voice within Indonesia to shared similar concerns. The deep divisions within the army – exacerbated by the events surrounding Suharto’s resignation and aftermath – led to ineffective and divided responses to the explosion of social disruption, strife, and violence that accompanied the historic events. The military also showed an “extraordinary propensity to shoot itself in the foot” through heavy-handedness in dealing with protests in a tumultuous period of Indonesian political expression, and demonstrating a general inability to effectively maintain law and order – traditionally, a central aspect of the military’s public and self-defined role. The military’s public image, already under fire for the complicated role it played in maintaining Suharto’s grip on power, suffered accordingly.

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51 Schwarz, 382; Dijk, 252-88.
52 For discussion, see "Disintegration Dreaded," The Economist, December 9 2000. and Huxley, 349. Also useful is Cribb, 169-78. These suggest that concerns of potential “Balkanization” for Indonesia were alarmist and overplayed. Cribb points out that Indonesian military officials were particularly prone to point out Indonesia’s national fragility – at least in part because these reinforced the need for a strong, active military role in public life to maintain cohesion by “promot[ing] a sense of national alarm” and argue in favor of a “return to national discipline.” Schwarz also attributes this propensity in the post-Suharto era to the many military officers that “continue to view civilian rule as a recipe for national disintegration.” Schwarz, 406-8.
53 Barbara S. Harvey, "The Future of Indonesia as a Unitary State: Separatism and Democratization," (Center for Naval Analyses, 2002).
Another significant factor in this highly dynamic environment, however, related to Habibie’s ongoing quest for domestic political legitimacy, as well as the reformasi movement’s continued efforts to delve into the many unsettled issues left following three decades of New Order rule. Political and civil society, which for so long had been denied a voice under Suharto’s rule, exploded with energy as Habibie sought to address the worst excesses of the New Order by legalizing political parties and allowing an unprecedented period of openness and debate. Following the highly restrained public space of the New Order, a degree of chaos ensued. Revelations of systemic abuse, torture, and murder inflamed opinions yet further, particularly in East Timor, West Papua, and Aceh. Continued ethnic and religious strife, combined with renewed separatist sentiment across the archipelago amidst immense economic distress did little to soften the flames of protest and violence.

Violence exploded across the archipelago, reflecting a formidable deterioration of social ties. Intercommunal strife between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas (Maluku) resulted in thousands of deaths and the destruction of several churches and mosques. Migrant Madurese, having settled in Kalimantan, were targeted by native Dyaks in a brutal campaign of head-hunting and dismemberment. Though the circumstances of both situations defy easy explanation, they similarly speak to the near-anarchic societal breakdown in the late 1990s. In a rather apt metaphor for Indonesia during this period, forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan grew so massive that the resulting haze severely impacted air quality throughout Southeast Asia. Amidst a particularly severe drought, long-term mismanagement and relentless exploitation of the forest created the conditions for the “worst fires of the modern world.” The military, long the self-appointed protectors of Indonesian integrity, proved either unwilling or unable to do much about it. Others painted an even darker picture. The military was widely rumoured to be encouraging such various reasons, including to have the violence serve as a reminder of the military’s importance during a period in which military’s “state within a state” structures were being scaled back (“[t]o justify a need for more firefighters, set

more fires”). Explanations also included using the violence to strengthen the business interests of the military, divide the opposition to strengthen the military’s political strength, and to serve as a distraction from investigations of Suharto or military figures, particularly after the intense criticism of the military’s role in East Timor.

These developments left the United States in an awkward, difficult position. For most of the period following Indonesian independence, close relations with the Indonesian military had served as a major pillar of American foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. Justifications for doing so were varied over time, but were generally based upon the sense that security relations with Indonesia were central to the complicated geopolitics of the region. Under Sukarno, the US sought to bolster its standing with Indonesian military officers at a time when bilateral relations were increasingly tense, if not dysfunctional. Following Sukarno’s ouster, emphasis was placed upon the military’s role in maintaining societal and political stability and ensuring close relationships and influence with professional colleagues in Indonesia. Most obviously, throughout the Cold War, the United States sought to promote and reinforce the military’s anti-Communist stance, though following the mass killings of 1965-6 there was little real chance of Indonesia falling to Communist forces. The military’s rapid fall from grace – and more troublingly, being implicated in the violence that was consuming the nation – in the aftermath of Suharto’s resignation put a rather emphatic point on what had been already suggested throughout the 1990s: major aspects of the US-Indonesia relationship, including but hardly limited to the close military-to-military relationship between the two, required a fundamental reevaluation, something that had been previously hinted at since at least 1991 but never seriously or comprehensively conducted. Human rights abuses, which increasingly came to light amidst the new atmosphere of political openness, were particularly damaging for the military. Though scattered throughout the archipelago, some of these abuses related to past conduct in East Timor. But upcoming events in East Timor would prove to be the most damaging to the

56 This did not stop the New Order regime, including the military, from regularly citing the Communist bogeyman when politically expedient to do so. As with many authoritarian regimes during the Cold War and after, threats (perceived or real) were frequently portrayed as Communist or leftist-inspired.
Indonesian military’s standing, and therefore negatively impacted relations with the United States. Not for the first time, it was largely the military’s own conduct, whatever its self-justification might have been, that led to the greatest criticism.

**East Timor**

The former Portuguese colony of East Timor, under Indonesian control since 1975, had long been a sensitive target of criticism for Indonesia, with the issue brought up at seemingly regular intervals in the United Nations General Assembly. The massacre of East Timorese protesters sympathetic to independence in 1991 by members of the Indonesian military became known as the Santa Cruz massacre, and brought renewed international condemnation including military assistance restrictions demanded by the US Congress. Domestically, it also proved significant, as the resulting investigations into misconduct by the Indonesian military demonstrated the growing friction between Suharto and the military elite. In the period of openness that followed Suharto’s resignation, separatist sentiment increased in those areas in which control by Jakarta was most contested, and a region only partially (and recently) incorporated into the Indonesian state, East Timor became a natural flashpoint. Contributing factors included the burgeoning reformasi movement, long-repressed political voices, and a weakened and heavily divided post-New Order military.

In the midst of the rapidly-changing political environment following Suharto’s fall, Habibie – without consulting the military elite beforehand – agreed to allow a referendum within East Timor to settle whether autonomy within Indonesia or independence was desired. Habibie, eager to relieve considerable international pressure on the issue, figured that such a move would demonstrate his own democratic credentials

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57 The comments of Armed Forces Commander (and future Vice President) Try Sutrisno inflamed the already volatile situation further. He was quoted in an Indonesian newspaper as describing the Timorese as “obstinate” and claimed that the “…armed forces cannot be underestimated. Finally, yes, they had to be blasted. Delinquents like these agitators have to be shot and we will shoot them. [The army] is determined to wipe out whoever disturbs stability.” Schwarz, 213.

58 The circumstances surrounding Habibie’s decision were extraordinary. After receiving a letter from Australian Prime Minister John Howard regarding East Timor in January 1999, “Habibie took it home with him one day and laid it on his night table when he went to bed. In the middle of the night, he awoke, turned on his light, scribbled his solution to the East Timor problem on Howard’s letter, and went back to sleep…Habibie had a meeting with the American ambassador, Stapleton Roy, that morning and gave him the handwritten ‘policy paper,’ which Habibie said he would be announcing to the press soon.” Powerful military and political figures were “notably stunned”. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry later called Roy for a copy of the proposal, which apparently he alone possessed. Friend, 434.
in advance of the June 1999 elections, improve his standing with the international community, and demonstrate the will of the East Timorese for continued incorporation. Other factors included the considerable cost of maintaining a large (and resented) military presence in a poor, distant province. This showed astoundingly poor political judgment: most Indonesians saw little reason to support Suharto’s chosen protégé, international observers criticized the poor preparatory work and continued TNI presence within East Timor, and in the first opportunity to determine their own political fate, local voters overwhelmingly chose independence. Even a cursory understanding of local conditions would have indicated that independence would almost certainly win over continued incorporation within Indonesia.

The TNI sent large numbers of uniformed military and pro-Indonesian militia units, money, and weapons to East Timor before, during, and after the vote. This occurred despite claims from Wiranto, the commanding general in the area and a politically powerful military figure, that the TNI would withdraw – suggesting that he either knew about such movements and was blatantly lying, or that rogue elements within the military acted with impunity.\(^{59}\) Given the dark history of military-led repression and extralegal killings within East Timor, the introduction of paramilitary forces within the province hinted at further violence and mayhem. In the lead-up to the vote, TNI-supported militias, paramilitary groups, and pro-integration irregulars “punished” the East Timorese voters, and following the vote in favor of independence by a wide and unmistakable margin, conditions worsened. The result was enormous destruction and further violence, with a resulting human crisis as tens of thousands crowded into refugee camps to flee the mayhem. Eventually, a largely Australian-led United Nations force helped stabilize conditions. The systematic campaign of murder and rape had left approximately 1000-2000 dead and countless physical and emotional scars.\(^{60}\) For the people of East Timor, the long-sought goal of self-determination carried an extraordinarily heavy price.

\(^{59}\) The truth, as with many things in this period, most likely combines aspects of both. Prabowo, despite having lost the power struggle with Wiranto, was suspected of contributing to the chaos from the shadows. Wiranto was eventually dismissed for his failure to maintain control of the military, which some claimed should result in a trial for war crimes. Shiraishi, 73-82.

\(^{60}\) Remarkably, an Indonesian government commission (KPP-HAM) reported that crimes in East Timor were “so systematic, planned, collective, massive and widespread as to constitute gross violations of the
Internationally, the violent chaos provoked severe and immediate criticism of Indonesia. Although the introduction of American troops, either independently or in conjunction with the UN force, was ruled out early and consistently on a bipartisan basis, the reaction from Washington involved heated criticism of Indonesia, particularly as charges of negligence in allowing such violence to occur were increasingly replaced by claims of promoting and aiding in the violence. The integrationist militias and military units did little to disguise their presence. US pressure, though late in coming, did prove pivotal in Habibie’s eventual acquiescence to the UN Force, a key step in halting the violent cycle. Critical to this was the unyielding line taken by US Ambassador Robert Gelbard and Adm. Dennis Blair, Pacific Commander; the close relationship between the US and Indonesian militaries made Blair’s firm criticism carry particular weight with the TNI elite. The US Congress took a particularly strong stance on the events, with Indonesian conduct in East Timor subject to a rare joint hearing of the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. The Leahy Amendment severely curtailed US military assistance to the Indonesian army until substantial accountability improvements in key areas of human rights were certified.

Within Indonesia, reaction to the international response was mixed. For some members of the reformasi movement, the dark cloud of suspicion that already hung over the military had, if anything, already revealed a corrupt, uncontrollable, and deeply compromised organization. Some reformers within the military, eager to ‘return to the barracks’ following the deep politicization of the New Order era, found themselves strengthened by the hard-line behavior of the conservative military factions. A considerable portion of the population, however, found themselves shocked at the rapidity with which Indonesia had become an international pariah due to the actions of small, unaccountable portions of the military. Indonesians remained overwhelmed, still traumatized and trying to make sense of the chaotic recent past: the economic dislocation of the Asian Financial Crisis, the riots and strife that accompanied Suharto’s fall from

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Geneva Convention, as well as of national law.” Individual prosecutions following the report were not nearly as successful as many hoped. See "Report of the Investigative Commission into Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM)," in Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military & Violence in East Timor in 1999, ed. Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald (Canberra: Strategic & Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002).

61 Priest, 238-43.
power, the societal- and archipelagic-wide disorder that continued to rack the country under Habibie’s erratic transitional rule, and finally the violent, vindictive destruction of East Timor. While relations with Australia suffered a major blow with the introduction of the UN mission – the image of “large white foreigners carrying weapons on what had shortly before been Indonesian territory” invoked emotional historical memories of the independence struggle against the Dutch – considerable disappointment was also targeted at the United States. The US seemed to add one disappointment on top of another: having ignored Southeast Asia for most of the 1990s, the Clinton Administration seemingly required unrealistically harsh conditions as a requirement for IMF aid, then showed little eagerness to engage once long-supported US ally Suharto had been ousted. In the disorder and confusion of the East Timor vote, Washington diplomatically ostracized an entire nation for the behavior of a few rogue TNI officers in a distant corner of the archipelago. While perfunctory praise greeted Abdurrahman Wahid’s election as President in late 1999, comparatively little attention had been given to the earlier nationwide parliamentary elections in June, the first since 1955, and the difficult transition to a democratic society. The resentment and emotion associated with these disappointments would not fade quickly.

Of course, the view from the United States looked very different. For most of the prior decade, the United States had failed to pay much strategic attention to Southeast Asia due to the region’s relative stability and an especially complicated international environment rather than neglect. The working relationship with Suharto had remained productive, particularly following his leadership role in persuading other developing Pacific Rim states to join the APEC forum in 1993, while reformers within Indonesia could take solace in the Clinton Administration’s vote to condemn army abuses in East Timor. Similarly, during the Asian Financial Crisis, necessary economic reforms were stifled by a lack of leadership by Suharto in addressing the remarkable levels of corruption and cronyism that limited Indonesia’s potential and, ultimately, fed the crisis itself. In East Timor, the belated but strong response by the United States prevented a horrible situation from getting worse; until the TNI demonstrated a willingness to

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62 Friend, 446.
adequately incorporate basic reforms, including respect for human rights, strict limits would remain on American aid. It was the Indonesian military, or at least particular elements therein, that put the United States in the position – and such a position required a firm stand against sustained and coordinated terror campaigns against civilians.

What, then, to make of American policy towards Indonesia during the late 1990s? The overwhelming characteristic of the period was tremendously chaotic and rapid change: few, if any, societies faced more upheaval in so many areas in such a brief period of time as Indonesia in the late 1990s. For both Washington and Jakarta, the rate of change outstripped either’s ability to foresee likely events, much less control them, even if this was reflected in different ways with diverse effects. Washington’s foreign policy, subject to both predictable and unpredictable events across the globe, was unquestionably slow to appreciate Indonesia’s situation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The reaction of the Clinton Administration to the burgeoning crisis in Asia seemed initially aloof and distant, and then once it engaged with the seriousness of the crisis, came off as opportunistic and aggressive in pushing economic reforms via the IMF – some of which, particularly in Indonesia’s cause, proved counterproductive. Tact and diplomacy were notably absent.

In many ways, this period served a necessary purpose in updating and preparing the US-Indonesian relationship for the challenges of the 21st century. The Asian Financial Crisis looms particularly large over this period of time, and not only because it led directly to Suharto’s ouster and the convulsions that resulted in the East Timor tragedy. As a major political and economic event, the AFC was indicative of the rapidly changing international environment and an integrating global economy, one that differed significantly in practical and thematic ways from the Cold War paradigm that had defined Washington’s view of Indonesia for nearly all of its entire history. Indeed, the changes that transpired during this period laid the groundwork for what became a substantial shift in the relationship between the two nations. Gone was the corrupt authoritarian tolerated over three decades for the staunch anti-Communism and stability he delivered; in his place was a deeply flawed and fragile, but nonetheless transitional, democracy. Civilian rule, in question throughout Habibie’s uncertain presidency, was maintained amidst deep
social pressures and economic dislocation, and the surprise election of the respected cleric Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as President was enormously significant.

The 1999 Parliamentary elections – the first national democratic vote in Indonesia since 1955 – were of considerable importance and obviously an important marker in Indonesia’s transition from New Order autocracy. As such, the optimism they engendered became a major influence on American views towards Indonesia, though subsequent events in East Timor later in the year moderated this assessment. The transitory and fractured nature of the Indonesian political system tempered initial enthusiasm, with the military still representing a substantial voting block and the political elite largely reflecting late New Order political life. Most understood that the political, social, and economic wreckage of the New Order regime would take some time to clear, but the strength of the reformasi movement inspired some qualified hope in Washington. Wahid became President after misgivings from several important political factions about Megawati’s personal and ideological stances, as well as concerns over Habibie’s viability. After reluctantly accepting defeat to Wahid’s compromise candidacy, Megawati became Vice President.

While his presidency was hardly an example of effective leadership, in this particular instance the process itself was of greater significance than the result itself. The independence of East Timor, even amongst the terrible conditions that it occurred, allowed space for a new opening in the US-Indonesia relationship. While the process was hardly smooth, the disorder and uncertainty of the late 1990s in Indonesia created the distance required by the United States to reevaluate the new Indonesia in light of its strategic goals. This would prove instrumental in defining Washington’s new understanding of, and new relationship with, a democratic Indonesia – particularly following the traumatic events of Sept. 11, 2001.

**Indonesia’s Constitutional Crisis**

American observers had generally desired Megawati, Sukarno’s daughter and a prominent moderate opposition figure throughout the last years of Suharto’s rule, to become President for reasons of democratic legitimacy, though Wahid’s standing within Indonesian society did offer encouragement for reform and addressing the many
challenges still facing Indonesia as it transitioned from New Order autocracy. But almost from the start, Wahid courted political tension. The fractious nature of the new political system made his task a difficult one by any means, but it also reflected the manner in which Wahid addressed the major political issues of the day including corruption, political decentralization, and military reform. His position as president had as much to do with Megawati’s own polarizing candidacy and Habibie’s weakness, but from the start of his presidency in October 1999, Wahid’s severely undercut his own political standing. Financial scandals brought a cloud of disrepute over his administration, and opposition to his continued hold on power amongst political and military elites grew. Wahid, who entered office considered to be a committed democratic reformer, proved to be highly erratic, disappointing many members of civil and political society that had advocated far-reaching reforms. In order to boost Indonesia’s beleaguered international standing, he also undertook a high number of international trips, some of which led to positive results. (Restoring Indonesia’s standing within ASEAN was one such example.) However, it also resulted in an absence of domestic leadership at crucial junctures. His penchant for making policy without consulting relevant cabinet ministers or ministries added a degree of uncertainty to his announcements: despite devolving some power to Megawati to shore up his political support in late 2000, Wahid then announced a reshuffle of his cabinet without consulting his Vice President. In ways, Wahid paralleled the ‘sultanistic’ leadership style of Suharto – the final arbiter of national consciousness and indispensable authority figure within Indonesian political life. But with the political and military elite largely holdovers from the New Order, “one of the reasons for Wahid’s inability to make more progress was that he was too removed from the old New Order, and was therefore not powerful enough to bring about the desired but painful changes.”63 It also posed severe challenges for the democraşi movement that had supported his candidacy.

Throughout 2000, the Indonesian political environment showed increasing signs of dysfunction as the reform process faltered. Military reform, decentralization of political power from Jakarta to the provinces, economic reform, and institutionalization of democratic norms – by most accounts the most pressing challenges facing Indonesia –

progressed slowly and in fits and starts. While broad consensus existed about the need for multi-faceted reform, agreement on an alternative to the status quo proved elusive. A significant degree of this can be attributed to the nature of regime change from the New Order to democracy – fundamentally conservative in nature, as many of the political elites of the New Order found themselves in important positions following Suharto’s fall. Political disagreements festered amidst growing political paralysis and an escalatory tone that seemed to condone, if not support, talk of violence to settle political disputes.

Wahid, increasingly frail, legally blind, and of generally poor health following a second stroke in 1998, seemed either unwilling or unable to address the ongoing militancy and unsettled tension within Indonesian society. Violence escalated across the archipelago and included sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians, which increasingly took the form of radical jihadist-inspired bombings of churches. Having failed in earlier efforts to radically reform the military, other reforms under Wahid also slowed, strengthening those resistant to major change. Economic growth floundered as corruption, by some measures, actually worsened following the decentralization reforms of the early post-New Order period. Decentralization of political authority created conditions for rent-seeking corruption opportunities by local ‘little Suhartos’ as regulatory uncertainty in the private sector further restrained economic growth. This attracted the continued attention of the United States, which had long recognized that the astonishing levels of Indonesian corruption served as a major disincentive for international investment as well as negatively impacting economic opportunities throughout society. Corruption, democratization, and military reform, however, would quickly take a back seat to another policy agenda.

Before it did, however, Wahid’s political standing became increasingly untenable. In 2000, two different scandals (Bulloggate and Bruneigate) suggested he improperly accounted for several million dollars. Violence continued across the archipelago, including terrorist attacks on multiple churches on Christmas Eve, 2000. Having managed to alienate nearly every important faction of Indonesian politics – conservatives for pushing liberalizing reforms, reformers for doing so seemingly half-heartedly, military figures through his selection of individuals for key positions, liberals for ruling
increasingly authoritatively, Islamists for his support (including multiple visits) for Israel, established New Era-power brokers through his attempts at economic reform, and his recognized frailty and erratic management style – Wahid fought a rear-guard action to maintain his office. Political turmoil resulted between his supporters and opponents; eventually, after several efforts, he was eventually impeached by the Indonesian Parliament in July 2001 and replaced by his Vice President, Megawati.

2000 US Election

Upon entering the White House in January 2001, several figures in former Texas Gov. George W. Bush’s administration could claim previous experience in Southeast Asia, including Colin Powell and Richard Armitage (in the Vietnam-era military), and most notably former Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz. Nonetheless, neither the region nor Indonesia itself was considered a top priority for the incoming Administration. Bush spoke little about foreign policy during the campaign, other than suggesting a need for the United States to remain “humble” in its dealings with foreign nations – a swipe at Clinton’s international activism and seeming willingness to deploy American troops abroad. Relations between the United States and Southeast Asia, prone to neglect for long periods before acutely worsening during and after the Asian Financial Crisis, seemed to rate a distant second to Northeast Asia in Bush’s early considerations. The diplomatic tension resulting from the March 2001 collision of US and Chinese military planes over Hainan Island further reinforced this focus, which was reinforced by the substantial (and overlapping) confluence of economic, diplomatic, geopolitical, and security factors in the region.

In time, Bush foreign policy towards Indonesia would undergo considerable evolution, though it was hardly a smooth process. The ongoing ripple effects of the Asian Financial Crisis played a significant role in this, as did the unstable political situation within Indonesia. For both Indonesia and the United States, the international reverberations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks became the dominant factor in the relationship.

64 Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and future Secretary of State under Bush, was described “nearly [having] an aneurism” when Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright challenged him over using his reluctance to deploy US forces in the former Yugoslavia, asking “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” Michael Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-Century Odyssey (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), 360.
Despite Bush’s widespread unpopularity amongst the Indonesian public, American foreign policy nonetheless achieved considerable success. The changing nature of the relationship was marked by the ongoing debate over ties between the American and Indonesian militaries, which itself remained heavily influenced by the process of military reform within Indonesia.

Neither Bush nor Clinton Vice President Al Gore devoted much attention to issues of foreign policy during the 2000 US Presidential campaign. Bush’s relative inexperience on the issues was a vulnerability that he sought to address head-on by criticizing Clinton for his (over)use of American military power throughout the world. By having the American military engaged in primarily “humanitarian interventions”, the United States was losing focus on its core interests:

“We can’t be all things to all people and I think that’s where maybe [Gore] and I have some differences. I am worried about overcommitting our military around the world. I mean, are we going to have a kind of nation-building corps in America? Absolutely not. Our military is meant to fight and win war.”

Bush made clear that a number of figures that played important foreign policy roles from his father’s administration would play prominent roles in his, including figures like Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Dick Cheney. Gore struggled throughout the campaign with finding a way to take credit for his role in shaping Clinton’s foreign policy while distancing himself from the less popular elements of Clinton’s persona and policies. Republicans offered various critiques of Clinton’s foreign policy record during the campaign, primarily emphasizing the need for heightened vigilance towards Iraq, a tougher approach towards China, further development of missile defence systems, and a general wariness of using multilateral institutions like the United Nations. Though some cited Southeast Asia as a region requiring greater degree of attention, it was hardly a front-line concern.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had a sudden, transformative effect on American foreign policy. Though Afghanistan was the most immediate and obvious target of attention, Southeast Asian policy was also directly affected. US troops were sent to the

65 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 282.
Philippines to assist government efforts in defeating a long-running Islamist insurgent group, Abu Sayyaf, which had maintained operational connections with al Qaeda. Various nightmare scenarios in the region were suggested, including the paralysis of international trade through the vital passageways of the Malacca Strait or South China Sea if a terrorist group attacked a large shipping vessel.

Megawati arrived in Washington less than two weeks after the attacks on a pre-planned trip. The tone and subject of the trip clearly had changed considerably, and US officials recognized “the public relations value of early and visible support by the ruler of the world’s largest Muslim population”.66 Megawati, for her part, used the opportunity of her presence in Washington to press for a resumption of military-to-military ties. She described the attacks as the “worst atrocity ever inflicted in the history of civilization”, pledged to “cooperate with the international community to combat terrorism”, and “condemned the barbaric and indiscriminate acts against civilians”. Most significantly, the visit served as an important symbol of global sympathy for and solidarity with the United States, though even a cursory examination of Indonesian public opinion during Megawati’s visit generated a more complicated picture.67 Bush re-emphasized American support for the Indonesia’s territorial integrity (a sensitive point in the relationship following East Timor’s independence) and increased economic assistance while also openly speculating about a resumption of military ties.

Within Indonesia, however, Megawati faced a difficult political balancing act. Following the narrow public space for political discussion under Suharto, public opinion in the reformasi period had become an important and vibrant new force within Indonesian politics. But fragmentations within a political elite still deeply divided over Wahid’s recent ouster also complicated the situation, as did her weak political standing after only two months as president. Moreover, the collapse of the New Order may have shaken up elite politics in significant ways, but many of the same structures and individuals

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remained the same in reconfigured ways the reformasi era. With Indonesian public opinion strongly opposed to the invasion of Afghanistan that followed and increasingly resistant to a “global war on terror” that many Indonesians saw as an attack upon Islam, she found herself in a difficult political position – further complicated by the suspicion and generally low-standing that she had with by Islamic party leaders. She had been elevated to the presidency largely because she was not Wahid, rather than because of personal political support. Megawati attempted to keep to a middle road between the competing demands of maintaining good relations with the United States and the demands of public opinion highly sensitive to claims of a “war on Islam” perpetuated by American anti-terrorism efforts.

The competing demands of international and domestic politics also took place amidst ongoing efforts to address a key demand of the post-New Order polity, namely military reform. This remained a crucial aspect of American policy and was considered a central measure of the health of Indonesia’s democratic transition. Initially, Wahid had aggressively attempted to force reforms upon a military elite that were both broadly suspect of the reformasi movement and unaccustomed to taking orders from civilian authorities. The privileged position that ABRI had enjoyed for most of Suharto’s rule had suffered considerably following the fall of the New Order, both in institutional and prestige terms. (The “dual function” doctrine, the principle justification for military representation in the MPR as a key ‘functional group’, formally came to an end after the 2004 election following a 2002 constitutional amendment.) However, as the democratic process became increasingly paralyzed over political maneuvering and continuing violence throughout the archipelago, military reform efforts slowed considerably. For some, the intercommunal violence provided reason to slow the pace of military reform, further consolidating the TNI’s favored view of itself as a necessary pillar of the

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69 During the New Order, ABRI represented the combined security forces of Indonesia, which included the military and police. In an important 1999 reform, the functions of the military (TNI) and the police (Polri) were formally separated into separate organizations with responsibility for external threats and internal security respectively.

Indonesian nation. Coupled with Megawati’s reluctance to confront the military following Wahid’s aggressive policies, military reform slowed and even reversed in important areas.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, various Indonesian public figures suggested that the attacks themselves were understandable, if not necessarily justified. Comments by figures like Vice President Hamzah Haz (the 9/11 attacks would “hopefully cleanse America of its sins”), the recently deposed Abdurrahman Wahid (the U.S. was a “terrorist nation”), and high-profile foreign policy advisor Dewi Anwar Fortuna (the World Trade Center was the “symbol of the Jewish financial influence in the U.S.”), were widely reported in the press and drew fierce criticism by US Ambassador Robert Gelbrand. More broadly, broad scepticism towards al Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks was relatively widespread in both popular and elite Indonesian society.

Continuing resentment over American treatment of Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis and the US approach to East Timor’s independence undoubtedly contributed to this populist approach within Indonesia. Gelbrand, citing intelligence of threats to the US Embassy (and himself), briefly closed the Embassy, a move to indicate strong disapproval of the post-9/11 tone of Indonesian public discussions. While Megawati’s visit to Washington served as an important marker within the still tenuous relationship between the United States and a democratic Indonesia, the post-9/11 political environment also served to highlight the distance in perspective and perception that continued to mark the two nations.

Nonetheless, despite fundamentally different views between the respective polities of both countries on the threat of terrorism both internationally and within Southeast Asia, amongst government officials there remained relatively strong cooperation on security. While Bush had previously inquired about resuming the relatively modest military-to-military ties, the international and domestic political environment after 9/11 provided a major boost for supporters of security cooperation with Indonesia. Explicit links were drawn between the resumption of military aid and the Indonesian government’s ability to track al Qaeda-linked terrorists domestically.

71 Quoted in Emmerson, 121.
Initially, this took the form of a modest US$50 million program designed to improve the capabilities of the security forces, including police and counter-terrorism units. As a former Ambassador to Indonesia, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz became a high-profile proponent of closer ties with the TNI, making him a particularly important Administration figure in the reconfiguration of US policy towards Southeast Asia in the post-9/11 environment. This outreach was strongly opposed by external human rights-oriented organizations and sections within the US Congress.

While initial Indonesian opposition to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan subsided in time, Indonesian public opinion remained an increasingly volatile component of relations between the two countries. It also remained a highly asymmetric one, with American foreign policy being discussed (and frequently criticized) within Indonesian society in far greater detail than the other way around. Having been kept under tight wraps for such a long period of time, the volatility of Indonesian public opinion under *demokrasi* complicated US-Indonesian relations considerably. While American officials repeatedly emphasized the importance of Indonesia’s still-burgeoning democracy, the unpopularity of American policy towards the Middle East and elsewhere challenged Indonesian political leaders to operate in defiance of popular opinion and made aspects of the relationship more prone to the potential of populist demagoguery – particularly amongst Islamist-orientated parties and public.

Even in this heightened international security environment, however, the human rights record of the TNI once again dominated US foreign policy towards Indonesia. Local movements in West Papua and Aceh continued to press for greater autonomy, if not outright secession, from Indonesia. While a relative minority participated in such movements, the heavy hand of the Indonesian military presence generated sympathy for such movements amongst local populations. Indonesian efforts to link the separatist movements in both provinces to the larger “War on Terror” failed, with Wolfowitz in particular stressing the importance of distinguishing between attacks motivated by radical Islamist ideology and more localized grievances. In 2002, amidst continued agitation in West Papua, two American teachers were murdered. When pressed to investigate amidst Congressional pressure, Indonesian security forces fabricated a particularly unbelievable
cover story to disguise TNI complicity in the murders. US-Indonesian military ties were suspended contingent upon a declaration by the US Secretary of State that human rights were being respected by the Indonesian military, and that a satisfactory investigation of the two deaths had occurred. The 2001 murder of prominent West Papuan leader Theys Eluay under highly suspicious circumstances brought further international criticism, with both international NGOs and the State Department strongly criticizing Indonesian actions.\footnote{Further information about the Eluay murder can be found in Tertiani ZB Simanjuntak and Ahmad Junaidi, "Proamendment Legislators Dominant Crucial Commission," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Aug 4 2002. Seven soldiers were eventually convicted of Theys’ murder, with each receiving 3 ½ years in prison. According to a critical State Department report, “[t]he lightness of the sentences outraged many Papuans, as did a comment by the Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu, who called the killers ‘heroes’. ” \textit{Friend}, 517.}

Following the collapse of a 2002 peace agreement in Aceh with GAM (\textit{Gerakan Aceh Merdeka}, or “Free Aceh Movement”) Megawati declared martial law. Aware of her own sensitive political standing amongst the still-significant power of the military, Megawati allowed the TNI an enormous degree of independence from putative civilian superiors in determining the operation’s strategic and tactical goals. Understandably, heavy criticisms about the TNI’s conduct in the province, specifically towards civilians, attracted significant international and domestic media attention. But amidst the generalized sense of insecurity across Indonesia, the TNI actually gained in popular standing during Megawati’s remaining time in office, with the majority of the international criticism (including Washington and numerous NGOs) and from Indonesian human rights groups failing to gain significant domestic traction.

The strong concern expressed by the U.S. Congress over ties between the US military and the TNI in the aftermath of the West Papua killings, as well as continuing TNI conduct in Aceh, were not new issues. Wolfowitz, amongst others, was hardly the first make the case that the most effective route to improving the conduct of the Indonesian military was through direct links, and in particular training exercises, with their American counterparts. Nor were Congressional opponents, in particular Del. Eni Faleomavavea or Sen. Patrick Leahy, the first figures to resist such links until an adequate accounting of alleged human rights abuses occurred. Instead, the significance can be found in Indonesia’s growing stature within American foreign policy.
considerations towards the region and world and the generalized securitization of the post-9/11 international environment. While the most obvious changes in Washington’s understanding of Indonesia may have resulted from a “War on Terror”-related strategic re-evaluation, it also represents a number of continuing longer-term factors.

These long-term factors largely pre-dated the new strategic focus upon terrorism by the United States, but they were also amplified by characteristics of the international security environment and Indonesia’s perceived role within it. Indonesia’s transition from repressive authoritarianism to democracy, however imperfect, was considered important because of the potential for institutionalization of increased respect for human rights, democratic accountability, and openness that (usually) marked such transitions. While the “free-floating post-Cold War idealism” that had marked the relationship before 9/11 had focused on such intrinsic goals, afterwards an additional justification was frequently cited – namely, the alleged potential for increased radicalism in more repressive societies that prevented outward expressions of frustration. Such environments, it was theorized, contributed to the appeal of the violent, radical terrorism advocated and practiced by al Qaeda. As the world’s most populous Muslim nation, and one with a history of relative moderation in religious matters, Indonesia was thus cited as a positive example for others – even if the specifics of Indonesia’s case were significantly more complicated. Nonetheless, such dynamics helped draw new attention from Washington to the frequently neglected relationship with Indonesia.

From the beginning, the September 11 attacks meant very different things to the vast majority of Americans and Indonesians. The Bush Administration, at least privately, was critical of Indonesia’s perceived lack of seriousness in dealing with the threat of transnational terrorism. This view, however, failed in many ways to account for the unfortunate fact that Indonesian reactions were driven in part by the considerable amounts of violence that occurred before, during, and after Suharto’s fall. Calls to

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74 “Indonesian sources were also hard put to understand what, in retrospect, might be called the ‘Septembering’ of Americans – the media-magnified growth in the United States of the notion that the events of 11 September had fundamentally changed the world.” 2003 Country Report on Human Rights: Indonesia, ed. Human Rights Bureau of Democracy, and Labor (U.S. Department of State, 2004).
strengthen the powers and capabilities of Indonesian security forces, as suggested by Washington, concerned many in a polity still attempting to address in the significant autonomy historically enjoyed by security forces, with the considerable excesses that this created. Dynamics within Southeast Asia also complicated both the American and Indonesian response to the newly changed international environment, with Singapore and the Philippines in particular (as well as neighbouring Australia) pressing for a more aggressive response to the terrorist threat while Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia were more circumspect in their assessment of the region’s vulnerabilities to such threats. The porous nature of borders throughout the region increased perceived vulnerabilities. Megawati needed to address international pressure to address internal threats, but too actively supporting American efforts risked exposing her still-sensitive political flanks domestically.

Sensing a potential opportunity to build upon Washington’s new strategic imperatives, Jakarta pressed to have the main separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua, GAM and OPM respectively, listed as terrorist organizations by the United States.\(^{75}\) Washington was reluctant to do so. Such an action would open the well-practiced debate over military conduct in the provinces, which the Bush Administration sought to avoid as it pursued better relations overall and especially with Indonesian security forces. A second and broader reason related to the practical need for intellectual coherence within the “War on Terror”. Bush Administration officials were reluctant to describe organizations with limited, relatively defined political aims like OPM or GAM with the same language as al Qaeda and other radical groups. Washington was concerned that broadening the description to include such organizations would represent a slippery slope of designating such groups with the stigma of terrorism in the new vocabulary of Washington. Indonesian officials duly described the American approach as disappointing and hypocritical, accusing Washington of only seeing “terrorism” when Western targets were attacked. But from Washington’s viewpoint, organizations utilizing the language of jihad to justify civilian attacks with mass casualties were of a fundamentally different

character than those with limited political aims that used asymmetric efforts against the Indonesian military and state they considered an occupying, illegitimate force.

The “War on Terror” thus necessitated a substantially increased American presence within Southeast Asia, which was quickly (and controversially) deemed by some to be the “Second Front” in the war. The exact form this would take in Indonesia would be subject to considerable debate, with some emphasizing the need to build up Indonesian police capacity and others pushing for heightened military-to-military ties and a comprehensive regional approach. Efforts were complicated by the long history of military abuses within Indonesia, as well as the initial reluctance of some Indonesian officials to even admit the existence of domestic-based terrorist organizations. Indonesia’s significance was due to several factors, which served both positive and negative justifications: it served as a “model of moderation”, in Wolfowitz’s words, to other Muslim majority countries and therefore was worthy of support, while at the same time concerns over Indonesian state capacity to adequately deal with the “home-grown but externally linked” Jemaah Islamiyah.

Some of the actions Washington pushed Indonesia to take against extremists were extremely unpopular, and Jakarta argued that such actions would in fact fuel radicalization and greater extremism. Despite statements from President George W. Bush that the United States was concerned only with eradicating the small, violent fringe of radical jihadist organizations intent on committing acts of mass destruction and murder, the feeling that this represented a “crusade” against Islam itself nonetheless became widespread almost immediately. Conspiracy theories abounded: that the terrorist threat itself was widely overblown; was a manufactured pretext to wage war upon and/or invade Islamic countries; that the 9/11 attacks were not instigated by al Qaeda but American agents, or that the attacks were in fact an American conspiracy to justify future actions.78

77 John Gershman, "Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002).
78 A particularly creative explanation posited that American actions against Osama bin Laden were because bin Laden endangered the American economy by withdrawing money from Enron; it also suggested that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was an American-inspired plot to incapacitate both Muslim nations. This appeared in the leading daily of Indonesia’s third largest city, Bandung. Cited by Andrew Tan, "Southeast
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, opportunism marked the responses of Washington and Jakarta. Increased aid to the TNI, as well as heightened levels of cooperation between the Indonesian and American militaries, were about more than the recently declared “War on Terror”. For one, owing to reforms passed under Habibie and implemented under Wahid and Megawati, the Indonesian police, not the military, were responsible for addressing threats to internal security. While the ability or the willingness of the military to adjust to this new direction has been questioned following decades of strategic doctrine that focused almost exclusively upon internal security, it nonetheless would have seemed appropriate to promote, in the name of both public consistency over military reforms called for by the United States, greater coordination with the Indonesian police. Military ties, it seems, while not immune from the strategic logic of the “War on Terror”, are at least as much about increasing American influence on Indonesia. The “free and active” policy under Suharto did not go easily.

This view, however, would quickly change following the terrorist bombing outside the Bali bombings of October 2002 that killed over 200 people. The attack was linked to the Indonesia-based group Jemaah Islamiyah, which itself had financial and operational ties with al Qaeda. Indonesian officials had little choice but to admit the presence of locally based radicals, which had been questioned to that point. This was an embarrassing admission for Megawati’s administration, as she had personally cast doubt upon claims that Indonesia had a “terrorist problem”, but the incontrovertible evidence immediately led to a reevaluation of the threat and far closer coordination with the United States and others on counterterrorism matters. These events also gave new impetus to regional initiatives designed to counter the ability of non-state actors like JI, Abu Sayyaf, or even al Qaeda itself to operate within Southeast Asia. The Bali attacks “lifted the war against terror from an issue of largely diplomatic significance to an urgent political priority for Megawati’s government.”

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Asia as the ‘second front’ in the war against terrorism: evaluating the responses,“ Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003).
80 Emmerson, fn 16.
Perhaps the most significant event in her presidency was Megawati’s declaration of martial law in Aceh in response to ongoing separatist agitation. TNI hardliners prevailed upon Megawati using the familiar arguments of national integrity to justify a highly controversial military action in Aceh. Frustration with the accommodating stances towards separatists in Aceh and Papua under Habibie and Wahid had steeled the resolve of military leaders eager to address the rise in violence across Indonesia – as well a considerable percentage of the population. Reports of major human rights abuses were common.81 Almost entirely under TNI control from the beginning, the operation “restored the military’s claim to a domestic security role and returned the armed forces to the centre of policy-making in areas affected by separatist movements and communal conflict.”82

The action drew international concern, though not as much as it might have if world attention at the time had not been otherwise distracted. American officials, largely preoccupied with ongoing efforts in the Middle East, had little time or inclination to pressure Indonesia, however much they doubted the viability and validity of Indonesia’s response. Human rights groups criticized the effort, though with little obvious success. Little appetite existed, generally in the post-9/11 environment, to inflame either elite or popular Indonesian opinion amongst important American figures.

Having taken over in the midst of crisis following Wahid’s impeachment, Megawati’s leadership from 2001 onwards was not particularly decisive, effective, or praiseworthy. Outsider observers, including in Washington, were not especially impressed, and judging by her domestic political standing, Indonesians remained rather sceptical as well. On major issues, including economic recovery, military reform, corruption, and ongoing violence throughout the archipelago, Megawati’s time in office demonstrated the indecision and aloofness that had led to her being passed over for the presidency initially (and has hampered her political ambitions since leaving office). Desperately needed economic growth remained elusive following the Asian Financial Crisis. On the crucial issue of military reform, Megawati gave indications that she would allow the military elite to pursue reforms according to their own schedule – and,

81 Priest, passim.
amazingly, left the Minister of Defence portfolio unfilled for the final year of her presidency. This was an obviously disastrous recipe for the proposed reforms. The declaration of martial law in Aceh precipitated one of the biggest military exercises in Indonesian history, which brought immense international criticism and charges that Megawati was increasingly reliant upon support from TNI elites. One prominent analyst described the TNI as having “basically adopted her as a sort of mascot” following Wahid’s impeachment and that Megawati may “give a green light to the military to do whatever it wants in Aceh, Papua, and to some extent other areas of conflict.”  

83 Human rights activist Munir Said Thalib, a prominent critic of military conduct in the late New Order and afterwards, was poisoned to death on a 2004 Garuda Airlines flight to Europe. The murder captivated Indonesia, and due to strong indications of the involvement of senior National Intelligence Agency figures, it was interpreted as the culmination of a campaign of pushback by Indonesian security forces against the reforms of the previous six years.

The impact of American strategic culture upon the relationship with Indonesia during this period is difficult to pinpoint, largely due to the speed and intensity with which events of major consequence moved. Perhaps understandably, American policy largely acted in reaction to, rather than anticipation of, events on the ground. Little obvious planning had been done at the time of Suharto’s downfall, which itself was due in part to the loss of support for the New Order from Washington. The events of 9/11 recast the imperatives of American grand strategy, even as the constituent elements and influences upon that strategy remained in tact. Regarding Indonesia, overall strategic uncertainty caused inconsistent levels of support for reformasi-era governments, even as the uneven performance of the Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati presidencies provided limited enthusiasm for greater engagement. This changed after the 9/11 attacks, but despite the increased interest in closer ties from some in Washington – particularly Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, and amongst the Pentagon hierarchy – there remained considerable distance between Bush’s post-9/11 strategic vision and the ability of both countries to actively pursue a closer relationship.

The Asian Financial Crisis and the intense uncertainty of its immediate aftermath were always going to prove pivotal for the political development of Indonesia, and they proved to be far greater than early estimates. In addition to the vast economic wreckage left in its wake, the Crisis directly provoked the downfall of Suharto, only the second leader in five decades of Indonesian independence. But new leadership, first in the form of Habibie, then Wahid, and later Megawati, exposed the myriad challenges Indonesia still faced, with shaky and weak leadership by all three successors exacerbating intense problems of politics, society, and economics. While Indonesia’s possible dissolution was overstated at times, the explosion of violence in East Timor and ongoing tension in Aceh, amongst other places, demonstrated the urgent need for military reform and strong leadership to address the many problems of a country clearly deep in crisis. While supportive of these efforts, the United States remained largely aloof until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 dramatically changed the course of American foreign policy. Not for the first time, Indonesia’s profile in Washington’s regional and global considerations was elevated considerably. It would largely fall to Megawati’s successor, retired Army General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and American President George W. Bush as he prepared for a second term in office, to chart the future course of the renewed, though still uncertain, relationship in the following years.
CHAPTER 5:

US FOREIGN POLICY AND INDONESIA, 2004-2016

“Yesterday, President Yudhoyono and I announced a new, Comprehensive Partnership [CPA] between the United States and Indonesia...This is a partnership of equals, ground in mutual interests and mutual respect.”

-U.S. President Barack Obama, Nov. 9, 2010

“...nearly halfway through Obama’s Presidential tenure, and a year past President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s resounding reelection...the political enthusiasm of re-engagement is evident in the flurry of diplomatic activity over the past year to implement the CPA. Yet while the CPA and other diplomatic gestures are significant...the window of opportunity which could have fundamentally changed the spirit of US-Indonesia relations for the foreseeable future has closed...”

-Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, 2010

The Presidential elections of 2004 in Indonesia and the United States were eagerly awaited in both countries. For Indonesians, the first direct, democratic presidential election of the post-Suharto era represented a historic opportunity following years of authoritarianism and the recent, uneven experience with demokrasi. Incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri, criticized extensively by important parts of the Indonesian political elite, faced a difficult election battle against Susilo Bambang Yudyohono (SBY), a retired army general and former minister in the Wahid and Megawati administrations. For Americans, tensions over the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq War dominated the campaign between incumbent George W. Bush and

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1 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President at the University of Jakarta in Jakarta, Indonesia," (2010).
challenger Sen. John Kerry, a stark contrast to Bush’s previous largely foreign policy-free presidential campaign against Al Gore. Yudhoyono’s resounding victory over Megawati represented not only a change in administration, but also a political revival of sorts for military figures following substantial distrust in the early post-Suharto years and an indication of the considerable political clout the military maintained. In his previous role as Coordinating Minister for Security and Politics, SBY had been critically important in negotiating the 2002 agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or the Free Aceh Movement) separatists in Aceh, despite the later collapse of the agreement amidst accusations of military interference. Running as a candidate of “change” and backed by his military credentials and reputation for competency, SBY – with the support of the powerful Suharto-era political vehicle, Golkar, by way of his running mate Josef Kalla – emerged victorious following a direct run-off against Megawati. His election via popular vote represented an enormous and proud moment for many Indonesians given the experience of previous decades and recent tumult.

In the United States, the presidential election centred primarily upon security-related issues, hardly a surprise in the context of a post-9/11 world with the American military actively engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush was further aided by the inability of Sen. John Kerry to convincingly explain his stance on the still-controversial 2003 invasion of Iraq, infamously stating that he had been “against the war before he was for it” - a reference to an arcane Senate procedural vote that preceded the final Senate vote. The comment, intended to shore up Kerry’s support within a Democratic party base that remained largely opposed to the initial invasion, did little to change the public’s perception of Kerry as being both aloof and a figure beholden to inside-the-Beltway traditions - rarely a winning formula in American politics. With Kerry unable to gain traction on the most prominent issue within the campaign, Bush ultimately won a relatively close, but nonetheless decisive, victory.

This chapter traces the increasingly warm relationship between the United States and Indonesia through the period of 2004-2016. While not without challenges – in addition to the inherent challenges involving a change of Administration (and political party) in Washington with the 2008 election of Sen. Barack Obama – this

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period of time is noteworthy for the growing compatibility of interests in the bilateral relationship and the relative consistency with which these were pursued. Two key factors included SBY’s 2009 reelection and the high regard with which many Indonesians regarded Obama, in part because of the period of his youth that was spent in Jakarta. But most of all, American foreign policy towards Indonesia is consistent with the neoclassical realist approach to both grand strategy and specifically foreign policy towards Indonesia described throughout this work. Indonesia’s democratic development and recovery from the devastating impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, in conjunction with a more assured international presence as Indonesia became more politically stable and demonstrated an increasing compatibility with American interests, resulted in a considerable transformation by the end of Obama’s presidency. Importantly, the successful (and peaceful) transfer of presidential power in 2014 from SBY to political newcomer Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) was remarkable for the very reason that it was remarkably tension-free, a highly noteworthy change from both recent events and Indonesian history.

The warming of relations during Bush’s first term and Megawati had occurred in a largely piecemeal manner, occurring as both nations struggled to negotiate post-crisis environments – the AFC in the case of Indonesia, the 9/11 attacks in the case of the United States. While part of this ad hoc approach can be attributed to the Bush Administration’s preoccupation with the Middle East and terrorism – culminating in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – Megawati remained focused primarily upon domestic issues, emblematic of her still-shaky standing amongst important components of the Indonesian political elite. By contrast, SBY commanded a significantly greater personal mandate, owing to his military background and the populist reform platform he championed throughout his presidential campaign. His direct election represented a major event in Indonesian politics, even if his tenure in office ultimately left some reformasi advocates disillusioned. Once again, the burgeoning relationship was not without challenges, but it nonetheless demonstrated an impressive and notable degree of vitality and resilience.

Within the Bush Administration, increased engagement with the Indonesian military had been raised by some officials (including Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, a former Ambassador to Indonesia) as a potential way to deepen relations with Jakarta while addressing counterterrorism in a volatile region with
demonstrated experience of violent extremism (including the 2002 Bali and later bombings). However, ongoing Congressional opposition to increased links with the Indonesian military due to human rights abuses in West Papua and the aftermath of East Timorese independence remained extensive, particularly in key committees within both Houses of Congress. Nonetheless, a low-key and largely decentralized effort to raise awareness of Indonesia’s strategic value to American foreign policy – particularly in a post-2004 tsunami environment – was formulated, as was recognition of the substantial advances that had been made in consolidating democratic norms within Indonesia. Condoleezza Rice specifically highlighted Indonesia during her confirmation hearings as Secretary of State in early 2005 and recommended a modest resumption International Military and Education Training (IMET) aid, a key marker with historical resonance of US-Indonesian relations.

SBY’s Victory

SBY’s resounding victory, with over 60% of the vote in a runoff against Megawati, was received optimistically in the United States. A credible record of military and government service had established his reputation as a capable reformer, and his election simultaneously offered the potential for more stable governance and leadership – important qualities following the tumultuous and erratic nature of Indonesia’s post-New Order politics. Significantly, military units under SBY’s command were perceived to have a relatively good record on human rights, a key issue following the turmoil surrounding the East Timor referendum and the military’s still-controversial record. In the last days of the New Order, “Yudhoyono had managed to build a reformist image in the officer corps and the political elite without

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4 Before leaving his ambassadorial post in 1989, Wolfowitz gave publicly criticized the endemic corruption and lack of democratic reforms under Suharto, saying that “if greater openness is a key to economic success…there is a need for openness in the political sphere as well.” It is unlikely that such a public rebuke would have occurred if Indonesia featured more centrally in American grand strategy at the time. Some members of civil society complained that the comment came too late and said too little. Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, "Jakarta Tenure Offers Glimpse of Wolfowitz," Washington Post, Mar. 28 2005.

5 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State, 109th Congress, 1st Session, Jan.18-19 2005.

6 Per Indonesia’s post-New Order Constitution, if no candidate receives at least 50% of the votes (with 20% of the total being contributed from at least half of the provinces) during the initial round of voting, a runoff is to occur between the candidates with the 2 highest vote totals. SBY received 33.6% in the initial round of voting in July; Megawati finished 2nd with 26.6%. The election results are discussed in depth in a report by international election observers in The Carter Center, "The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report," (The Carter Center, 2005).
drawing Suharto’s anger”, preventing him from being sidelined while maintaining an image as a voice for change. SBY had been a leading advocate of not using military force against anti-Suharto student demonstrators and was generally understood as a moderate (unlike fellow generals and controversial political rivals Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto); he also participated in the last IMET course before the program’s 1991 suspension, allowing for personal connections and experience with the US military that proponents had long used to justify the program’s continuation or resumption.

American officials that had worked with him were convinced of his competence and his grasp of Indonesia’s growing importance in the world, though some doubt existed about his decisiveness as a leader. He was understood to be a committed military reformer, both more eager and able to put into practice the military-civilian reforms that Wahid and Megawati had struggled to successfully implement. At least as significantly, the personal political mandate he could claim following direct election was significant, despite the relatively weak showing of his new political party, Partai Demokrat (PD), in the April 2004 Parliamentary elections. Perhaps most importantly to American policy-makers was the strong stance SBY had taken against terrorism throughout the campaign, in contrast to the qualified and tempered responses offered by Megawati. While some reserved judgment, primarily due to concerns about his political alliance with the Suharto-era Golkar party (represented by his Vice President, Jusuf Kalla), it was hoped that SBY would signal the end of the tumultuous transition period away from authoritarianism and the firm establishment of democratic norms. Cautious optimism seemed to be a common sentiment – a “wait and see” approach to the new Indonesian president.

The challenges facing the new President were substantial. The transitional rule of Habibie, the erratic nature of Wahid’s presidency, and Megawati’s perceived tentativeness – in addition to the substantial, unsettled institutional challenges still facing Indonesia in the transition from three decades of authoritarian New Order rule – had resulted in some limited successes. However, a distinct sense of political drift, exacerbated by lacklustre economic growth, backsliding on reform efforts, and still-

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7 Mietzner, 236.
8 While in part a function of considerable personal resolve and SBY’s strong political standing, this also reflected a change in circumstances: by the time of SBY’s election, public tolerance for radical groups had diminished sharply amongst the general population, in part due to the heavy human, financial, and reputational costs associated with continued attacks.
Tsunami Relief

American commentators and policy-makers did not need to wait long for an opportunity to evaluate SBY’s performance. On December 26, 2004, approximately two months after SBY’s inauguration and Bush’s reelection, a massive undersea earthquake struck off the coast of northern Sumatra, triggering a tsunami that ravaged the Indian Ocean rim. Extending throughout Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and as far away as East Africa, regions closest to the epicentre suffered the worst. Northern Sumatra and Thailand were particularly devastated. Indonesian deaths related to the tsunami were estimated at approximately 170,000 people, the vast majority of which occurred near the epicentre in Aceh – including approximately 14% of the population of Banda Aceh, the provincial capital.10

An international effort was launched immediately to address the humanitarian crisis caused by the earthquake and tsunami, which in time also took the form of promoting development and reconstruction in the most devastated areas. The international reaction to the immense devastation was considerable. Condolences, donations, and statements of support from around the world poured in, reflecting the unprecedented scale of the disaster. For all of the tremendous suffering and destruction caused by the tsunami, the natural disaster advanced US-Indonesian relations in several important ways. The outpouring of humanitarian support, on a

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9 Donald Emmerson, "Rebalancing Indonesia?," in Transforming Indonesia: Selected Speeches from International Observers, ed. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Jakarta: Office of Special Staff of President for International Affairs, 2005).

governmental level as well as privately from American citizens and charities, generated significant goodwill towards the Indonesian state and people. In addition to approximately US$907 million in disaster relief from the US government to affected countries (principally distributed via USAID), US charities and NGO’s contributed substantial financial and material support. The US military, at a time of considerable public unpopularity amongst Indonesians due to ongoing involvement in Iraq, provided immediate and much-need medical support via the USNS Mercy, which served as an offshore hospital under the command of the US Navy.11

An immediate effect of this effort was to considerably improve the standing of the United States amongst Indonesians, with those holding a positive view of the United States jumping from 15% in 2003 to 38% in 2005.12 While these numbers reflect numerous factors – and with the earlier figures being influenced by the widespread unpopularity of US actions in Iraq – the jump in public support helped provide momentum to closer relations between Jakarta and Washington. In transitional democracies like Indonesia, in which the effect of popular opinion upon foreign policy is a powerful but comparatively new force to be considered, this mitigation of popular opposition to the US served an important purpose. Within Indonesia, international pressure combined with the immense scale of devastation in Aceh further contributed to a peace settlement between Jakarta and GAM, which finally settled the long-running insurgency while granting considerable autonomy to Aceh. While it is important to remember that such a settlement reflected more than just a post-tsunami phenomenon, the devastation nonetheless played a major role in convincing both Jakarta elites and local GAM separatists that reaching a lasting agreement made sense in light of the massive devastation and resulting recovery process. The Bush Administration was quick to support the deal, which also had the effect of generating greater foreign direct investment to the region – no small consideration given the province’s significant oil and natural gas reserves and the economic suffering caused by the tsunami.

Aceh Peace Agreement

In contrast to the earlier 2002 agreement, the post-tsunami agreement largely held. Its success can be attributed to several important factors. For one, unlike the earlier agreement, the military was financially motivated to comply with the agreement, with funding provided for “transition” costs that largely replaced the loss of important income from military-run businesses in the region. Given the still-uncertain nature of reforms designed to steadily remove the military from the lucrative private sector role it had long enjoyed, this stream of income smoothed acceptance of the reform process, while the huge amounts of destruction within the province persuaded many Acehnese to favour the offer of greater autonomy rather than outright secession. The substantial devolution of power from Jakarta and the promise of retaining greater amounts of locally derived income both addressed political and economic grievances within Aceh. International pressure also played a significant role in both facilitating the agreement and ensuring its viability, as much of the post-tsunami aid was to be disbursed contingent upon a peace settlement. Both Jakarta and GAM “felt a need for international support and legitimacy”, and in the post-tsunami setting the pressure to reach a lasting peace settlement was powerful.

SBY and Vice President Kalla played central roles in the deal’s negotiation, and as a result SBY’s Administration had considerable amounts of prestige invested in seeing the deal succeed. Yudhoyono’s credibility with military elites, something neither Wahid nor Megawati enjoyed to anywhere near the same degree, allowed him to sideline outspoken conservatives like Ryamizard Ryacudu and promote reformists to important leadership positions, boosting the chances of success for the agreement. These factors all contributed to success, but perhaps most importantly was the improved security environment facing Indonesia compared to the chaotic early years of post-Suharto rule.

USAID played a formal role in supporting the agreement via civil society dialogue groups and through the material distribution of aid, but more significant than

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14 Ryamizard openly clashed with Yudhoyono over the earlier 2002 agreement, contributing to its eventual failure. Ryamizard also previously courted controversy by describing the killers of West Papuan activist Theys Eluas as “heroes” and was openly critical of military reform efforts. Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, "The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed," in Policy Studies (Washington: East West Center, 2003), 29-31; Mietzner, 293-6.
material support were the agreement’s political implications. The agreement was interpreted, not inaccurately, as a critical marker of the military reform under Yudhoyono — a key factor in the resumption of military ties, which remained a goal of administrations in both countries but prone to controversy. With the military having previously enjoyed an essentially free hand to operate under Megawati due to her unwillingness to confront centres of power, the agreement served as a visible measure of SBY’s ability to successfully challenge understandings of the status quo within the military. This helped set the stage for a significant improvement in relations between the two countries, including the contentious and vexed issue of ties between the countries’ respective militaries. This had been sought by military leaders in both countries, as well as civilian leaders in Indonesia, and due to the post-tsunami boost to relations and the growing strength of the reform movement within Indonesian political circles, the end goal of normalization was far more feasible than it had previously been.

**Resumption of Military Ties**

Though domestic political concerns necessarily remained a central component of SBY’s political agenda, confidence in his personal electoral mandate and high public popularity allowed his Administration to focus increasing attention on Indonesia’s international role regionally and globally. In many ways, this represented a continuation of Jakarta’s “normalization” following the continual chaos of the immediate post-Suharto period. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami and the resulting peace deal, a major effort was made to resume greater ties between the American and Indonesian militaries. It would set the cornerstone of a strong if still controversial relationship going forward between the two. The issue had long served as a key issue in the debate over US foreign policy towards Indonesia, particularly from a Congressional perspective. Following a visit to Aceh, Wolfowitz argued for at least a modest resumption of IMET ties, as did Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her January 2005 nomination hearings. For both, as well as other advocates, the prohibition on military ties – which had been in place to varying degrees since the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 – served a purpose out of line with current geopolitical imperatives and risked sidetracking a relationship with Jakarta that otherwise offered considerable promise. Though these arguments predated the “War on Terror”, the emphasis upon countering terrorism after 9/11 generated additional weight for the
argument inside and outside of military circles. The surge in public sympathy for Indonesia following the tsunami, the regard for SBY’s record to date (including his highly-rated tsunami response and progress on Aceh), and the short-term American amnesia towards recent military abuses in East Timor all helped create political opportunities for the resumption of ties in the post-9/11 political and security environment.

In February 2005, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved IMET funding. The decision had outspoken critics, both inside the government and amongst NGO communities. Some focused on the circumstances related to the resumption of the IMET program: namely, certification by Secretary of State Rice that Indonesian authorities had adequately cooperated with a FBI-led investigation of the 2002 Timika murders in West Papua.\(^\text{15}\) Inserted into federal law in 2003 at the insistence of longtime TNI critic Sen. Patrick Leahy, this condition more broadly sought to pressure Indonesian authorities to address the relative impunity with which the TNI had operated that continued following the violence accompanying the 1999 East Timor referendum and ongoing presence in West Papua. Rice’s approval of the resumption of training was based upon the grand jury indictment of Antonious Wamang, despite members of the TNI Special Forces unit (Kopassus) having been implicated in the murders. Various motivations for potential TNI involvement in the murders were put forth: to increase pressure to have OPM (of which Wamang was allegedly a member) listed as a terrorist organization, to sow divisions amongst factions in the West Papuan independence movement, and possibly to remind management of the nearby Freeport McMoRan gold mine – the largest in the world – of the continued need for TNI-supplied security at a time when such revenue streams were under considerable threat. In 2006, Wamang was sentenced in an Indonesian court to life in prison.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{15}\) Indonesian police investigators found evidence suggesting TNI complicity in the murders, but ambiguity over the police’s ability to bring charges against TNI personnel led to inconclusive results. The FBI investigated, and the ensuing stonewalling by the TNI resulted in Congress suspending military cooperation. The FBI later indicted Wamang, though details of the controversial case remain extremely murky.

\(^{16}\) As Kirksey and Harsono point out, “a new era of military cooperation” with Indonesia was announced by the Pentagon on the day of Wamang’s sentencing. S. Eben Kirksey and Andreas Harsono, “Criminal collaborations? Antonius Wamang and the Indonesian Military in Timika,” *South East Asia Research* 16, no. 2 (2008).
More broadly, the murky and highly controversial circumstances of the Timika murders – and potential American acquiescence with TNI complicity in the murders – spoke to larger and long-standing questions, in particular the still troubling lack of military accountability and the overall poor state of civilian-military relations. Within Indonesia, this remained a highly complicated and central issue in the transition from autocracy to democracy, reflecting not only the military’s considerable and diverse bases of power and historical dwi fungsi (“dual function”) role, but also the fundamental nature of Indonesia itself following Suharto’s ouster from power. After enjoying tremendous influence and the privileges of Suharto’s autocratic rule for the majority of the New Order, the influence of the military in post-Suharto Indonesia remained strong and it viewed itself as a critical institution holding the country together. Deep divisions within the political elite unquestionably contributed greatly to this phenomenon, serving as both cause and effect of the chaotic political environment that had dominated the period since Suharto’s fall from power.

If the Timika killings were a test case for military accountability, military accountability itself was a test case for Indonesia’s future. Military reform was correctly viewed, domestically and internationally, one of the central challenges facing Indonesia – and remained a major bilateral issue for the United States. This largely reflected the fact that the term ‘military reform’ was in fact a diverse set of interrelated issues that affected nearly the entire spectrum of post-Suharto political life and structures, no less under SBY than it was under his predecessors. It remains so. The entrenched role of the military throughout society during the New Order meant that few areas of political life remained unaffected by the reach of the military. While the reformasi movement’s strength had pared back some of the military’s post-New Order involvement under Habibie and Wahid, the military still remained an extremely significant political player in Indonesia at the time of Yudhoyono’s election. Notably, Wahid and Megawati’s ineffectiveness – and frequent ambivalence – in addressing critical issues of military reform, as well as divisions amongst political elites, allowed the TNI to regain substantial portions of the institutional and political power it had initially lost following Suharto’s ouster. While some issues, such as military representation within Parliament, would clearly not return, the military’s relative influence can be seen in the 2004 Presidential elections, which featured several prominent retired generals (Yudhoyono, Wiranto, and Agum). In addition to
the obvious issues of security, both internally and externally, the Indonesian military retained substantial economic interests, an extensive territorial base of operations, and following the rapid and indeed radical decentralization of political authority, considerable influence on local political decisions. On a broader level, the decades-long domestic orientation of the Indonesian military as guarantor of the Indonesian state meant that even in the new era of Indonesian democracy (particularly so, given the rocky early years of demokrasi under Wahid and Megawati), the military remained an influential political actor still adjusting to an uncertain new role.

To a large degree, therefore, greater US engagement with Indonesia also represented the prioritization of big-picture strategic issues over specific details more commonly associated with bilateral foreign policy concerns. Of course, this fit with a pattern consistent throughout the Cold War and after of finding ways to fit particular circumstances within a defined strategic framework, rather than the other way around. Obviously, those advocating a closer relationship with Jakarta followed particular developments within Indonesia closely, but advocacy was frequently couched in terms of the unique opportunity represented by Indonesia’s democratic transition, its role within the Islamic world, and potential for a larger regional role with support for overall American diplomatic goals – which spoke to the core of grand strategy considerations – rather than a deep investigation of local conditions. Indonesia’s circumspect interest in negotiating the impact of growing Chinese power was also a major factor, particularly in the later years of Obama’s presidency.

Specialists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were generally more circumspect, if not overtly hostile, towards the resumption of military ties, aware of the difficulty, sensitivity, and tentativeness of reforms that had passed and those that remained proposed. There was also greater emphasis upon the TNI’s continued grip on power and possible retrenchment on reform, in addition to still-unanswered questions regarding TNI conduct throughout the New Era period. Larger geopolitical imperatives reflected in US grand strategy prevailed on the issue. In a post-9/11 context, the conduct of Indonesia’s military in relation to human rights – while still important, particularly in the US Congress – was less significant than the broader

\[17\] Haseman, a retired US Army colonel, is a case in point. See John Haseman, "Indonesia Military Reform: More than a Human Rights Issue," in Southeast Asian Affairs (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
goals of maintaining momentum towards a closer relationship with Jakarta and avoiding potentially embarrassing discussions of the TNI’s record. The advocates of restricting or eliminating links with the TNI such as Sen. Leahy argued otherwise, pointing to the blatant misconduct of the TNI in relation to the Timika murders and the still-contentious issue of military accountability. Additional weight was given to generating support within a prominent Muslim-majority state like Indonesia at a time when Muslim sensitivities remained high following unpopular invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Regional factors also played a role. Indonesia had also become seen as a key regional player in terms of the traditional leadership role – reflecting political, demographic, and geographic importance – it had played within ASEAN. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), one of several counterterrorism initiatives and programmes established following 9/11, was designed to address the threat posed by terrorist groups in Southeast Asia on a more cooperative regional basis, with the porous tri-border region of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines particularly in mind. JI and the similarly radical Philippines-based group Abu Sayyaf had previously demonstrated some operational links, and the bombing of the Filipino embassy in Jakarta by JI-linked terrorists in 2000 indicated such tactical ties.

Megawati’s cautious response following 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings and her questionable effectiveness in dealing with the sort of domestic terrorism conducted by JI and its allies did not endear her to Washington, and the pressing focus of the United States upon terrorism – signified by Bush’s comment that “you’re with us or against us” – left little political space for the ambivalent approach she advocated. Further terrorist bombings in 2003 (Marriott Hotel, Jakarta), 2004 (Australian Embassy, Jakarta), and 2005 (Bali) had a demonstrable impact on Indonesian public opinion, with many increasingly opposed to such violent tactics and the ideology they represented. Attempts by Islamist militants to provoke inter-religious conflict by bombing churches and gruesomely beheading three schoolgirls

18 In addition to the enormous diplomatic and political role it has played since ASEAN’s founding, Indonesia dominates Southeast Asia demographically and geographically. Indonesia represents approximately 40% of ASEAN’s total population (the next largest, the Philippines, comprises 16%), while positioned across critical global shipping lanes – ranging approximately 3000 miles from east to west and 1500 miles from north to south.

19 Significantly, Indonesia and Malaysia both rejected American requests for shared intelligence and patrols in the Straits of Malacca.
served to “delegitimize JI, even amongst Islamic hardliners.”20 Coupled with the resulting police crackdown, the result was a major setback for JI, which already was showing indications of internal division. The effectiveness of the police response had improved notably due to the establishment of Detachment 88, a police counterterrorism unit created following the initial Bali bombings – in part due to the continued international restrictions on cooperation with the military units and partly funded, equipped, and trained by US government personnel.21

As Indonesia’s response to domestic terrorist actions showed signs of increased purpose and effectiveness, so too did American viewpoints towards an opportunity for a renewed relationship with Jakarta. Most notably, this related to the strong rhetoric, and more importantly the resulting government actions, in response to terrorism. The Bush Administration had pressured Indonesia to take a firmer, more active stance against terrorists operating within its borders, but a shortage of resources and political will within the Megawati administration had largely frustrated such efforts. By 2005, under the new SBY administration, increases on both fronts resulted in a much stronger response. When it did, and Indonesia demonstrated its intent to act firmly against JI, the favourable political winds in Washington gathered speed.

Indeed, during this period, Yudhoyono’s political standing – by a significant margin, the most secure of any Indonesian leader since Suharto – spurred and accelerated reevaluation of the US-Indonesian relationship that had begun in earnest during the depths of the Asian Financial Crisis. Without question, major issues within the bilateral relationship remained, with closer engagement drawing criticism in both countries. The widespread unpopularity of the Bush Administration amongst the Indonesian populace, a resurgence of Indonesian nationalist sentiment, and the inflamed sentiments in the broader Islamic world brought about by the war in Iraq and continued American support for Israel all served as checks upon closer engagement. SBY stated an intention to continue Indonesia’s traditional “free and active” approach to foreign policy – first articulated by Mohammed Hatta in 1948 – but with an

20 Mietzner, 350.
21 Thomas M. Sanderson Arnaud De Borchgrave, David Gordon, ed. Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: Assessments from the Field, CSIS Transnational Threat Project (CSIS, 2009), 32.
updated strategic policy of “a million friends and zero enemies”.\textsuperscript{22} Even as cooperation with the United States grew, both strategically and tactically, Jakarta also remained wary of being too closely associated with American foreign policy goals, whether related to the Middle East, China and East Asia, or elsewhere. From the American side, long-standing concerns over the military’s commitment to human rights continued to influence discussion of ties with the Indonesian military, as did support for counterterrorism measures domestically and within Southeast Asia. Unanswered questions about military complicity in prior abuses persisted – including the very 1965 “coup” that brought Suharto to power and defined Cold War Indonesia.\textsuperscript{23} Nonetheless, the sense of fundamental change in the US-Indonesian relationship continued to grow. While the sustainability of this momentum was questioned in some quarters, broadly speaking both powers worked to emphasize points of agreement and minimize overt disagreement.

For Indonesia, one of the most notable ways in which this newfound attention and appreciation were manifested was the sustained efforts of the Bush Administration to bolster Indonesia’s international profile, which itself reflected the growing compatibility and broadly common interests of both American and Indonesian policymakers. This trend continued throughout the remainder of Bush’s second term, as well as into Barack Obama’s administration from 2009 onwards. Important and distinct differences in perspective and goals existed. All the same, these efforts obviously had considerable overlap with Yudhoyono’s cautious yet sustained efforts to grow Indonesia’s international profile after the tumult of the earlier transition to democracy. Washington’s growing appreciation for Indonesia’s role within the region represented a substantial statement of support. While the degree of compatibility between national outlooks can be overstated, this was itself a remarkable development for a country only recently considered by Washington to be more of a “problem state” than a potential partner.\textsuperscript{24} While bilateral diplomacy with individual countries continued to characterize American foreign policy towards


\textsuperscript{23} Historical memory and the 1965-6 killings remains an enormously provocative and controversial issue within Indonesia. For example, McGregor describes the difficult reconciliation process between former leftists and Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization. Katharine E. McGregor, “Confronting the Past in Contemporary Indonesia,” \textit{Critical Asian Studies} 41, no. 2 (2009).

\textsuperscript{24} Ann Marie Murphy, “US Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner,” \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia} 32, no. 3 (2010).
Southeast Asia, Washington’s support for Indonesia’s role within ASEAN gave Jakarta added credibility in an organization frequently accused of being about much talk and little action. An important example came in 2007 with the passage of the ASEAN Human Rights Charter, followed eventually by the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012 that codified the earlier framework. While both have been criticized by many (including important US foreign policy figures) for being too watered-down from their original form to be of great use (and overly reliant upon voluntary participation by individual countries, including those with regressive tendencies), the point remains that one of the major norms within ASEAN – namely, the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of any member state – was no longer considered sacrosanct. That Indonesia played a major role in the passage of a human rights covenant was notable given the enormous change in the relatively short time since the end of the New Order, as well as a return to tacit Indonesian leadership and political agenda within ASEAN.

US officials hoped that Yudhoyono’s strong leadership mandate combined with his military background would serve to encourage greater cooperation between Jakarta and Washington, not least because of his standing within the Indonesian polity. Moving cautiously, Yudhoyono had success in asserting civilian authority over the TNI – an important goal of international observers and one that Megawati proved either unwilling or unable to do in a serious, comprehensive way. Most significantly, this involved sidelining conservative military leaders most opposed to military reform. The issues at hand concerned more than human rights issues, as the continuing strength of the TNI in the Indonesian political sphere demonstrated that many of the reforms desired by external powers like the United States had to do with ensuring civilian institutional supremacy as much as the continued good conduct of the TNI itself. The Aceh agreement represented one example; an increasingly open press, if not completely free, represented another check on prerogatives traditionally enjoyed by the TNI. While not all moves on military reform resulted directly from

27 See Haseman, 111-25.
SBY’s leadership – some, in fact, were passed by the Parliament over initial opposition by SBY’s administration – the overall trend lines and SBY’s overall intentions were clearly welcomed by the United States.

The degree to which the successful, if necessarily incomplete, passage of military reforms is attributable to the resumption of ties with the US military, rather than the domestic dynamics of military reform within Indonesia, is difficult to ascertain with any certainty. Proponents of resuming military ties certainly suggested an ongoing causal relationship, with increased American support leading to an improvement in TNI behaviour, but as one scholar has suggested, “[f]oreign governments that wish to support Indonesia’s military reform process should be aware that their actions are unlikely to have a strong impact on domestic policy decisions. This applies both to possible sanctions and to support programs.”

Owing to his own military background, the further consolidation of the democratic process, and his strong personal mandate – was supported in his reform efforts by Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, who described his own role as being that of Yudhoyono’s “lightning rod” on military reform, in order to “[draw] all the public criticism [on military reform issues] away from him”.

To a large degree this also represents a further maturation of the Indonesian political process, and one that has added further support for Indonesia within Washington. But despite the rhetorical and practical backing offered by Washington, these developments nonetheless reflected a fundamentally domestic process within Indonesia far more than one imposed, or even directly influenced, by the United States.

Application of major reforms, both of the TNI and the national police, remained uneven throughout SBY’s presidency – particularly related to the territorial structure of the TNI, which institutionally provides the TNI with considerable influence at the provincial and village level, as well as still-inadequate levels of funding, creating a tacitly accepted solution of military-run businesses that blur the line of state ownership in order to fill budgetary gaps. (The opportunity for personal enrichment available to senior officers has long represented a major obstacle to

further TNI reforms.) Such conditions are firmly entrenched within the TNI’s institutional culture. Nonetheless, impressive progress has been made on a number of reforms, resulting in an Indonesian military that has largely “returned to the barracks” and away from everyday political involvement even while significant obstacles remain. For the United States, maintaining momentum for reform represents a key goal and directly impacts assessments of Indonesia’s progress regarding civilian control of the military and military legal accountability. Many in Washington complained about the lack of accountability in the poisoning death of TNI critic and activist Munir Said Thalib, a case signifying that little real change has occurred within the higher echelons of the military elite, nor in a legal system that still allows such figures relative impunity.\(^{30}\)

However, such a view also misreads, and significantly underestimates, the considerable amount of progress that Indonesia has made in a relatively short period of time on many important issues. Broad issues of military reform – such as the abandonment of dwifungsi (“Dual-function”, or military representation in Parliament) – as well as multiple cycles of relatively free and fair elections, garner the most attention, particularly so in the United States. Furthermore, the territorial command structure of the TNI does afford certain advantages for such a widely dispersed country as Indonesia, particularly regarding emergency response efforts, though practicality in such matters has traditionally been secondary to broader civil-military political considerations. In many ways, these represent but the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, one of the most significant challenges facing American policy remains complacency, in terms of not fully appreciating the enormous strides that Indonesia has made domestically or in acknowledging the still significant challenges that remain.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\) Munir, a noted human rights and anti-corruption activist, was fatally poisoned with arsenic on a Garuda Airlines flight from Indonesia to Europe in 2004, creating an international scandal. An off-duty Garuda pilot was sentenced to 20 years over the crime, though investigations (and leaked US State Department cables) strongly indicated the involvement of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN). Yudhoyono described the trial as “the test of Indonesia’s history”. Numerous trials have proven inconclusive, including the 2008 acquittal of former BIN director Maj. Gen. (ret) Muchdi Purwopranjano. The case, and particularly the manner in which it has been handled, remains a high profile and polarizing issue domestically and abroad. Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: Reopen Inquiry into Activist’s Murder," (New York, 2010).

Important issues of economic reform did not fare as well under SBY, leading to some descriptions of a “lost decade” economically despite the much-needed stability that SBY’s presidency provided. While economic growth continued at a healthy rate and Indonesia avoided some of the worst effects of the Great Recession that roiled international markets in the 2008-9 period, specific issues of graft remained a major issue. Despite progress on the issue, Indonesia under SBY still ranked as one of the more corrupt economies in the world. Issues of economic distribution remain a major political issue: though per capita incomes rose under SBY’s presidency, the distribution (represented by the GINI coefficient) of that income was disproportionately skewed towards wealthier Indonesia. Indonesia spent considerably less on “social protection” policies, such as rice subsidies to the poor, than other regional countries, and the money that was spent was not considered particularly well-targeted or effective.32 But as with so many issues, currents move in multiple directions and rarely, if ever, exist in isolation. International economists supported SBY’s efforts to curb long-standing petroleum subsidies due to the economic incentive-skewing and environmental degradation it produced, in addition to the enormous burden it placed upon the federal government’s budget. But the removal of the subsidy nonetheless disproportionately impacted the poorest Indonesians most directly and therefore contributed to inequality rates, even as subsidies were recognized as a highly inefficient and regressive policy tool.33

Though political, ideological, and identity-related concerns required a certain distance to be kept between the United States and Indonesia, there is little doubt that relations grew closer as the intensity of the immediate post-9/11 reaction transitioned into a more comprehensive environment of policy reevaluation during SBY’s presidency. Indonesia’s more active role within ASEAN was notable, particularly on issues related to the uncertain, uneasy relationship between the organization and a rapidly growing China. Clearly, China’s engagement offered specific opportunities for Southeast Asia, though the increasingly active role played by Beijing within the region was carefully observed in Washington and Jakarta. The most direct result was

a continuation of the warming trend described in counterterrorism issues, as Indonesia sought to provide a degree of regional balance to China’s soft power “Charm Offensive” of the mid-late 2000s.34

The 2008 election of Barack Obama seemed to represent a watershed moment in US-Indonesian relations and a continuation of the general improvement in relations under the Bush Administration. Having spent several years of his childhood in Jakarta, Obama was considered by many Indonesians to be something of a native son. The goodwill generated by his election impacted public opinion significantly, with approval ratings of the United States rising significantly following his election. The widespread unpopularity of the Bush Administration amongst the Indonesian public masked increasingly successful, frequently below the radar engagement on a bilateral level that resulted in some successes later in Bush’s second term. This occurred even as public opinion provided an upper limit upon the relationship – as did the near-total emphasis upon counterterrorism measures during the early years of Bush’s presidency. The “honeymoon” of goodwill associated with Obama’s election did not categorically change Indonesian opinion of American foreign policy imperatives, particularly as they related to US policy towards the Middle East amidst feelings of increasing Muslim solidarity. If nothing else it raised the bar on reasonable expectations of the relationship – even if critics have noted the danger of taking such symbolism too far in the absence of concrete policies. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Indonesia on her first international trip in February 2009, designed in part to capitalize on Obama’s popularity, was an indication that the Obama Administration placed significant value on Indonesia, and Southeast Asia more broadly. Obama personally visited Indonesia in November 2010, a visit that generated considerable enthusiasm for him personally while also providing evidence of the growing importance with which Washington tried to engage with Jakarta.

Importantly, for all of the still-outstanding issues it faces domestically, Indonesia’s increasingly vocal role internationally in the promotion of democracy and human rights was also well-received by the United States and served as an important justification for greater engagement with Indonesia amongst American political elites.

While critics have charged Jakarta with inconsistency and lacking sufficient political will for not pushing a more aggressive reform agenda domestically, for example, or by being “generally timid in making strong commitments to uphold human rights at the international level because it continues to struggle with its own human rights issues” domestically – it has nonetheless been increasingly active regionally and within ASEAN in supporting such movements, even if this support has been frustratingly halting at times. The 2008 establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), designed to promote dialogue related to the spread of democracy internationally, represents one such measure, as has the modest support it has provided to Myanmar in its efforts to transition from military rule. Similarly, Indonesia provided logistical support for several countries involved in the Arab Spring at an impressive level for a state that so recently joined the ranks of global democracies.

Indonesia’s recent democratic transition has served to complicate Jakarta’s response to China, just as it has complicated Jakarta’s diplomacy within ASEAN and with the United States. Only recently an authoritarian autocracy, Indonesia’s transition into a forceful advocate for democracy, both organizationally within ASEAN and domestically in individual Southeast Asian countries, has been striking. That SBY’s Administration went to such lengths to emphasize the BDF’s emphasis upon sharing information and not dictating particular courses of action to individual countries represents a hedge in this direction, but it is also unmistakable that advocacy for greater democracy was more prominent. Even if it takes quite different forms from that of the United States, it is clearly closer to Washington on this issue than to Beijing. Simultaneously, however, the impact of public opinion upon Indonesian politicians has created greater public space for a more “Islamic” foreign policy, some of which has resulted in occasionally severe criticism of Washington and American foreign policy. In this sense, Indonesia finds itself (hardly for the first time) facing a difficult paradox: while pro-“Islamic” foreign policy stances are familiar ground for Jakarta, such considerations have generally been a secondary, or even ex post facto, consideration rather than a strategic priority. The uncertain direction of democratic

35 Piccone and Yusman.
activism in contemporary Indonesia has created a potentially forceful voice within the development process of an Islamic-oriented foreign policy.\(^{37}\)

To be sure, the depth of Indonesia’s dedication to democracy promotion – more precisely, the uneven application of these principles and the frustrating lack of tangible progress within these organizations – has attracted criticism. Both within ASEAN and the BDF, as well as within the larger Islamic world of which Indonesia proclaims itself to be a leader, democracy has faced several high-profile setbacks. The prominent role of the military within Thai politics evokes memories of the New Order for many; neither Singapore, Malaysia, nor Vietnam (amongst littoral ASEAN states) has experienced a peaceful democratic transition of power. The inclusiveness of the BDF – which includes notably non-democratic nations such as China, Brunei and Saudi Arabia – has also been a source of criticism. Indonesia has touted this as a strength by allowing the sharing of past experiences and best practices in democracy promotion across a wide range of countries and national experiences. The BDF has been touted as offering (in the words of one organizer) “a non-threatening learning environment”, and arguably has greater opportunity for influence than American policy can offer.\(^{38}\) This represents a remarkable transition from Suharto’s New Order autocracy in a comparatively brief amount of time – even if the results to date have been frustratingly inconsistent to date.

Similarly, Indonesia has also been a proponent of a greater focus within ASEAN of human rights. In doing so, it has received support from the United States, aware that Indonesian efforts offer positive opportunities the US is incapable of pursuing or influencing. Several prominent NGOs, domestically and internationally, nonetheless criticized gaps within Indonesia’s domestic human rights record and SBY’s failure to more aggressively advocate a more far reaching reform agenda. In addition to questions of military accountability and restrictions on the press, protection of religious minorities remained a major human rights concern during the

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\(^{37}\) Sukma, ; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Foreign Policy, Islam, and Democracy in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesia Social Sciences and Humanities* 3(2010); Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World: between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), 2006).

later years of his presidency.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, within Southeast Asia – a region hardly known for widespread democratic practice or progressiveness on human rights – Indonesia represents a rare success story, even if concerns over the robustness of the progress and potential for back-sliding remain paramount. Such risks arise from the lively nature of Indonesia’s newly established democracy, remaining institutional challenges, and political willpower.\textsuperscript{40}

Such progress – tentative and incomplete though it remains – clearly aligns with the ideological and ideational aspects of American grand strategy, and has resulted in clear gains within the bilateral relationship. Such gains have occurred despite, or indeed because of, the differing motivations that both states have used in order to reach similar conclusions. On the most important security-related issue facing Southeast Asia, however, both intent and actions are more compatible. Indonesia’s reticence towards the seemingly all-consuming “rise of China” has also been noted with interest by American policymakers. The complicated, multi-faceted issues related to Beijing’s rising ability and willingness to project its (ideological, security, economic, and ideational) influence abroad has come to dominate both ASEAN-wide security diplomacy and bilateral Indonesian-US ties. Within ASEAN, the most directly provocative issue is China’s claim to nearly the entire South China Sea (SCS) – the so-called “9-dash line”. Washington’s diplomacy towards Indonesia and Southeast Asia has reflected concerns that the claim represents a dangerous, provocative precedent, a major challenge to regional security, and a violation of international norms. The seemingly meaningless debate over several inhospitable islands in the vast, open sea has been reliably and regularly cited as a plausible cause of a Sino-American confrontation. China’s claim is based upon so-called historical maps and declarations made in the immediate aftermath of the 1949 Communist victory and are vaguely based upon “historical documents”. The 2002 Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea, an agreement between China and ASEAN that attempted to develop a framework for dealing with contested areas, has been eclipsed by recent events.\textsuperscript{41} In practice, recent Chinese policy has largely operated on a “dual-

\textsuperscript{39} As a case in point, see “In Religion’s Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia,” (Human Rights Watch, 2013).
\textsuperscript{40} Aria Danaparamita, “An Elegy to Indonesian Democracy,” \textit{The Diplomat}, Sept 29 2014.
track approach”, which has involved bilateral negotiations with individual ASEAN countries as well as negotiations over contested areas with the institution as a whole. This became China’s preferred strategy more explicitly following the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and continued in following years, even as Chinese President Xi Jinping has authorized island-building and active harassment of US naval operations (“freedom of navigation operations”, or FONOPS) in the SCS in order to consolidate his domestic base of political power.

Efforts to bolster Chinese claims through the creation of manmade structures in the South China Sea, including military installations, and the largely confrontational approach to conflicting claims by Beijing – in particular to those of the Philippines and Vietnam, though Brunei and Malaysia also claim areas that China deems its own – have called into question the traditional freedom of passage through international waters that the United States has long held as a primary component of national grand strategy. It has also been viewed, rightly or wrongly, as a laboratory for China’s overall attitude and approach to regional diplomacy. This has provoked strong internal reactions within (and between) ASEAN states, regardless of SCS claimant status. As the most directly affected by Chinese claims, maritime states have been more vocal and forceful in confronting the circumspect, China-orientated land-based states within ASEAN (and China itself, of course) about these claims. For an organization founded upon the principles of non-intervention, Great Power non-alignment, and organizational unanimity (in name, if not always practice), this represents a major transition for the organization and arguably the most challenging tests it faces going forward. The consequences for external powers remain important.

Significantly, the reluctance or inability to develop a binding framework beyond the 2002 DoC has reinforced regional concerns over historical and cultural elements of Chinese diplomacy that incorporate aspects of China’s insistence upon bilateralism. In particular, the tradition of tianxia – the tradition of tribute being paid by mostly neighbouring “barbarian” clans and states to China’s self-declared “Emperor of all under Heaven”, particularly under the Han Dynasty – remains a significant influence on the worldview of modern China and its leaders, though the

environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China”, and called for Parties to “reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight over the South China Sea”, including “refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”
exact effect of this remains vague. This worldview of Chinese-centric bilateralism has increased in recent years, explicitly so according to the pronouncements of Chinese leaders, scholars, and state-sanctioned media. Unquestionably, this has also been complicated – as it is in all claimant states – by the strongly nationalist reaction provoked by any hint of diplomatic retreat from “sacred national honour/territory”, further steeling leaders against any concessions that could be interpreted as weakness. China (particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping) claims to maintain a desire for a harmonious rise; whether genuine or not, the seeming ability (and willingness) of the Chinese government to generate nationalistic support when necessary understandably leaves regional states in a state of wary apprehension.

Globally, the dynamic, multifaceted nature of Chinese-American diplomacy and incipient competition has been discussed at length elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this work. By necessity as much as choice, the role of ASEAN in handling and responding to this evolving situation is central to regional security now and in the future. Within that dynamic the implications for US-Indonesian relations, both within an ASEAN and bilateral context, are indisputable – and arguably the most significant since the 9/11 attacks, if not the end of the Cold War. In addition, conflicting South China Sea claims and related actions have become a principal topic of regional diplomacy – but by the end of SBY’s term in office (and beyond), increased tension and military confrontation have hampered resolution. Rising strains over recent incidents in disputed areas have strengthened this sentiment, and this has caused Washington to engage ASEAN states individually and collectively far more actively than it had even a decade ago. Undoubtedly, it represents one of the most significant tests in ASEAN’s history – it is hardly inconceivable to consider open conflict involving members over SCS claims, either with China or (less likely) between ASEAN states. Potential dissolution of the organization itself, while highly unlikely, remains a possibility. The increased level of ASEAN engagement by the United States in Bush’s later years and under Obama took on many forms – bilaterally with individual nations, the multifaceted “G2” dialogue with China, and in various regional fora such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the July 2010 ARF summit in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared an American “national

interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law” in the SCS; this came in response to a Chinese declaration of SCS sovereignty as a “core interest”, which was not well received by rival claimants within ASEAN.\textsuperscript{43} Neither position represented much of a surprise or an original statement of policy, though China appeared to be caught off-guard by the statements expressing concern about Chinese actions by 11 other participants, including Indonesia. That the US has demonstrated an increased interest in developing closer relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam (amongst others), while also repeatedly raising the issue in various multilateral fora, further emphasizes this. Perhaps even more telling – though predictable given the massive (and growing) disparity between Chinese power and capabilities and other claimant states – is the interest that ASEAN states, both individually and collectively, have demonstrated in supporting these efforts.

For their part, Chinese leaders and media have made clear both their belief in the strength of their “historical” claims as well as the antiquatedness of the United States’ “Cold War” mentality in attempting to “contain” China’s natural ambitions – even as several regional states have opposed Chinese efforts and taken actions to confront China. China’s nationally-leaning press has gone further in response, claiming that the U.S. has interfered with Chinese territory due to violating China’s (claimed) 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) afforded to it by the UNCLOS. China has repeatedly, and forcefully, opposed American actions in the South China Sea, which has included naval exercises nearby and within areas claimed by China. This remains one of the most pressing bilateral – and, from the American perspective, multilateral – issue between the two. China’s attempts to apply UNCLOS to disputed territory has been rejected by many, including the United States and Indonesia, and unquestionably remains one of the most significant regional security issues facing ASEAN. In a widely publicized rebuke, in 2016 a South China Sea arbitration tribunal in the Hague ruled against China’s claims in a case brought by the

Philippines. The repercussions of that ruling, while vast, are still uncertain with multiple scenarios available to all parties involved in the complicated, dynamic issue.

A full discussion of the many aspects of the South China Sea issue – or for that matter, strictly that of conflicting sovereignty claims – including a wide range of perspectives and the potential outcomes facing claimant and non-claimant states remains an ongoing topic in the numerous excellent works on the topic. It is important to note the awkward diplomatic situation in which Indonesia finds itself, and how this clearly impacted SBY’s final years in office, particularly as it relates to the United States. Clearly, following the resumption of diplomatic ties between Beijing and Jakarta in 1990 (after two and a half decades of deep freeze under the New Order), China arguably represents Indonesia’s most important bilateral relationship. This has taken on even greater precedence due to China’s continued engagement – positive or otherwise – with ASEAN, and more generally as China’s economic and material strength continued its rapid growth following the end of the Cold War. Unquestionably, maintaining a positive relationship with China represents a core goal of Indonesian diplomacy.

But the pushback against Chinese actions in the South China Sea within ASEAN – multiple ASEAN states, after all, represent rival claims to China’s “9-dash line” – has left Indonesia to attempt a difficult balancing act. While only a relatively minor claimant itself, the proximity of Indonesian territorial waters to the contested areas and its considerable geopolitical importance necessitates much greater interest in the manner and substance of any potential resolution for Indonesia than the relatively minor amount of contested territory would suggest. Being both a minor claimant and a traditional leader within ASEAN, Indonesia’s prospective contribution as an arbiter further magnifies the importance of the issue within Indonesian foreign policy thinking.

Clearly, this has had significant repercussions for US-Indonesian relations, particularly following the Obama Administration’s declaration of a “pivot” (later described as a “rebalancing”) from the Middle East and Europe towards the Pacific.

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The balancing act for Jakarta – weighing the increasingly competitive interests not only of China and the United States, but also those of fellow ASEAN states – is significant and remains a major topic of regular conversation within regional capitals and fora. While Indonesia’s claims within China’s claimed area are relatively modest (the Natuna/Riau Islands), the area surrounding these islands represents some of Indonesia’s largest offshore natural gas deposits and are therefore potentially extremely valuable. The series of aggressive Chinese actions raised concerns throughout China’s immediate periphery, as did China’s strenuous rejection of the Hague’s 2016 ruling in favour of the Philippines based on UNCLOS. While the later years of SBY’s presidency saw somewhat of a tempering of such behavior, it nonetheless reinforced concerns amongst several neighbors, including Indonesia, for the consistency with which such an approach was taken and the finely tuned escalated control and pressure that Beijing seemed to selectively utilize. While opinions of China within Indonesia overall remain positive, the reality of growing Chinese capabilities remains real and concerning to many regional states. For many reasons, not least of which are the stakes involved on numerous levels, it represents one of the most important and complex issues facing the United States and the principal thematic and practical preoccupation of Washington’s interactions with Southeast Asia.

There is also the unsettling opaqueness of Chinese governance, which has served to reinforce many of the concerns within the region. “Sinology” has become a major trend within academic, policy, and public circles, in large part due to the near-complete lack of transparency within the Chinese Communist Party. While Chinese participation within the multitude of regional fora has allowed for greater interaction with regional counterparts, understanding the complicated, intricate world of Chinese politics is a difficult task at best. As important as understanding the multifaceted nature of Chinese decision-making is, the impact of these decisions is at least as unsettling. As Luttwak points out,

...if democratization did take place and China’s policies were no longer formed in total secrecy by a few party chiefs, and if its policies were no longer so largely focused on the maximization of power, there would certainly be less concern over China’s rise, and less resistance by neighbors and peers. Democratization would not suspend the logic of strategy that mandates
growing resistance to growing power, but it would raise the culminating level of unresisted Chinese aggrandizement.45

This has represented a delicate balancing act involving multiple levels of diplomatic consideration due to the obvious risks of being “torn between America and China”.46 Clearly, there is also principled objection to China’s unilateral actions in contested areas so close to Indonesia’s sovereign borders, as well as reflecting concern over the impact this could have upon critical maritime passageways such as the Malacca and Sunda Straits. Nonetheless, Jakarta has attempted to remain somewhat neutral in the various disputes, while having shown no intention of backing down from either its own claims or those of its fellow ASEAN states with more significant claims. Clearly, with multiple ASEAN states involved (including some with conflicting claims amongst themselves, not just with China), the South China Sea represents a fundamental challenge to the organization itself. In 2012, differing viewpoints about China’s actions in the South China Sea led to an embarrassing failure to reach agreement on a joint communiqué for the first time following the annual ASEAN summit, belying the chosen theme of “One Community, One Destiny” for the meeting.47 Given Indonesia’s traditional role as one of the founding leaders of the organization, this is no small thing, with the potential to even split the organization permanently. This has impacted US-Indonesia relations significantly, as critics have questioned ASEAN’s continued usefulness after its inability to reach agreement.

One of the consequences of this level of tension in the region – and the multiple, overlapping claims of claimants – has been a generalized desire for a continued, if not increased, American presence throughout the region. American emphasis on freedom of navigation has been supported by multiple states in the region – concerned, as they are, about the potential might of China as well as Beijing’s increasingly provocative behaviour. Indonesia has been a participant in this trend, if rather reluctantly, simultaneously wary of being seen by either the Indonesian public or other regional partners as following the lead of the United States too closely. This reflects one of the few historical traditions that can be claimed in some capacity

45 Luttwak, 5.
47 Kevin Novotny, Torn Between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).
by the otherwise contrary approaches of both Sukarno and Suharto. In the contemporary context, the impact of the changing dynamics caused by China’s continued “peaceful development” (in the mantra of the Chinese Communist Party), and how this specifically affects a regional security architecture that has remained broadly unchanged since the end of the Cold War remains a critical consideration. China’s uncertain path as its economy continues to grow and Beijing grows increasingly assertive in its handling of what it considers to be its rightful claims. The 2002 DOC seems to belong to a far different era of diplomacy, whatever signatories may claim.

For different but related reasons, such concerns have also been reflected in highly contested, historically muddled claims along similar lines over islands in the East China Sea with Japan and South Korea, respectively. Since taking power in late 2012, President Xi Jinping has maintained an assertive policy approach to territorial disputes across the board, even as such an approach has raised major regional concerns. The populist Chinese press, led by the state-owned *People’s Daily* and especially the nationalistic *Global Times*, has strongly supported such an approach, going so far as to call war “inevitable” in the South China Sea if the United States did not “re-adjust” its “outdated Cold War mentality”, particularly over US demands that China cease its land reclamation efforts in contested waters around the Spratly archipelago and elsewhere. Such an adjustment seems unlikely, though regional states have been reluctant to overtly press the issue for fear of Chinese retribution. The election of Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte in May 2016 has complicated regional responses, as Duterte has pursued a far more conciliatory approach towards China and reversed many of his predecessor’s stances on key SCS-related issues despite – or perhaps, because of – the recent Filipino arbitration win over UNCLOS.

The emphasis upon freedom of navigation was a key component of Bush’s approach to Southeast Asia, but events during the Obama Administration caused this to become an even more relevant (and vocal) aspect of American diplomacy. A major bipartisan effort from the White House, with general support from an otherwise recalcitrant Republican-controlled Congress, resulted in the 2012 announcement of the “Pacific Rebalancing”. American and foreign attention has focused upon the

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military dimensions of the shift, though the move was intended to represent a renewed level of American engagement across multiple dimensions. It received mixed reviews within Indonesia, which was generally supportive of greater American engagement while wary of the initial effort’s overtly military focus. In the years since its announcement, perceptions of the lacklustre fulfillment of initially grandiose pledges made by Obama’s Administration have attracted significant criticism, including from the former editor of the Jakarta Post quoted to start this chapter. In particular, concerns have been raised that having made such a public declaration of American interests in a particular vision of regional order in East Asia, a failure to utilize appropriate means to adequately maintain such an order could embolden those resistant to Washington’s initial approach. Clearly, Beijing views the situation very differently. Obama’s commitment to Asia has been called into question, particularly his willingness (and ability) to marshal the use of American resources to reinforce stated commitments – with some suggesting that the move represents more of a tactical shift than a strategic reevaluation.

This is hardly a uniquely American concern, with regional states (including Indonesia) obviously far more closely placed to the areas in question – to say nothing of the sovereignty claims themselves and therefore control of enormous oil and natural gas reserves. Regular military exercises of Chinese air, land, and sea forces have done little to comfort regional states, both in their escalatory nature and as a reminder of the freedom of navigation concerns raised by Washington. The ability of the United States to conduct similar exercises without raising similar concerns reflects numerous factors, among them the difference between a status quo and a revisionist power as well as being an off-shore balancing force without territorial claims in

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49 Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa was explicit: “[w]hat I find somewhat unfortunate, the focus on the pivot, is that it makes the U.S. engagement in the region unnecessarily appear to be unidimensional, as if it is only a military presence…” Marty Natalegava, "Natalegawa: Indonesia Wants to 'Facilitate Conversation' on Tense South China Sea,” (New York: Asia Society, 2013).

50 Shortly after the rebalancing became American policy, John Kerry used his Secretary of State confirmation hearings to urge a cautious approach. “You know, the Chinese take a look at [U.S. military superiority and increased engagement] and say, ‘What’s the United States doing? Are they trying to circle us in? What’s going on?’” Quoted in Robert G. Sutter, The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First Century Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 107.

contested areas. But proximity to the issue – and China’s enormous, multidimensional importance – has also prevented rather than caused a clear break between ASEAN and Beijing over such behaviour. US actions have not been welcomed by all, having been interpreted as being provocative or overly assertive in their own right – including, at times, Indonesia. Chinese leaders, as well as parts of the nationalistic Chinese press, have increasingly viewed Washington’s actions as both undue interference in a regional issue of which a far-away country like the United States should play no part, and more broadly a major aspect of larger Chinese claims that American actions represent an illegitimate, multipronged effort to “contain” China’s natural geopolitical ambitions.

Clearly, few in Washington view the issue in the same way as Beijing’s leaders have stated it, insisting that traditional freedom of movement through open international waters is a fundamental, nonnegotiable right. What is lost in translation between Beijing and Washington, intentionally or not, is how each views the SCS and the applicability of international law, as it currently stands. It has consistently been a major bilateral issue between China and the US at multiple levels of government, with rival claimant states surrounding the South China Sea clearly having more at risk than legal claims of jurisdiction. Administration officials of both parties have regularly repeated the importance of freedom of navigation through contested waters, though recent developments have drawn more domestic and international attention to these statements. Most importantly, perceived Chinese aggression in pressing its claims, acting forcefully towards rival claimants, and building up of artificial “islands” to bolster Beijing’s claims have raised the issue in recent years, and remain the principal security matter regionally and within the bilateral US-China relationship. The impact all these factors will have upon Washington’s approach to Jakarta remains to be seen, though the impressive gains made in recent years within the relationship leave both parties well placed to take advantage of growing compatibility of perceived interests.

Critically, such interests are consistent with traditional American approaches to grand strategy, suggesting that amidst considerable change within Indonesia itself and the US-Indonesia relationship, the renewed relationship has the potential to be deeper and longer lasting than present events indicate. The history of American policy towards Indonesia indicates that during periods in which the underlying elements of American strategic culture are broadly consistent with both grand strategic approaches
and bilateral foreign policy, awareness of Indonesia’s relevance to overall goals of American foreign policy tends to grow. Though not to be overstated or simplified, the general compatibility of outlook between Jakarta and Washington regarding China’s rise suggests this trend will likely continue for the immediate future. Furthermore, this suggests that Indonesia’s increasing profile within American strategic thought could continue along the present upward trajectory and, potentially, lead to the closer relationship that both nations claim to be seeking.
CHAPTER 6:

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN AN UNCERTAIN AGE

“It is our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.”

-Richard Hofstadter

Previous chapters have examined the theoretical underpinnings of this research project, with particular focus on the course of American foreign policy towards Indonesia throughout the Cold War, the uneasy transitional period of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the growing consolidation of the US-Indonesian relationship under the Indonesian presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his American counterparts George W. Bush and Barack Obama. This chapter examines post-WWII American grand strategy in order to better understand the “macro”, big picture perceptions, logic, and practice of the United States throughout this period.

Clearly, this has been the subject of countless prior works and interpretations in academic, policy, and popular literature. This work is intended to be a modest contextual description how American grand strategy has influenced and shaped the foreign policy of the United States towards Indonesia. American decision-making regarding strategic priorities in 1945 and at the end of the Cold War provided potential opportunities to “reset” American grand strategy, as did the terrorist attacks of 9/11. But since the Second

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World War, the vastly changed material environment has corresponded to a distinct change in the essentially liberal ideological basis of American grand strategy, even as the relative importance of this varied throughout the Cold War. Nonetheless, the remarkable staying power of this approach – what Michael J. Green has termed the ‘three-note chord’ of American grand strategy – has demonstrated that this particular aspect of American strategic culture is a particularly salient and consistent one in examining grand strategy.

This chapter is structured in the following manner. The neoclassical realist approach to state behaviour and grand strategy discussed in Chapter 2 will be briefly reviewed. Furthermore, American strategic culture will be examined as a potentially strong conditioning agent in the development of grand strategy, and therefore how this can contribute explanatory value to strictly structural explanations. The chapter will then describe a distinctive strategic culture of the United States based upon a strong preference for an international liberal order. This has frequently been matched by a heavy dose of realism, which has led to regular and predictable tension within the American grand strategy tradition.\(^2\) American grand strategy, as Green details, has traditionally focused on three major areas: physical security, economic security, and the promotion of values. The consistency and interweaving of these concerns is particularly notable in the American experience, as is the underlying basis behind all three areas: a liberalism in international affairs that is also marked by a reluctance to adequately match the ambitious global goals suggested by American grand strategy, reflecting the tensions described above. Significantly, these tensions were also clearly evident in American foreign policy towards Indonesia throughout this period.

The period since 1945 will be considered with this framework in mind. The predominant (and broadly consistent) grand strategy of containment was only one of a number of different options available to post-war American leaders; while subject to differing interpretations and emphasis throughout the Cold War, containment remained at the core of American grand strategy during this period. The constancy of its applicability throughout the Cold War should not be mistaken for a dearth of alternative options.

Similarly, American power following the Cold War allowed for several different potential paths to be taken. Despite these choices being available, a grand strategy that invoked important liberal values and assumptions was settled upon at both junctures. Furthermore, even with the immense changes to the material environment after the Soviet Union’s collapse, American grand strategy continued along largely unchanged lines during the 1990s: while containment as policy was necessarily jettisoned once the Soviet Union, the target of that particular strategy, collapsed, the underlying assumptions of the strategy remained unchanged and, if anything, emboldened. The perception of success during the Cold War and the continuing influence of strategic culture have important explanatory value in this context. Following an examination of the grand strategies of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the respective approaches of George W. Bush and Barack Obama will be considered. Initially, the younger Bush tilted towards a realist approach, in part because of the reaction against Clinton’s conduct of foreign policy. But following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 the United States followed a grand strategy that has combined primacy with ambitious international goals. While some have criticized this as a departure from traditional American grand strategy, Bush’s approach reflected aspects of Wilsonian ideology and emphasized liberal international goals, suggesting a persistent American strategic culture in this strikingly familiar approach to grand strategy. Similarly, the Obama Administration’s strategic framework reflected long-standing themes of American strategy – including soaring rhetoric and noteworthy reticence in supporting stated strategic imperatives. These suggest that once departures in tone and domestic politics are taken into account, considerable similarities in underlying strategic substance remain – suggesting an approach of mostly consistent pragmatism influenced by the elements of exceptionalism suggested by Hofstadter to start this chapter.

Consistency of “the 3-note chord”

The course of the United States’ interactions with the world has been the source of considerable study and has been approached from innumerable angles, methodologies, perspectives, and theoretical paradigms. A particularly vibrant subset of this literature has analyzed the importance of several key concepts within American grand strategy that have demonstrated remarkable consistency and substantial continuity throughout the Cold
War. This consistency of approach, despite the radically different security environment over the 20th century, suggest that material conditions are insufficient in describing the development or the practice of American grand strategy. While structural influences within the global environment can plausibly be expected to heavily influence such considerations, the consistency of particular elements within the American strategic tradition raises legitimate questions about an approach that privileges the structural components of American power without appreciating other explanatory variables such as strategic culture.

As suggested earlier, the burgeoning amount of literature from recognizably neoclassical realist perspectives does not attempt to abandon the insights of realism, but rather to supplement them with explanatory depth. Neorealism primarily emphasizes the nature of the material environment facing a state, as did its classical predecessor – Waltz’s “third image”. Neoclassical realism’s refusal to set limits on influencing factors upon this creates a greater degree of agency to be afforded policy-makers while also allowing for a wider variety of potential outcomes depending on domestic-level variables unique to particular states. The approach, overall, is more overtly historical in emphasis compared to its more rigidly structural alternatives. It is in this manner that a state’s strategic culture, no less than its makeup or organization, has a substantial effect on its foreign policy. This focus requires modesty, as it generally tends to limit the applicability of conclusions to a particular state, rather than providing systemic answers. Nonetheless, a nuanced answer to how and why a particular state acts the way that it does, something that strategic culture attempts to provide, should hardly be dismissed out of hand because

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3 Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis.*
5 Demonstrating the richness of this methodological approach, some neoclassical realist scholars have offered theoretical explanations that are generalizable beyond the state(s) under examination. Examples include Schweller, ; Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: the United States, Japan, and Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000); Norrin P. Ripsman, "The Curious Case of German Rearmament: Democracy and Foreign Security Policy," *Security Studies* 10, no. 2 (2001).
it cannot be applied more generally. Parsimony should be considered of secondary importance to accuracy.\(^6\)

In the American experience, grand strategy has traditionally emphasized three principal aspects: physical security, economic security, and the promotion of (liberal) values. These different aspects have been asserted with varying degrees of importance, but importantly, they fit together to form Green’s “three-note chord” of American grand strategy. While he applies such considerations specifically to US grand strategy in Asia, one can plausibly recognize their wider applicability on the global level. In this case, the parts do reflect the whole. The significance of this approach is difficult to overstate, as it effectively and concisely summarizes the core objectives of “the American project” over and through time. Green argues that:

\[A \text{ mix of idealism and realism has always driven US foreign policy in East Asia. From the birth of the republic, presidents have returned consistently to the same three-note chord that describes US interests in the Pacific: physical security, economic prosperity, and the promotion of values...the interplay of security, economic and democratic interests in American foreign policy has unfolded with a logic that suggests that the end of the Cold War did not – and will not – lead to a new prioritization of these interests...the rhetoric of democratic expansion – and the reality of economic and political power – have always been difficult to disaggregate. The expansion of democracy equates with a reduction of potential physical threats to the United States, whether from communism, terrorism, or nuclear weapons.}\(^7\)

It is worth noting that to some degree, such factors have influenced the grand strategies of many states. Physical security remains central to any state’s goals, as this directly impacts the state’s ability to survive in an anarchic world – a fundamental assumption of the realist approach. Similarly, economic security – particularly in a world defined by economic complexity and increasingly global trade flows – has long been a vital national interest of Great Powers over time. Even something as malleable as “values promotion” can be observed in a variety of different national approaches and contexts. Promoting support for particular ideological stances does not necessarily equate to the


\(^{7}\) Green, 23-4.
liberal approaches favoured by the United States but rather seeking support for particular world-views or ideologies.\(^8\)

What is significant is the manner in which these elements are woven together: beginning with the end of the Second World War, the composite elements of this “three-note chord” have been viewed as not only complementary but also necessary to each other. The mix of liberal idealism and realism that has marked US foreign policy from the Republic’s early years continues in this vein. American grand strategy, for a host of historical, cultural, and political reasons, has traditionally sought to fuse these interests together in a manner unique to American political culture and tradition. While different aspects have been emphasized and weighted disproportionately according to the changing demands of the international environment at the time, this three-chord note continues to represent the backbone of American foreign policy aspirations. It has not always succeeded in implementing these aims; far from it, and at times catastrophically so. But given the presence of such conditions in Southeast Asia, thanks largely to the changing post-Cold War international order and environment, it can come as no serious surprise that American foreign policy would strive, with renewed urgency, to promote such goals.

This does not mean that US foreign policy, or grand strategy, has remained static or is immune to innumerable influences of the international environment – though no doubt American policymakers have wished for such a fate at times. The substantial changes to the environment in which American foreign policy is considered following the attacks of 9/11 are merely one clear example of how significant and deep changes do occur, even as the constituent elements of strategic culture are interpreted in broadly consistent ways. What is important to remember is the degree to which common themes and elements of American grand strategy are reinterpreted and reapplied to new circumstances, be they externally or internally driven. It is the unique strategic culture of

\(^{8}\) One obvious example of this is the Soviet Union’s efforts to export Communist ideology and revolution. Westad discusses the ideological underpinnings of this in Westad, 38-72 Robert Kagan and (to a lesser extent) Larry Diamond have argued more recently that autocracies and liberal democratic states are involved in an ideological struggle, with governing regimes in Russia and China, amongst others, seeking to undercut the spread of democracy through the promotion of autocracy. See Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008) and Larry Diamond, "The Democratic Rollback: The Rise of the Predatory State," Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (2008): 36-48.
the United States, based on historical experience, that provides an important filter through which American actions are formulated.9

Green’s three-note chord formulation accurately captures the thinking behind the American strategic imperatives in Asia, and is significant for the continuity and consistency that it has demonstrated over the post-World War II and post-Cold War environments. Importantly, the interchange between the various parts of American grand strategy relate to one another in a manner that reinforces the overall approach. Importantly, these have both ideational and material aspects – which reflect the mix of idealism and realism that many commentators have described American foreign policy as reflexively exemplifying.10 American ideals, in the form of the creation of a liberal international order, have frequently also served American material interests: US efforts to prevent destabilizing power rivalries in Asia placed the United States as the centre of the regional security order, just as the post-World War Two Bretton Woods order has benefited American economic interests, and rebuilding a defeated, weakened Japan (and Germany) in the aftermath of the Second World War served critical political, economic, and ideological ends.

The manner in which American grand strategy came to include such elements has been the source of considerable study.11 Significantly, the elements of the ‘three-note chord’ that came to define American grand strategy during the second half of the twentieth century (and beyond) have roots in the particular history of American diplomacy. The influence of domestic political factors, and in particular of the American diplomatic history tradition, is significant and cannot be assumed to be of passing importance to environmental and material forces, as strict realists would suggest. Instead, it is an important intervening variable that largely defines how foreign policy is made,

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9 Mead, .
10 Others have similarly noted the importance of various elements of American grand strategy, but Green’s analysis stands out for his parsimonious presentation; see Roger S. Whitcomb, The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998) . For an alternative view that stresses the discontinuity of American grand strategy under George W. Bush, see T.J. Pempel, "How Bush Bungled Asia: militarism, economic indifference and unilateralism has weakened the United States across Asia," The Pacific Review 21, no. 5 (2008).
11 Walter Russell Mead and Walter McDougall have distilled American diplomatic history into distinct themes, demonstrating the consistency of American foreign policy approaches throughout the 20th century and before. See Mead, and McDougall, .
even if this is itself in reaction to environmental or systemic cues. Broadly speaking, this has fallen under the rubric of strategic culture within the field of security studies. If material factors such as security and economic concerns help drive the reactions of states, the manner in which they formulate responses is conditioned, and often heavily so, by domestically-located factors. Strategic culture is one such factor.\(^\text{12}\)

What matters in the case of the United States is the manner in which such physical, economic, and ideological considerations are applied – and for this study, with particular reference to both American grand strategy and US foreign policy towards Indonesia. Similarly, the blending together of these various elements to form a mostly coherent approach sets the US apart from many other states. For American policymakers, economic security relates in important ways to ideological concerns (support for an open trading system) as well as physical security (prevention of costly rival security alliances based on exclusionary trade). The American case is unique in the manner in which these considerations blend together as well as the lasting power of all three chords. Indeed, the fact that all three chords are considered to be inseparable has contributed directly to the long-lasting longevity of the approach itself. This has much to do with the particular history of American foreign policy and the biases that continue to influence it.

Of course, the constituent elements of American ideology have changed considerably over the history of the Republic. The three-note chord is one explanation of American strategic culture, not necessarily the only explanation. The relative power of the United States, to pick one rather obvious factor, has influenced the way in which Americans view the world and determine the rightful place of the United States within it. Other factors include contrasting interpretations of the “American tradition”, vastly different circumstances and constraints in the global environment, and the actions and beliefs of individual policy-makers. Instead, “[i]t therefore makes sense to speak of an American ideology that goes back two hundred years, but it is an evolving ideology into

\(^{12}\) In a highly influential review essay, Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism” to demonstrate the links between this new area of research and those “classical” realists, such as Hans Morgantheu, that based realism’s foundations on human nature rather than a reflection of the nature of international anarchy. See Rose, 144-72.
which generational experiences are interpreted and perceptual conflicts solved.”  

Clearly, American grand strategy has developed over time, embracing new concepts and refashioning old ones, while adapting to different and complex circumstances. Nonetheless, important elements of American strategic culture have deep roots and have manifested themselves regularly and, for the most part, consistently. Since the United States passed the United Kingdom as the world’s most powerful state towards the end of the 19th century, these ideas have regularly had an enormous effect on American grand strategy.

**Containment**

The strategy of containment, born out of a particular set of geopolitical, ideological, and material circumstances following the Second World War, was one of several grand strategies available to the United States in the war’s immediate aftermath. Numerous works have detailed the causes – geopolitical, diplomatic, ideological, and even personal – behind its adoption. Owing in part to the close compatibility between containment and American strategic culture, it proved to be remarkably resilient and would provide the strategic framework for the United States throughout the Cold War. This lasting power can be attributed not only to the bipolar competition with the Soviet Union and the impact this had upon the global security environment, but also to the compatibility between containment and long-standing traditions and biases present within American strategic culture. Containment was a function of contemporaneous circumstances, most notably the growing power of and tension with the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, but it also fit within well-established, traditional patterns within American foreign policy.

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13 Westad, 9.
American planning for the post-war period began well before eventual victory in 1945. There was little question that the international order of the post-war period would be fundamentally different from that of the 1930s, due to the destruction of the war, the enormous power disparities resulting from the war, and the commonly-held belief of policy-makers that the situation was both too much of an opportunity to waste and too important to allow the diagnosed “mistakes” of the 1930s and before (including after World War I) to be repeated.\(^\text{16}\) Exactly what form this new order would take, however, was still very much in doubt. By 1946, it had become increasingly clear to American policy-makers that the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union had given way to an increasingly aggressive competition for global influence. Competition seemed both inevitable and inescapable, and the stakes could not be higher with the development of nuclear weapons.

The intellectual roots of containment predated George Kennan, but they received their most famous assertion in his 1946 “Long Telegram”, and later publicly in the “X” article within *Foreign Affairs*. The article is widely regarded as the most influential essay in the history of American foreign policy.\(^\text{17}\) Kennan suggested that based on the long history of Russian imperialism and the revolutionary nature of Communism, the Soviet Union – and by extension global Communism – must be resisted around the world. American leaders took Soviet leaders and Communist ideology seriously: in their view, communism and capitalism were engaged in a zero-sum global struggle, with a gain for one resulting in a corresponding loss for the other. Rhetorical excesses accompanied this view and bordered on the sensationalist at times: the struggle against Communism was nothing less than a “test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation” that involved Americans “…pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.”\(^\text{18}\)

Simultaneously, and as a direct result of the perceived consequences of the struggle, containment came to reflect more than a resistance to Soviet or Communist

\(^{16}\) Traditional aspects of American exceptionalism cannot be dismissed either. Harry Truman believed that “God has created us and brought us to our present position of great power and strength for some great purpose”; Dean Acheson likened the US to the “locomotive at the head of mankind and the rest of the world was the caboose.” McMahon, 15.

\(^{17}\) “X”, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-82.

\(^{18}\) “X”, 868.
expansionism. It became a moral crusade, with the challenges associated with any such struggle. Inherent within such an approach were particular prescriptions for US behaviour, including the creation of a liberal international order that could effectively serve to combat the environment of economic destruction and political polarization in which Communism might gain support.\(^\text{19}\)

In the immediate post-war period, the rebuilding of the European and Japanese economies was centrally important to American goals for the post-war international order – particularly as local Communist strength in both areas raised the spectre of neutralist or Soviet-aligned orientation in the war-ravaged societies. Should indigenous Communist parties come to power, there was little doubt that American interests would be adversely affected. The compatibility of these concerns with the moral imperative requiring opposition to Communism was not accidental. The prospect of a neutralist Western Europe and Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe was anathema to American leaders – not just for the obvious material impacts, but also for the intense pressure such developments would place on the remaining non-Communist Western world, geopolitically and indeed morally. It also bred fears within Europe that, as in 1919, American leaders would abandon Europe to its own means.\(^\text{20}\) In part to address this, as well as the thorny question of German rehabilitation within the Atlantic alliance\(^\text{21}\), the United States took on unprecedented obligations, of which the Marshall Plan and NATO are the most well-known. These two obligations positively reinforced the other in one of the clearest examples of the three-note chord in American grand strategy. As much as containment suggested opposition to Soviet (and Communist) expansion, it also stood rather more

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\(^\text{19}\) Not all assessments of containment or American grand strategy are as generous. Kennan himself grew frustrated with the heavy military focus of containment, likening the sensation to having “inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnessing its path of destruction in the valley below…” Quoted in Gaddis, 381. Gaddis’s work remains an authoritative work on containment written from a ‘post-revisionist’ perspective.

\(^\text{20}\) Lundestad in particular has emphasized the degree to which the United States was “invited” into Europe (and Asia) as a means of ensuring continued commitment. See Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation” in the American Century,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 2 (1999).

\(^\text{21}\) Trachtenberg, amongst others, asserts that the ‘German question’ – in short, the debate over Germany’s post-war role between leaders in Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, and not least of all Germany – was of central importance to the balance between the United States and Soviet Union as well as within the Western Alliance. Principally, this centred upon questions of German economic reconstruction, political orientation, and military rearmament. See Trachtenberg, .
positively for the creation of a liberal economic and political order. As such, it was very much in tune with both the tumultuous international conditions of the period and American strategic culture – namely, the importance of a fundamentally liberal international approach. To a much greater degree than after the First World War, the aftermath of the Second World War resulted in American power being used to contribute and shape a distinctly liberal international order using the political and ideological framework of containment. The multitude of American actions in the immediate post-WWII era to create this order, both intentional and not, were made amidst considerable political manoeuvring amongst Western European allies.

Importantly, such an approach also married American interests with ideals in a fundamental, characteristic manner. Support for free trade was one such example; while a liberal economic order along the lines of the Bretton Woods system was considered critical for global economic recovery – as well as preventing 1930s style beggar-thy-neighbour currency and trade policies – it was implicitly (and explicitly, on occasion) assumed by American policymakers that the world’s leading economic power would benefit greatly from an expansion of trade and integrated global economy. Another example, linked to economic restructuring, was decolonization. American support for decolonization in the form of trusteeship and eventual independence for former colonies was genuine if inconsistently applied, particularly once the Cold War upset prior geopolitical considerations and faced strong European opposition. But decolonization also served American interests, in the form of decentralizing rival power centres, opening regions of the world to American influence, and undermining the imperial trading regimes in favour of a global trading regime.


“Predicated on the notion that expanding trade and productivity redounded to the benefit of all nations, the new, American-inspired economic regime sought to impart structural stability to the international economic system by eliminating the trade barriers, exchange controls, and discriminatory practices that gave rise to interstate tensions and conflict. That such a multilateral commercial order well served the material interests of the United States was a given.” McMahon, 16.
Containment, in addition to measures like the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods institutions, and NATO, represented a major change in American foreign policy, domestic politics, and international commitments, even if the intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine reflected long-standing American preferences. While some have suggested that the reality of American power and incipient competition for geopolitical supremacy with the Soviet Union forced the United States to take on a leading global role, alternatives to containment did exist. Significantly, the United States had been a leading international power for several decades without an international profile to fit – a classic case of strategic “understretch”. Powerful voices within the foreign policy community envisioned and advocated alternatives to containment that they thought would better serve American interests, as did some in Europe. Though it is perhaps easier to see containment’s allure (or strategic “inevitability”) from a distance, the rapidity and significance of contemporary events in the war’s aftermath made the adoption of such a strategy anything but a sure thing. That the United States, having been involved in two global conflicts within three decades, should now be facing an exhausted but potentially dangerous and hostile rival, suggested that the opportunity to reform the international system was an important and historically unique one not to be wasted. The cataclysmic events of the preceding years required nothing less. But different schools of thought differed on what actions should be taken.

Leading alternatives to containment included strategies that can be loosely defined as “rollback”, “Fortress America”, and “spheres of influence”. Rollback envisioned a forward military effort in Europe to “liberate” Eastern Europe from Soviet control. This grew more popular in the later 1940s, particularly amongst conservative internationalists, as the brutal and uncompromising nature of Soviet rule became clear. To proponents, containment’s weakness was its bias towards the status quo: why shouldn’t the United States actively push back against Soviet rule, given that the Soviet Union was engaging in such behaviour towards the U.S? Such a strategy also suggested that the United States use its monopoly on atomic weapons while it could: if not through actual use, then at least by leveraging this advantage to gain geopolitical advantage. But such a strategy was wildly ambitious, highly risky, and heavily opposed by European allies. The chances of “rolling back” Soviet influence in Eastern Europe were a long shot
at best given the military realities on the ground. There was a reasonable to good chance that such an effort would result in greater Soviet power relative to the US rather than less, and European allies were hardly eager to see a continuation of war on the European continent following the devastating effects of WWII, which itself perversely magnified the still enormous damage and dislocation caused by the earlier “Great War”. There was isolated domestic appetite in the United States for such an ambitious effort, though it did maintain support amongst the hard right wing of the Republican Party. This approach consciously rejected the more conciliatory policy advocated by Democratic and Republican leadership in favour of a more actively hostile fight to the Soviet Union and “global Communism”.24

“The Fortress America”, to use the term popularized by former President Herbert Hoover, sought to return the United States to its pre-war strategy of strategic disengagement from Europe while maintaining an effective defence of the American homeland. Proponents viewed this as the “American tradition” in international affairs, and there is some basis in this. However, the nature of the world order, as well as the power of the United States, had changed substantially by the end of the war. Also, the liberal assumptions that drove American grand strategy during the war were largely inconsistent with allowing this chance to restructure the international order pass, because of both the opportunities and potential dangers the postwar settlement presented. Particularly relevant were the traumatic “lessons” of the interwar years – namely, the harsh consequences that resulted from the abdication of international leadership by the United States. To many, particularly within the Democratic foreign policy elite that populated the Roosevelt and Truman administrations but also amongst mainstream Republicans, the “Fortress America” mentality was based upon the same beliefs that led to the American rejection of the League of Nations, ultimately a tragic event leading directly to international instability and revisionist states. Relatively early on in the war, members of the Allied leadership began discussing new international institutions, including the United Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations, in order to prevent, as they saw it, a return to the interwar period’s American aloofness. The neoisolationist

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posture suggested by a Fortress America approach was highly inconsistent with and skeptical towards any such approach built upon the internationalist tendencies of liberal elites.

The “spheres of influence” approach between the United States and the Soviet Union had considerable political appeal, in part because of its partial resemblance to containment. However, the strategies differed over whether the United States should aim to prevent any Soviet expansion at all. Walter Lippmann, an influential advocate of the “spheres of influence” approach, feared containment would surrender the strategic initiative to the Soviet Union by allowing the Kremlin to strike when and where the West was most vulnerable, therefore forcing the United States to face the Soviet Union on Soviet terms. A strategy based on spheres of influence would essentially lock in the post-war settlement circa 1945 by way of a formal understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States; given the enormous power of the American economy and nuclear arsenal, the sooner this happened the better. To its proponents, this would allow a clear understanding between the major powers about which areas “belonged” to which state, and as such would prevent expensive arms races between the powers as well as a dangerous cycle of escalation, competition, and brinksmanship. But such an approach was viewed as essentially fatalistic: those in the Soviet sphere were consigned to suffer the harsh and heavy hand of Soviet rule, and the West was unable or unwilling to do anything about it. While in practice this came to define portions of the Cold War, it was never adopted as strategy, largely due to the incompatibility of this approach with traditional liberal, exceptionalist, and messianic aspects of American strategic culture. Conservative Protestant religious leaders such as Billy Graham, particularly influential in

25 Lippmann grew concerned that American “globalism”, which he viewed associated closely with containment, was also unnecessarily provocative. In Lippmann’s view, containment prevented legitimate Soviet security demands from being met, and therefore destabilized the international system. “Intervention in the name of the balance of power was justified and necessary; indiscriminate intervention in support of far-flung and unstable client regimes was wasteful and dangerous.” Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 439.

26 Winston Churchill advocated such an approach, emphasizing the importance of the American nuclear monopoly in facing down Soviet conventional superiority. “Therefore I am in favour of efforts to reach a settlement with Soviet Russia as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself, and of making those efforts while the immense and measureless superiority of the United States atomic bomb organization offsets the Soviet predominance in every other military respect.” Quoted in Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (1994).
the South, opposed the *de facto* acceptance of Soviet rule over coreligionists and frequently spoke of the global threat posed by “Godless Communism” in their strong opposition to the “spheres of influence” approach.

While American efforts in Europe gathered the majority of the attention in the immediate post-war era, Japanese recovery was also of central importance to American post-war aims. The logic of American strategy towards Japan mirrored the objectives and concerns over Europe, and more precisely Germany – understandably given the role both nations played during the war. Containment was highly influential in shaping American strategy towards both regions, though in truth the global requirements of containment implied a rejection of distinct regional delineations.\(^{27}\) Economic and political reconstruction of Japan was of unquestioned importance for both positive and negative reasons: an economically devastated Japan made the immense political tasks of stamping out militarism and reforming Japanese society even more difficult, while conversely an economically recovered and politically rehabilitated Japan was expected to play a central role in the American strategy towards Asia.

*Truman administration planners envisioned a revitalized Japan emerging once again as the dynamic hub of commercial activity throughout Asia, in the process giving a much-needed boost to the regional and global economic systems, thwarting communism’s military threat and ideological appeal, and insuring Tokyo’s loyalty to the West. According to the logic subscribed to by nearly all top American strategists, Japan’s economic health demanded that peace and stability prevail throughout Southeast Asia.*\(^{28}\)

Even in its shattered state after the war, few denied Japan’s immense power potential. This took on even greater significance following the surprise Soviet test of an atomic bomb (1949), the fall of the Kuomintang regime and establishment of Mao’s Communist regime in China (1949), and North Korea’s invasion of South Korea (1950). It was widely accepted that a neutral or Communist-aligned Japan could have tremendous

\(^{27}\) A 1947 CIA report emphasizes this linkage. Having already established the importance of Southeast Asia to Japan’s economic recovery, the ongoing process of decolonization in Indochina and Indonesia had come to directly endanger European recovery: “Of important concern in relation to Western European recovery is the existing instability in colonial (or former colonial) areas upon the resources of which several European powers (the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands) have hitherto been accustomed to depend...the continuance of unsettled conditions hinders economic recovery and causes a diversion of European strength into efforts to maintain or reimpose control by force.” Quoted in McMahon, 31.\(^{28}\) McMahon, 38.
negative consequences for American interests. As in Europe, the consequences of getting things wrong in Asia were substantially high, as were the benefits if rehabilitation and reconstruction succeeded. While Western Europe had NATO and the Marshall Plan, the United States effectively disarmed Japan while providing for its economic recovery. The rich resources of Southeast Asia were of central importance to Japanese and European recovery. This in turn became a critically important factor in ensuring the continued economic integration of the newly decolonized states of Southeast Asia throughout the late 1940s and into the 1950s. While diverse in nature and logically distinct, both means and goals of grand strategy were effectively used in concert during this period.

**Containment’s Lasting Power**

For many of the same reasons that containment was adopted in the first place, it proved to have lasting resonance and resilience throughout the Cold War. Though the basic concepts of restricting Communist advances globally while creating a liberal political and economic international order were interpreted over time and by different Presidents in various ways, containment remained the recognizable organizing principle of American grand strategy throughout the Cold War. In its lasting power, it was somewhat incredible, taking into account widely differing circumstances and situations. Indeed, containment’s reinterpretability provided the United States with enormous strategic flexibility, something its Communist rivals did not enjoy.  

While bipolar competition between the Soviet Union and the United States was the consistent and inescapably defining characteristic of the Cold War, within that period of time international circumstances, material strength, and military capabilities varied considerably. The United States, no less than the global environment itself, changed vastly between 1945 and 1991, just as the Soviet Union’s collapse led to a hitherto unprecedented era of global unipolarity. Why, and how, did containment retain such persuasiveness, even when accounting for the variety of ways in which it was interpreted over time?

The persuasive value of containment can be attributed to several factors. Primarily, the answer lies in the strategy’s compatibility with the three note chord

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29 Gaddis, 389.
suggested by Green and the cultural filter through which the international environment is perceived and interpreted. This has both outward and inward components: it affects how Americans see global events and the international environment, but it also has an important impact on how the United States sees itself. Containment was initially adopted in large part because its compatibility with American strategic culture fit the pressing needs defined by the international order: namely, the perceived hostility of a revolutionary Great Power rival seemingly intent upon expanding at the expense of the United States. But as has been stated, containment was one of several potential strategies available to policy-makers. Its adoption can also be attributed to the compatibility it demonstrated with American security culture, and specifically its commitment to a liberal international order. But part of containment’s staying power also satisfied important domestic political traits: namely, how Americans viewed themselves and how they wanted to be seen by others. It gave purpose and direction to a central element of American self-identity, namely the “vindicationist” tradition in American diplomacy described by historian H.W. Brands.30 “Containment was an extraordinary theory – at once hard-headed and idealistic, profound in its assessment of Soviet motivations yet curiously abstract in its prescriptions. Thoroughly American in its utopianism, it assumed that the collapse of a totalitarian adversary could be achieved in an essentially benign way.”31

Containment also held continuing appeal because, despite seemingly regular crises of confidence, it broadly worked. This assessment, of course, was not immediately available, but in time a sense that containment’s success – or, at least as importantly, the lack of unmistakable failure – became a rationale for its continued practice. The closest thing to such failure the United States experienced was the Vietnam War, an episode that had considerable international implications and came to define a generation of American citizens. But for all of its immense domestic importance and substantial international significance, withdrawal of American troops in 1973 did not lead to the catastrophic

30 Brands begins a topical work with one such assessment: “If a single theme pervades the history of American thinking about the world, it is that the United States has a peculiar obligation to better the lot of humanity.” He then divides this thought process into “exemplars” and “vindicationists”. Brands,
31 Kissinger, 130.
consequence (certain) generations of policymakers had predicted.\textsuperscript{32} In some sense, the lack of eventual consequence makes the American experience in Vietnam – to say nothing of that experienced by the Vietnamese or its neighbours – that much more tragic. But the larger point remains that even in this case, despite immense errors in judgment, containment in the larger sense could still be effectively applied.\textsuperscript{33} It proved to be a far more adaptable and flexible strategy in both theory and practice than the paranoia, fear, and recklessness that marked much of Soviet international behaviour throughout the Cold War – and, indeed, some strategic alternatives put forth within the United States throughout the Cold War. In addition to providing an overall logic and sense of purpose to American grand strategy, with several notable exceptions, containment managed to maintain a degree of pressure upon the Soviet Union that eventually brought to bear the internal contradictions of Soviet economic and political system. It was these contradictions, rather than those inherent to capitalism as Communist ideology had suggested, that played a defining role in the Cold War’s eventual result.

Containment also had international appeal, indicating a level of American commitment toward allies that promised a continued presence in global affairs. While no country throughout the Cold War was immune from friction with the United States over what this role meant in practice (and some would come to regret their earlier support for America’s leading role), containment ensured a forward-looking and engaged United States.\textsuperscript{34} It was helped considerably in this context by the presence of “something worse” – illiberal and frequently brutal Soviet domination.\textsuperscript{35} Such a prospect limited dissent and division within the Western alliance to certain bounds. To paraphrase Winston Churchill’s adage regarding democracy, while an active and engaged role for the United

\textsuperscript{32} McMahon, 184-91.
\textsuperscript{33} Lind has argued that for all of its tragedy and associated trauma, American involvement in Vietnam did forestall Communist expansionism. See Michael Lind, \textit{Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous War} (New York: Free Press, 1999).
\textsuperscript{34} Lundestad has pointed out the importance of this factor, particularly early in the Cold War when some American leaders strongly supported bringing American troops home from Europe. Lundestad. For a contrary view that stresses American economic interests as a primary reason for a European presence, see Christopher Layne, \textit{The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 71-95.
\textsuperscript{35} Mastanduno argues that “though the United States is relatively more powerful in security terms after the cold war, its allies are less dependent”, which serves to constrain American policy options. Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” \textit{World Politics} 61, no. 1 (2009): 153.
States might have negative consequences and the simultaneously emotive and technical issue of alliance burden-sharing might be regularly troublesome and divisive, the alternative(s) were clearly worse.\(^\text{36}\) For much of the world, the only thing worse than having to rely upon American global leadership, particularly as it applied to Europe and Asia, was to not have such leadership available.

Finally, containment as grand strategy allowed ample opportunity for allied, aligned, and even non-aligned states alike to take advantage of the US’s global focus on containing Soviet expansionism. There were certain bounds to actions taken by weaker states, but these were not always apparent or even truly binding. But given the geopolitical imperatives throughout the world, other states realized that the global interests of the United States required making sacrifices in order to serve the perceived “greater good”, an elusive calculation at the best of times. Deals with unpleasant, odious, or even murderous regimes were considered an unfortunate but necessary aspect of American global leadership. This is not to suggest that these deals were always appropriate, desirable, or conducive to American interests – examples abound of numerous examples in which this is patently not the case.\(^\text{37}\) But as one prominent practitioner has commented, “a country that demands moral perfection of itself as a test of its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”\(^\text{38}\) While some have seen such bargains as proof of American hypocrisy in international affairs and a betrayal of liberal ideology, others have suggested that this moralistic tradition, regularly condemned by realists as a sign of American domestic “defects”, created the conditions for such criticisms to develop and be taken seriously.\(^\text{39}\) It was a sign of strength not that these bargains were made in the first place, therefore, but rather that domestic and international

\(^{36}\) "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it is said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston Churchill, "Speech to House of Commons - Nov. 11 1947,”  http://www.bartleby.com/73/417.html.

\(^{37}\) It should also be noted that American acts of omission, as much as commission, have had major consequences for the world as well. The absence of action can be as much or more morally and practically damaging than action, a point made in Reinhold Neibuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Scribner, 1952).

\(^{38}\) Kissinger, 130.

\(^{39}\) Kennan found this moralist tradition in foreign policy deeply troubling, distracting as it did from the appropriate balancing of interests and the moral self-aggrandizement that frequently resulted. While not alone in making such criticisms, these criticisms have become central to the realist critique of American foreign policy. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Rev ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
criticism of such bargains on liberal grounds was taken as seriously as it was by American policymakers.

Liberal international rhetoric by American leaders and policy makers was more than simply a way to promote particular policies. That these deals tended to run counter to the moralistic tone and language in which American diplomacy was often couched frequently undercut the staying power of such deals – qualms and reservations that the US’s superpower rival, the Soviet Union, certainly did not give the same weight to, nor felt particularly restricted by. In turn, for all of its obvious shortcomings and contradictions, the regular and systematic level of attention placed on global liberalism served to undercut the legitimacy of the Soviet Empire over time. These sacrifices of principle were not particularly pretty in detail, nor did (or do) Americans have any exclusive claim on morality. But the flexibility and essentially pragmatic character of containment, undergirded and reinforced by liberal international ideology, limited the damage caused by such deals over time and played a prominent role in its eventual strategic success.

End of the Cold War

Structural realism provided a particular logic to the Cold War that readily explained, or at least attempted to explain, the international environment under bipolarity. It was during the Cold War that realist thought became the dominant paradigm of international relations thought. It suggested that states used a particular logic in their search for security, one characterized by systemic pressures. Famously, however, just as neorealism seemed to be all-conquering, its proponents neither predicted nor could readily explain the end of the very bipolar environment that structural realism had spent so much time analyzing – in short, why the Soviet state collapsed how and when it did. Structural realism had little explanation for how the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc would cease to exist in the peaceful manner that it did, other than noting the worsening economic and political pressures facing the Soviet state in the 1980s.40 Great Powers, even relatively weak ones, still sought to maximize their own security, whether

this implied outward expansion (power maximization) or the more limited aims for responding to threats (security maximization). If structural realism failed the final test of the Cold War by providing inadequate warning of its pending conclusion, it also struggled with the first major question of the post-Cold War era: given the collapse of its nearest competitor and the enormous superiority in most material measures, what did structural realism suggest the United States would do – or should do? Offensive realists, emphasizing that states expand when they can, offered that the United States would seek to press its power superiority to its advantage. Defensive realists, noting the near-complete absence of Great Power threats, suggested that American power would withdraw from the forward military stance of the Cold War – in large part because if it did not, “overextension” and a loss of power would be the likely reaction. For the most part, both suggested that the “unbalanced” nature of the international environment would encourage balancing or hedging coalitions, and that unipolarity represented but a passing moment in the international system.

The theories imply the adoption of different approaches. Offensive realism suggested that the United States would attempt to press its enormous material advantage


42 Structural realists have made several responses to this charge. Some have asserted that realism is a theory of foreign policy, rather than international politics – suggesting that the neorealism of Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* describes a method of considering state behavior rather than of predicting it. Others have argued that to pick a single exception to realist thought, however significant, involves historical cherry-picking and is therefore experimentally unsound. See Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries," ibid.22, no. 1 (1997) and Charles W. Kegley Jr., "How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (1994).


in order to maximize its power while it could – in short, a strategy of primacy. Defensive realism suggested that the likelihood of a balancing coalition against the United States called for a more circumspect grand strategy, in the form of selective engagement, offshore balancing, or at its most cautious, neo-isolationism. Events would fulfil neither prediction, or at least not fully. Offensive realists were forced to contend with the fact that American policy-makers, reflecting the apathy of large segments of the American populace towards foreign affairs and a strong desire to focus upon domestic affairs, did comparatively little to press the enormous material advantage the United States enjoyed during the early 1990s. At the same time, American power did assert itself around the world – though international responses to famine in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, or continued malfeasance by Saddam Hussein in Iraq required an extremely expansive definition of “security threat” to prove defensive realist predictions correct. While tension between China and the United States over Taiwan in 1995-6 briefly reinvigorated realist theory, the resulting actions (including a distinct change in Chinese grand strategy) proved once again problematic for offensive and defensive realist predictions.\textsuperscript{46} Overall, during the 1990s realism was increasingly challenged theoretically, in part because of the difficulty it faced in explaining American actions.

**George H.W. Bush’s Grand Strategy**

As the Soviet Union began showing unmistakable signs of weakness verging on collapse, President George H.W. Bush’s primary preoccupation was the maintenance of international order, going so far at one point as suggesting to Gorbachev that the United States would understand if the Soviet leader instituted martial law as protesters, unaccustomed to the degree of political freedom allowed by Gorbachev, increasingly threatened the integrity of the Soviet state. Faced with the collapse of power within the Communist Bloc, Bush worked closely and extensively with Gorbachev and other European leaders to ensure a peaceful unwinding of the post-war bipolar order. Bush attempted to limit nationalistic aspirations that would almost certainly pull the Soviet

\textsuperscript{46} Goldstein suggests that the reaction of the United States to China/Taiwan tension – which included US naval maneuvers intended to ensure Taiwanese security against Chinese threats – led to a change in Chinese grand strategy that emphasized, amongst other things, reassuring regional neighbors of China’s peaceful intentions. See Goldstein,
Union apart, calling such aspirations “suicidal nationalism”.47 Bush, cautious and a realist by nature, eventually paid a price for his political caution as critics from both the right and the left criticized his largely managerial approach to the enormous changes to the international system.48 This is significant, as it demonstrates the lasting significance – if tempered by uneven application – of the liberal international imperative within American political and strategic culture. However, this can best be understood as a temporary and short-lived exception to American grand strategy, a response to the exceptional and unprecedented change occurring within the crumbling Soviet state. Seeking to stabilize the situation and extremely wary of a vacuum of power in the former Soviet empire, Bush attempted to both prevent the appearance of gloating while simultaneously addressing the pressing and uncertain security needs in the enormous geopolitical vacuum left across the globe.

Bush’s grand strategy was consciously intended to be more than just reactive, however. For a leader lacking the self-described “vision thing”, Bush nonetheless put forth an ambitious conception of international order following the Cold War, calling for a “new World Order” based largely upon liberal goals, multilateralism, and international society.49 However, in the absence of substantial follow-through, Bush’s vision withered on the vine, hardly aided by a reluctance of the American populace to take a more active international role.50 The elusive “peace dividend”, based on the savings resulting from reduced defence costs in the post-Cold War era, was by contrast far more attractive. In

48 Jeffrey A. Engel, "A Better World...but Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush Twenty Years On," Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (2010). National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was also a major influence on Bush’s decision-making. For a discussion of Scowcroft’s realist approach during this period, see Bartholomew H. Sparrow, "Realism’s Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989-1993," ibid.
49 Bush’s rhetoric, rarely considered a strength, was nonetheless breathless in its scope: “…a new world order can emerge: a new era…An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice.” George H.W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," (American Presidency Project, 1990).
many ways, this was an extraordinary development: at the peak of its power, with no major state competitors on the horizon, the United States refused to press its enormous material advantage. Despite seeing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion and successfully managing an unprecedented global coalition in the Gulf War, Bush found himself on the defensive on foreign policy matters throughout the 1992 election campaign. Lacking direct experience (and by most accounts, much interest) in international affairs, Clinton criticized Bush’s record for being insufficiently attentive to the liberal framework and history of American grand strategy.\footnote{Chollet and Goldgeier, 57-66 See also Halberstam, and John F. Harris, \textit{The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House} (New York: Random House, 2005), 42-51.} In an election campaign that largely focused on domestic issues, perhaps most of all the American economy, Clinton nonetheless enunciated a vision for America’s interactions with the world that had an unmistakably liberal and Wilsonian-infused character. How he would implement such rhetoric remained to be seen.

As the first post-Cold War President, Clinton entered office without the shadow of the bipolar competition with the Soviet Union dominating the international environment. As tends to happen during periods of major structural change to the international environment, a variety of different theories to guide American foreign policy were advocated and debated. Clinton and his aides were eager to take advantage of the situation, if uncertain how to go about it. The discussion of alternative grand strategic theories, which for nearly the entire Cold War had been subsumed under the guise of containment, had begun anew, if not necessarily afresh.\footnote{Chollet and Goldgeier describe this process in detail, in particular the contest for a new term for American post-containment grand strategy that was simple enough to “put on a bumper sticker.” They also quote Kissinger on this challenge: “Every new administration tries to develop a new strategy. The problem is that they never start with an analysis of what the world is, but what they think it should be.” Chollet and Goldgeier, 69-71.}

\textbf{Grand Strategy Options, post-Cold War}

As a number of different authors have noted, during the 1990s at least four distinct strategies existed for the United States to consider.\footnote{One of the more influential contemporary statements of American grand strategy options available in the immediate post-Cold War period was Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996).} Each involved different
understandings of American power and the necessity of using it to pursue particular goals.

Isolationism, or alternatively “strategic independence”, suggested that the United States, having committed considerable blood and treasure to the Cold War’s ultimately successful conclusion, should withdraw from the significant military and security commitments that superpower competition required. Given the vastly changed security environment, the United States needed to change its forward defence stance accordingly – and significantly, have allies take a larger role in their own defence. In significant ways, such an approach mirrored the “Fortress America” strategy of the early post-WWII era. In practice, this involved a significant scaling back of American military and security commitments in Europe and Asia – and of the US military overall. Minimal defence requirements would be maintained, with nuclear weapons providing important constraints on threats to American interests.

Selective engagement did not advocate a retrenchment of such aggressive proportions, but advocates did seek a more reserved and conservative approach to the international environment by the United States. In such an understanding, global pressures required a more reserved stance from the US, and advocates suggested that a balance of power approach best suited a still-uncertain international environment. Maintenance of the status quo was considered imperative given the still “fragile” international environment. Given the uncertain environment, the United States should be most concerned with the rise of a potential Great Power rival. While such a development seemed unlikely in the heady days immediately following 1991, such a development nonetheless would have proved tragic to American interests.

Cooperative multilateralism sought to assert American interests internationally in a manner that neither selective engagement nor neo-isolationism did. It envisioned the United States playing an active leadership role in international affairs. Importantly, it sought to do so using a multilateral approach that emphasized alliances and peaceful resolution to disputes rather than the use of American power. Primacy also advocated the assertion of American power and leadership, but in contrast to the focus on alliances of multilateralism, it sought to do so through aggressively and actively pursuing American
interests. In a dangerous and uncertain global environment, supporters saw the Cold War’s successful (and peaceful) end as an indication of the Western alliance’s fundamental strength. At the core of this strength was a committed and unapologetic assertion of American interests globally.

**Clinton’s Choice(s)**

Clinton’s own lack of interest or experience, as much as the difficult and indeterminate nature of the global environment in the early 1990s, created conditions that contributed to significant strategic drift. Personnel shifts and tensions did little to help.\(^{54}\) A grand strategy is necessarily heavily influenced by international conditions, and in particular assumptions about its character. The operating assumptions of the Clinton Administration stressed the importance of multilateralism and a fundamentally liberal approach, but did so in a way that owed more to the continuation of the status quo than a major rethink of the global environment. As much as anything else, Clinton’s approach to grand strategy represented a continuation of containment without the Soviet Union. The economic aspects of American grand strategy during the Cold War were emphasized as security policy, while still vitally important, was no longer considered to carry the vital importance it had while the Soviet Union and the threat of superpower conflict still existed.\(^{55}\) The policy of “democratic enlargement”, as elucidated by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, encapsulated this liberal approach that heavily emphasized democracy promotion and multilateralism.\(^{56}\) It became the basis for the National Security Strategy of February 1995, which envisioned three “central” goals: “to sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight; to bolster America’s economic

\(^{54}\) This was particularly notable in defense matters. Some Clinton insiders considered Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a rival of dubious loyalty due to his service in the Bush Administration and considerable gravitas in national security matters. Further contributing to Clinton’s difficulties was Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s erratic behavior and short term in office, as well as a politically contentious and ultimately unsuccessful move to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military. See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001) and Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*.


revitalization; to promote democracy abroad.” Rarely has the three note chord been more explicitly advocated.

However, the unmistakable reality of American power meant that elements of a primacy strategy also existed, sometimes in parallel to multilateralism while at other times in direct contrast. Though present during Clinton’s first term, this became more pronounced during his second term in office and required nuanced management. In his second inaugural address, he spoke at length about the unique role of the United States and the opportunities presented before it:

*America stands alone as the world’s indispensable nation. The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps; instead, now we are building bonds with nations that once were our adversaries. Growing connections of commerce and culture give us a chance to lift the fortunes and spirits of people...and for the very first time in all of history, more people on this planet live under democracy than dictatorship.*

Such an assertive declaration of American ambition unsettled some, but by and large Clinton’s approach was supported by the majority of public opinion. The uncertain transition period from the Cold War had not led to a reduction of American power, as some predicted, but rather the opposite: by nearly every material measure, the United States had become wealthier and more powerful in the intervening four years. Throughout his second term, this strategy of primacy was mixed with the emphasis Clinton placed on multilateralism during his first. As one would expect from such strategies, tension between the two did occasionally occur – most notably over the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Faced with continued recalcitrance by Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, Clinton overruled European reservations and authorized the use of military force in Kosovo. Initially (and by instinct) reluctant to use American military

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58 Clinton, .

59 This is not to say that Clinton’s first term did not involve some friction with other international actors, but if anything American power (in settling the Bosnia crisis, for instance) resulted in more bandwagoning behavior than hedging or balancing opposition. The supposed inevitability of balancing against American power predicted by some had manifestly not occurred, and such potential counter-coalitions became distinctly less likely over the course of his presidency.
force unilaterally, during the late 1990s Clinton’s approach increasingly bore the markings of primacy – even though such action took place under the guise of NATO and with international support, there was little question that the United States was the principal driver of military action. This can be attributed to several factors, including ongoing frustration with European hesitation in the Balkans, greater comfort with the prospect of American force and leadership, and the increasing political fortunes of the Republican opposition in the Congress. Rhetorically and now practically, Clinton had embraced the “uniqueness” of American power.

Importantly, the structure of the international environment at the time also played a significant role. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, prominent scholars made predictions of an emergent balancing coalition forming against the United States due to the enormous power advantages it enjoyed. For the most part, such a coalition did not eventuate – a noteworthy nonoccurrence. The continuing material superiority of the United States caused many in the Clinton Administration to push for a greater assertion of American power in an effort to further advance liberal internationalist goals. American hegemony, it seemed, was here to stay, and given these conditions the opportunity to press American interests globally was simply too great to resist. While multilateralism still played an important role within American foreign policy, the assertion of American primacy and a unilateralist approach as necessary became far more pronounced. As one might expect, this was both praised and criticized from various quarters.

**Bush’s Grand Strategy**

Mainstream Republican criticisms, including those made by George W. Bush, generally focused on Clinton’s perceived overuse of the American military in “peacekeeping” and humanitarian-related operations during the 2000 presidential election, arguing that such missions endangered both the readiness and capabilities of the US military while also “entrapping” in missions of secondary importance to the American interests. A vocal minority within the Republican party also pushed a more isolationist, “America first”-style approach as well. American efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo were derisively termed efforts at “social work” that misused

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American military power in the quest for a utopian, and hopeless, effort to stabilize the world. Condoleezza Rice summarized this viewpoint with her quip that “[w]e don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten”. Core national security interests required a more circumspect and reserved foreign policy that focused on potentially hostile powers.

Upon entering the White House, Bush’s initial foreign policy orientation was predominantly realist. However, rarely (if ever) can an administration be defined by a single theoretical approach, and Bush’s national security team certainly validated this. A number of different viewpoints from Republican foreign policy circles discussed and debated the new direction that Bush would take, with the result being issue-based factional support rather than a single message of strategic clarity. General consensus settled upon criticisms of Clinton’s approach, and in particular his use of American military force. Criticism of Clinton’s approach served as the unifying factor in the Bush team’s initial foreign policy assessments, to a far greater degree than agreement on what a Bush approach should look like. Though by and large a realist-oriented camp won out with its argument that Clinton needlessly engaged the US military without clear national interests at stake, a vocal contingent argued the point from the other direction, stressing Clinton’s unwillingness to back his rhetorical pressure on misbehaving states such as Iraq and North Korea with any sort of real pressure. Various (and somewhat simplistically) this group, which envisioned a more active and robust use of American power, coalesced under the banner of neoconservatism.

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62 Colin Dueck suggests the “really interesting division within the [George W. Bush] administration – a division that seemed to cut through many individuals internally, including the President himself – was not between unilateralists and multilateralists, but between a ‘realist’ strategic vision, and a more ambitious and idealistic vision of American global primacy.” Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000-2004," Review of International Studies 30(2004): 525.
63 In an essay widely understood to reflect Bush’s pre-election views, Rice argued that the Clinton Administration had failed to adequately prioritize American national interests, leading to uncertainty in the exercise of American power and haziness over US goals “In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated ‘national interest’ either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures.” See Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (2000).
64 While the intellectual antecedents of neoconservatism can be traced back until at least to the 1930s, as a doctrine of foreign policy neoconservatism became prominent in the 1970s in reaction to the inward turn of
Realists, many of whom were veterans of the elder Bush’s national security team, initially had the edge in the policy-making process. Bush’s early efforts at grand strategy thus bore the markings of a realist orientation, fearing that the rash application of American power would cause unforeseen and destabilizing ripple effects in the international system. It also sought to bring greater order to the international environment by focusing upon the state-based nature of the system, even if this meant greater tension with potential rivals. Though Russia’s still uncertain transition unsettled some, the most obvious candidate was China. China was described as a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner”, indicating a balance of power logic at play.

Bush also sought to free the American hand from unnecessary or counterproductive treaties, which resulted in the rejection of or withdrawal from the Kyoto Accords, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and International Criminal Court Treaty. These rejections were based on the perceived constraints that they placed upon American freedom of action. The liberal multilateralism mixed with primacy of Clinton’s two terms in office gave way to a realist framework that similarly focused on more circumspect primacy. Concerns over the popularity of Bush’s early actions were dismissed using the familiar logic of realism: public opinion polls didn’t matter, nor did appeals to the desirability of international cooperation; power, and specifically the relative distribution of it amongst competing and potentially hostile nations, defined the international environment.

This would change immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Some – mostly from the structural realist school of thought – claimed that the fundamental conditions of the international system had not changed in a major way, at least in ways that typically (should) dictate state policy. The United States, after all, maintained as clear a lead in material measures of national power on September 12, 2001 American foreign policy following Vietnam. “Neocons” opposed this, favoring a robust and unapologetic confrontation of Communist regimes globally. On the origins of neoconservatism, see Mann; ; John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, 1945-1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); and Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: Autobiography of an Idea (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

As a candidate, Bush outlined his preferred approach during a debate with Gore. Asked about his approach to foreign policy, Bush answered: “What’s in the best interests of our people? When it comes to foreign policy, that will be my guiding question.” Suggesting a more restrained course of action, he later added that “[i]f we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us. If we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us...” He also advocated a more limited role for the military focused on war rather than “nation-building”. Chollet and Goldgeier, 281.
as it did on September 10, 2001. In actuality, there can be little question that global politics as a whole changed considerably as a result of the attacks for several reasons. American perceptions of the international system changed tremendously due to the major loss of life caused by radical acts of jihadist terror perpetuated by seemingly distant non-state actors, which necessarily meant major reverberations for the international system given the significance of American power. The largest loss of life on American soil since the Civil War, and with it the ensuing perception of vulnerability felt by many Americans, would come to have enormous influence upon nearly every aspect of American foreign policy – and as the world’s strongest power, such a change had a major impact on the international environment. This impact was felt almost immediately on American policy towards Indonesia, particularly on the historically sensitive matter of military cooperation and newly urgent counterterrorism efforts.

In direct response to the attacks, within a month the U.S. and supporting nations invaded Afghanistan in order to dislodge the Taliban government that had provided sanctuary for the terrorist leadership that had planned the 9/11 attacks. While military action in Afghanistan was clearly important, the terrorist attacks led to a significant change within American grand strategy and understanding of threats to American national interests. The new approach was expressed most clearly in the 2002 National Security Strategy, which unmistakably bore the imprints of a far more aggressive and activist foreign policy than the pre-9/11, realist-tinged Bush approach. The neoconservative approach to foreign policy had never been content with realism’s realpolitik calculations based on relative power and amoral “national interests”, arguing that liberalism and market democracies around the world needed active support from the United States. Furthermore, in a dangerous world marked by numerous threats to American security, not least of which were terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, security required an expansive definition of American national interests. Noting that al

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68 It should be noted that across the mainstream political spectrum, there is considerable support for the belief that support for an international liberal order – including the active promotion of democracy – is entirely consistent with American interests. Indeed, this belief is an integral component of the specifically American strategic culture described throughout this work.
Qaeda primarily drew support from individuals in repressive, authoritarian regimes, the spread of democracy was deemed vital to American foreign policy goals. Even before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, certain members of the Bush Administration and influential outsiders had advocated the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{69} Long a goal within conservative foreign policy circles, the eventual 2003 invasion of Iraq gave way to a bloody insurgent campaign, enormous amounts of sectarian violence, and placed significant strains upon U.S. military capabilities and resources.\textsuperscript{70}

Just how different was Bush’s approach to grand strategy from that of his predecessors? This has been one of the most asked and divisive questions of the post-9/11 era. To begin with, important aspects of both versions of George W. Bush’s foreign policy – the brief realist-influenced approach pre-9/11, and the aggressive post-9/11 approach encapsulated within the 2002 NSS – could legitimately claim historical roots in aspects of the admittedly broad spectrum of American strategic culture.\textsuperscript{71} There is an even easier case to make for Bush’s second term approach. Significantly, Bush’s post-9/11 foreign policy was in fact a return, albeit with a different level of tone and emphasis, to aspects of traditional Wilsonianism. The very heart of this approach, as during the Cold War and the 1990s, was concerned with the promotion of a liberal international order. The lasting power of such an ideological approach has been remarkable, and demonstrates the importance of such viewpoints within American political dialogue and experience. As Monten stated in his analysis of the Bush Doctrine and democracy promotion:

\begin{quote}
Like progressivism, the result of these ideological dimensions in conjunction – liberal optimism, the virtue of U.S. power, and the capacity of U.S. power to effect
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{69} An open letter from the “Project for a New American Century” to President Clinton in January 1998 advocated “the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power” by using the “full complement of [American] diplomatic, political, and military efforts.” Signatories Elliott Abrams, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz all served at senior levels of the subsequent Bush Administration. Available at: \url{http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm}.
democratic change – place contemporary neoconservatism squarely in the vindicationist tradition of U.S. liberal exceptionalism. To the extent these ideas represent the dominant policymaking coalition within the Bush Administration, U.S. national security policy favors mission over example as the primary means of extending democracy to strategic areas.\footnote{Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy in U.S. Strategy," \textit{International Security} 29, no. 4 (2005): 155.}

Critics of Bush’s post-9/11 turn in foreign policy frequently point to the Administration’s suggestion that preemptive war, in the age of sub-state terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was necessary to forestall potentially devastating attacks on the US. It was famously suggested that the next attack “could come in the form of a mushroom cloud”, creating the need to act preemptively if necessary against dangerous terrorist organizations wishing and willing to attack the United States.\footnote{Karen DeYoung, "Bush Cites Urgent Iraqi Threat," \textit{Washington Post}, Oct. 7 2002.} Specifically, “the gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”\footnote{House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States,."} In practice, Bush advocated preventive war, not necessarily preemptive war – a key distinction.\footnote{Preemptive war, such as Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1967, describes war designed to forestall a forthcoming aggressive action in the immediate future against the initiating state. Preventive war aims to prevent the rise of the threat in the first instance – for instance, invading Iraq before the weaponization of WMD. See Marc Trachtenberg, "Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy," \textit{Security Studies} 16, no. 1 (2007).} Bush’s approach sought to achieve a traditionally liberal goal: the maintenance of stability and order through the expulsion of insecurity from the world, whether it was terrorism or “rogue states”.

Supporters and detractors of Bush, for their own reasons, have described this as an enormous change in American foreign policy.\footnote{A sampling of critical works from traditionalist perspectives include Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, \textit{America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy} (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, \textit{America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jacob Heilbrunn, \textit{They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons} (New York: Doubleday, 2008). More praiseworthy accounts include Rowan Scarborough, \textit{Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terror Commander} (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004); Lewis D. Solomon, \textit{Paul D. Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker, and Strategist} (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007); Bob Woodward, \textit{Bush at War} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). Woodward paints a far less sympathetic portrait in a subsequent work, Bob Woodward, \textit{Plan of Attack} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).} It is difficult to separate the inherent political posturing in such positions, however valid. But to suggest that either side is exclusively setting false terms of debate also has risks, namely of dangerous cynicism and attacks \textit{ad hominem}. Detractors have argued that such an approach has endangered
the United States for several reasons: by setting hypocritical standards that only apply to the world’s hegemon and therefore inviting global opposition, by aggressively asserting and flaunting American power while rejecting efforts at global cooperation and compromise, and overextending the scarce resources of the United States. Supporters counter that in a dangerous world, to not act against clear and rising threats to American and global interests such as WMD is not only foolhardy and negligent, but cynical and morally inconceivable. Owing to the lack of a supranational international authority – an assumption shared with realist thought – the United States must take the lead in addressing such threats. There is no question that playing the doctrine of preventive war at the centre of America’s strategic thinking represents a departure from the post-Cold War period, including from Bush’s pre-9/11 approach. But neither preventive war itself, nor preemptive war, were new concepts to American military planners or civilian leaders. At various times, both were discussed and planned for before, during, and after the Cold War.

Bush’s foreign policy, therefore, shared many assumptions of a traditional Wilsonian approach. Bush’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks understandably set the tone and

77 “Bush’s strategy is less of an innovation than it at first seemed to be. Pre-emption had never been ruled out during the Cold War…[t]he doctrine was simply not publicized to the extent that Bush chose to do.” Gaddis, 383.
78 Smith argues instead that Bush’s key departure is his lack of faith in deterrence, particularly when applied to groups like al Qaeda. But he neglects to note that deterrence itself was never a certainty during the Cold War – the Cuban Missile Crisis being the best example, but even in the late stages of the Cold War American and Soviet leaders showed nothing like absolute assuredness in the doctrine at times. Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
79 Leffler and Trachtenberg argue that preventive war was considered, and advocated, by US planners before and throughout the Cold War. Before Pearl Harbor brought direct U.S. involvement in the war, military and civilian leaders feared Nazi domination of Europe. A September 1941 “Fireside Chat” by Roosevelt included the following suggestive lines: “One peaceful nation after another has met disaster because each refused to look the Nazi danger squarely in the eye until it actually had them by the throat. The United States will not make that fatal mistake…when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.” (emphasis added) Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 3 (2005); Trachtenberg, 22-29.
80 The aspects of Bush’s approach in the 2002 National Security Strategy document – the centerpiece of his first term grand strategy – that demonstrate important liberal and Wilsonian assumptions about the international order suggest a strong intellectual and cultural link between the central figure in liberal international thought and arguably the most conservative President of the post-1945 era. This is the essence of the strategic culture argument, and even more striking given Bush’s pre-9/11 criticisms of Clinton’s involvement in “humanitarian causes”. For differing perspectives on the compatibility of Bush’s approach with traditional Wilsonianism, see G. John Ikenberry et al., The Crisis of American Foreign Policy:
approach of the rest of his presidency regarding foreign policy, but even in the context of immediate crisis management, it is striking how much the initial reaction to the attacks set policy for the remainder of his time in the White House. The striking language of his speeches immediately after the attacks was hardly a passing phenomenon; it became the basis for the grand strategy of Bush’s remaining time in office. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) represented a striking turn away from Bush’s realist-infused foreign policy of the pre-9/11 period and invoked both the spirit and language of primacy. It begins with a stark assertion: “[t]he United States possesses unprecedented – and unequaled – strength and influence in the world”.

As time passed following the terrorist attacks and the Bush Administration found itself in a complex and confusing multidimensional game of high stakes in the Middle East, the foreign policy of Bush’s second term struck a different tone from his first term in office – largely due to a more difficult international environment exacerbated by a disintegrating Iraq, a perpetually unstable Afghanistan, the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran, widespread global opposition to Bush’s assertive nationalism, and other international challenges. But despite obvious changes within the international environment, these changes reflected in important ways (though it would likely be rejected by supporters of either administration) some core aims of Clinton’s second term, as did Bush’s post-9/11 foreign policy in general. Bush’s second inaugural address of January 20, 2005 bore considerable resemblance to Clinton’s second inaugural address eight years earlier, but if anything Bush’s address was even more ambitious in invoking traditional aspects of liberal international ideology and an explicitly freedom-seeking agenda. 81 Clinton advocated a multilateral approach that favoured a liberal international order, though American unilateralism was expressly reserved if circumstances required such an approach; Bush emphasized a more unilateral approach to securing a similarly liberal order, though multilateralism was to be practised if possible and when possible. In practice, their respective approaches differed more in style than substance.

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What is left is a short period, ranging from early to mid 2001, of relatively traditional realism that was quickly subsumed by a far more traditional approach to American foreign policy, propelled as it was by the 9/11 attacks. This commonality has been described by Hassner as “Wilsonianism in boots”\textsuperscript{82}, reflecting the combination of liberalism and exceptionalism present throughout American diplomatic history. While tactics between the two Presidents differed considerably and stemmed from differing ideological starting bases, the basic outlines of American grand strategy itself were similar in important ways. Both reflected heavy use of Wilsonian arguments that emphasized the importance of democracy within the international community.\textsuperscript{83} The main difference between these approaches concerned the relative utility of multilateral institutions and the conditions under which American military force should be used, and even here similarities far outweighed differences. The degree of consistency within American grand strategy after the Cold War between presidential administrations is considerable.

As a candidate for president, Barack Obama made a rejection of Bush’s foreign policy a centrepiece of his campaign. His victory in the Democratic primary over Hillary Clinton was based in large part on his differences from Bush, and to a degree from Clinton and Democratic establishment figures. He ran (explicitly) as a relatively traditional candidate of change, albeit one with considerable and unconventional political attributes. The enthusiasm that he generated as a candidate was noteworthy on multiple levels and represents one of the more incredible occurrences in modern political history, with the winning “Obama coalition” immediately becoming a part of the American political lexicon. His powerful personal attributes – most of all his mixed-race heritage, rhetorical ability, and air of urbane, deliberative sophistication – were some of the most

\textsuperscript{82} Though Hassner uses this description in a post-9/11 context, he also draws attention to Clinton’s willingness to use military force to serve humanitarian ends. See Pierre Hassner, "The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?,” \textit{EU-ISS Chaillot Papers} 54(2002).

\textsuperscript{83} In her confirmation hearings in January 2005, Rice emphasized liberal arguments extensively. She stated, “First, we will unite the community of democracies in building an international system that is based on shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to fight the threats to our common security and alleviate the hopelessness that feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set for America in the world and is the great mission of American diplomacy today.” \textit{Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State}. 
remarkable in recent American politics. His criticisms of Bush’s foreign policy were central to this appeal and were as trenchant as any policy area, most of all over the Iraq War. It is all the more remarkable that his approach to grand strategy during two terms in the White House was, by many measures, quite traditional, with the typically attendant virtues and shortcomings.\(^8^4\)

In matters of grand strategy and foreign policy generally, the Obama Administration’s record matched that of a fairly traditional centre-left Democrat. Much of his foreign policy could be considered Clintonian – and not just because former first lady Hillary Clinton served as his first term Secretary of State. In this sense, he also demonstrated a broadly similar approach to much of Bush’s second term in office. Clearly Administration officials of both sides would likely disagree with that assessment, but if particular partisan and rhetorical differences are considered, the substance of strategy was remarkably similar. Famously, Obama refused to use the phrase “radical Islamic terrorism” during his term in office out of concern for potentially inflaming public opinion in the Islamic world and misusing a term that had come to represent something of an ideological litmus test rather than an accurate, useful statement of the complex, interconnected issues of radicalism, local grievances, and religiously-inspired violence. Bush shared the concern, if not the practice, by frequently emphasizing that neither the United States nor the West were “at war with Islam”.

Early in his presidency, Obama sought to reset relations with Russia; early in his presidency, Bush vouched for President Putin after “looking into his soul” and suggested a more positive relationship than the one he had inherited. Neither leader was able to do so, albeit for reasons not entirely of their making. In Asia, the similarities were even more pronounced. Obama’s strategically oriented “Pacific Rebalancing” represented an accelerated continuation of Bush’s efforts towards East Asia, with reinforcement of existing regional relationships and security architecture at its core. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal was officially signed in the final year of Obama’s presidency, and despite the subsequent withdrawal of the United States by the Trump

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Administration from the agreement, was understood as being a strategic agreement as much as an economic one. TPP negotiations, including American involvement, were begun in the last years of the Bush Administration. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War – the two unequivocally defining events of Bush’s presidency – there was little ability for Bush to spend his dwindling political capital on the issue on his way out of the White House, particularly as the global economic crisis reached epic proportions in 2008-9.

Had their presidential tenures been flipped, it is difficult to imagine that Bush would not have pushed hard for something resembling the final deal agreed to by Obama’s negotiators. It fit with Bush’s, and the Republican Party’s traditional, support for free trade generally as a way to generate economic growth and to win support for security-related measures through political, economic, diplomatic, and ideational measures. The same could be said about Bill Clinton, who signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after earlier negotiations during Reagan and Bush’s presidencies provided the groundwork using similar arguments. This says less about the specific approach of Bush, or Obama for that matter, and more about the enduring consistency of American ends and means. In the context of the TPP, a major justification for the agreement was the perceived need to “lock in” Pacific Rim countries to a American-centric economic framework, in no small part because of uncertainty and apprehension of China’s future course and amidst Chinese initiatives intended to achieve similar goals centred around Beijing.85 Indonesia’s role in this complex diplomatic and political environment is noteworthy, both in its own right and as a regional leader, and therefore requires an examination of the policies of the United States designed to further these goals. While bipartisan populist anger against “elites” during a presidential campaign and the implicit tradeoffs inherent in any complex negotiation played a significant role in generating the eventually fatal political opposition to the deal in the United States, the grand strategic framework that created space for such negotiations and agreements remains a familiar one.

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85 Tai Wei Lim et al., China’s One Road One Belt Initiative (London: Imperial College Press, 2016); Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?," Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010).
Realism alone has difficulty explaining the similarity of approach by the United States in these periods despite the clearly different material environments in which American foreign policy operated. Different presidencies starting with differing ideological predispositions and interacting under different geopolitical conditions should not end up at the same, or even similar, places in terms of grand strategy. Yet the United States keeps playing, or trying to play, a similar note – in theory if not always in practice. American grand strategy during the 1990s proved to be something of a mix of offensive and defensive realist predictions, suggesting that further explanation beyond the structural level is needed. A combination of several approaches to grand strategy was utilized during the period, reflecting in part a lack of consensus on the characteristics of the international environment. Overall, aspects of selective engagement and primacy became the operating grand strategic approach of the United States, despite the proliferation of theories and approaches following the Cold War’s conclusion, in large part because they fit with the traditional strategic culture environment. More than anything else, this represented an update of important characteristics of containment. This is despite a drastically changed international environment following the Soviet Union’s collapse: with nothing left to contain, containment became a victim of its own success. But in the absence of strategic failure, an approach broadly consistent with American ideals and biases was settled upon. Central elements of Cold War grand strategy, namely a liberal international economic and political order maintained by American security and military commitments, became central elements of post-Cold War American grand strategy.

This remarkably consistent approach, as much as the questions of “soft balancing”, “unipolarity”, and “bandwagoning”, represents a direct challenge to realist theory. This is not to say that the fundamental insights of realism – namely, the primary importance of the international environment in dictating state responses and the search, by states, for (broadly-defined) security – are erroneous, but rather incomplete. Material factors remain a fundamentally central aspect of the international environment, as they have a central role in dictating state actions via the perceptions that policy-makers hold of the international environment. Attempts to explain foreign policy behaviour through domestic politics first, rather than focusing on the international environment, puts the cart before the horse in an important way: domestic political factors influence the way in
which decisions are made, but these are being made first and foremost in response to the international environment. After the Cold War structural realism required adjustment to a vastly changed international security environment now defined by American unipolarity and the decreasing likelihood of Great Power war.\footnote{Explanations for the increasing unlikelihood of Great Power war vary and represent a field of international scholarship, though the overwhelming reality of American power and the inclusive nature of the American-led international order are plausibly cited as potential explanatory variables. Michael Mandelbaum, \textit{The Case for Goliath: How America act as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century} (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). Needless to say, critics of the role played by the United States hardly see such virtuous outcomes. See Noam Chomsky, \textit{Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance} (Crow's Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2004) and Gabriel Kolko, \textit{The Age of War: the United States Confronts the World} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006) for critical viewpoints.} For all of the challenges facing realism, and particularly structural realism, it retains important explanatory and predictive value. But supplementary explanations, particularly relating to the influences of the strategic culture in which such decisions are made, offer significant value.

Taking into account American strategic culture manages to fill important theoretical holes in structural realism, and in doing so offers a more robust and complete picture of American grand strategy. Such an inclusion deviates from structural realism in significant ways – most obviously, in the use of explanatory variables unrelated to systemic variables (i.e. various measures of state power). In doing so, however, it also returns to earlier theoretical roots of realism. Classical realists, unlike their structuralist counterparts, have traditionally found space for culture within their theoretical framework. More recently, neoclassical realists have broadened this framework to incorporate a variety of variables located at the domestic level. These variables – of which strategic culture is an important example – act as important influences upon state actions made in response to the changing international environment. In the process, by focusing the question of “why” a state acts on the systemic or structural level, while addressing the question of “how” a state acts by way of domestically oriented variables.

Armed with such a framework, American grand strategy becomes more explicable than a strictly structural realist response would allow. The importance of American strategic culture in the formulation of grand strategy is central, consistent, and pervasive due to the inescapability of decision-maker bias. In particular, the continued advocating of liberal ideals while attempting to maintain maximum strategic independence has
served as an important filter upon the implementation of the “three-note chord” that is critical to the particularly American method of grand strategy. The uneasy balance, and frequent mismatch, between these two frameworks help to further explain the mixed results and uneven approach to American grand strategy throughout the 1990s. That the over-arching approach to American foreign policy – the method by which the United States sought to “cause” security for itself, in Posen’s formulation of grand strategy – remained broadly similar to what it had been whilst trapped in bipolar superpower competition with the Soviet Union suggests that a structural explanation alone is sufficient.

**Conclusion**

Faced with a number of different strategic options in the early days of the Cold War, American policy-makers chose to adopt a strategy of containment, which would serve as the basis for American grand strategy through the end of the Cold War. The relative consistency of this approach throughout was not guaranteed, but the flexibility of application allowed for its continued use in various circumstances. Startlingly, however, the massive changes to the international environment caused by the collapse of the Soviet Empire did not bring about a fundamental change in grand strategy approach by American policy-makers. Instead, many of the operating assumptions of containment, including the establishment of a liberal international order that reflected the three note chord of physical security, economic security, and values promotion, continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s on a similar course. While allowing for an initial change in emphasis between the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations that largely reflected domestic political considerations, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in a swing back towards a bold, but nonetheless recognizable, form of international liberalism that served a principal role in American grand strategy during the Cold War. The same can be said for Barack Obama, who despite having entered the White House explicitly as a candidate of change, continued with policies that closely resembled those of Bush, in practice if not in rhetoric.

These broad similarities in approach and outlook, despite different Administrations and vastly different material circumstances, demonstrate the inherent
limitations of a strict structural realist explanation of US foreign policy towards Indonesia, and indeed grand strategy overall. The structural realist emphasis on international structure underestimates the considerable impact inherent motivations, biases, and perceptions – some explicit, some not – within American strategic culture have upon these complicated processes. Intervening variables such as strategic culture have strongly influenced the process by which American foreign policy is formulated, with significant impact upon resulting policies and strategies. The consistency of the characteristically American approach to grand strategy has resulted in a pattern of actions – principally though not universally in the area of democracy promotion and liberal values – in recent decades that exceed the rather limited scope of structural realist predictions. A neoclassical realist model that emphasizes the importance of national strategic culture come far closer in terms of explaining both the contours of American foreign policy towards Indonesia, the varying levels of attention paid to Indonesia by the United States, and the overall scope of American grand strategy as it relates to Indonesia.

The incorporation of strategic culture as an intervening variable helps address some of the inherent challenges within structural realism’s explanation of responses across vastly different material environments and circumstances. The incorporation of an intervening variable – strategic culture – that serves as a filter upon structural inputs (perceptions) and outputs (responses) can add considerable explanatory value, demonstrating the utility of a neoclassical realist framework. As Monten suggests, “Scholars are gradually coming into consensus that both power and ideas interact to produce outcomes of interest in international politics, and these cases demonstrate the utility of this approach in producing a more theoretically sound and empirically comprehensive understanding of this vital dimension of U.S. foreign and security policy.”

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87 Monten, 156.
CHAPTER 7:

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND INDONESIA

“The questions of how states make decisions, and what results in world affairs from those decisions, transcend time, place and culture. All states face, in an existential sense, the intended and unintended consequences of their own decisions. In history, states have risen and fallen because of key decisions, as have empires and new civilizations. Understanding how decisions are made, therefore, can offer a window on history and insight into a timeless dimension of the human condition.”

-Steve A. Yetiv

“... choice is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice.”

-Jean Paul Sartre

As Yetiv suggests, determining how and why a state makes decisions in international affairs is indeed a timeless pursuit, and one that remains a central preoccupation of historical and modern international relations scholarship. Sartre’s formulation offers an important, if profound and seemingly obvious, rejoinder: while attention necessarily gravitates to the actions and decisions that are made, ones that are not made can be critically important. Depending on circumstances, an act of non-decision or negligence can be far more revealing than one that is actively made or pursued. This research project has asked a number of theoretical and practical questions related to the foreign policy process, especially as it relates to Indonesia. In particular, it has sought to address a relatively under-theorized field of research: namely, the relationship between grand strategy and bilateral foreign policy and the

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1 Steve A. Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. decision-making and the Persian Gulf War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 214.
mechanisms that lead to change within this relationship. American grand strategy has been examined in order to provide a practical application of this theoretical approach. So has American foreign policy towards Indonesia, beginning with the immediate post-Second World War period as the United States embraced a far more engaged role in the region than it had practiced before the war. It has been suggested that the particular strategic culture of the United States, and especially the tension between the liberal and realist-infused traditions within this culture, has played a significant role in the development of American grand strategy. While this strategic culture has deep roots in the political and historical experience of the United States, the particular elements emphasized within this study have been examined in the post-1945 era. These common aspects of American grand strategy in significantly different ideological, political, and material environments suggest that the neoclassical realist model proposed can add significant explanatory value to this particular set of questions.

The final aspect of this study is an attempt to determine the nature of the relationship between grand strategic “macro” considerations and the “micro” level of bilateral foreign policy, and in particular how this relates to Indonesia. This is a question of immense importance for both theoretical and policymaking reasons, and yet an area that has been largely neglected in the considerable scholarship on grand strategy, foreign policy, and international relations more generally. Under what conditions do grand strategy considerations have larger relative importance, and when does bilateral foreign policy come to influence grand strategy more directly? Furthermore, how does this interaction influence the overall effectiveness of a state’s stated (or unstated) grand strategy?

If an idealized theoretical model of top-down state action driven by grand strategy is an inaccurate - or at least insufficient – description of state-level policymaking, this would necessarily require a reevaluation of the function played by national strategy and the process of policy formulation itself. So too would a finding that strategy itself, in spite of the considerable amount of attention it regularly attracts, is in fact a less coherent or robust concept than is commonly accepted by both scholars and practitioners. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, a state’s chosen grand strategy at a particular point is relevant both for what it includes as well as what it excludes, as well as being representative of the process by which it is
created. Similarly, in terms of implementation, it matters less that a chosen grand strategy fails short of some Platonic strategic ideal – history has demonstrated how rarely, if ever, this has occurred in practice – but rather that such strategies are perceived to be important. Grand strategies of the United States, as has been demonstrated, matter both for what they say about the United States and those making strategic decisions as well as what they represent in practical impact.

It is important to stress the modesty with which these conclusions should be treated. As the United States has been the focus of this study, and especially the particular characteristics of the American strategic framework, the ability to extend these conclusions beyond the American experience should be undertaken with abundant caution. This is also true of the bilateral relationship examined in depth, Indonesia, for reasons discussed in the introduction. This study does not suggest that strategic culture is the only, or even always the most, effective way to explore and explain foreign policy outcomes. But while the structure of this study may initially limit the scope for extension, such a tight focus has also allowed for a greater degree of depth than would be the case if other models had been adopted, such as a large-n or even a small-n case study. The historical case study approach utilized allows the opportunity to delve deeply into this topic in a manner that a broader approach would have prevented.³ It is hoped that this allows for further examinations into this important and relatively neglected field of research.

This chapter will examine the important findings of previous chapters in order to highlight the theoretical viewpoints already described – such as the importance and relevance of an expansive definition of grand strategy – as well as the significance of the practical aspects of grand strategy, including the importance of strategic culture as an explanatory variable. American foreign policy towards Indonesia since 1945, covered in depth earlier, will be briefly summarized in order to provide relevant context. The majority of this chapter, however, seeks to explain the relationship between these two levels of analysis and offer several modest conclusions. It will suggest that while grand strategy can and should be understood as the primary road map to a nation’s foreign policy, the relationship is a complex one that changes over

³ On this point, Rose has argued that “…neoclassical realism’s relative modesty about its ability to provide tidy answers or precise predictions should perhaps be seen not as a defect but rather as a virtue, stemming as it does from a judicious appraisal of its object of inquiry.” Rose, 172.
time, particularly in reference to perceptions of relative threats and opportunities. This is of particular relevance to the topic at hand, as Indonesia’s importance within American grand strategy considerations reflects a substantial degree of opportunistic optimism by Washington about Indonesia’s future, rather than the more threat-based perceptions that dominated during the Cold War. Furthermore, the impact of the American strategic culture described earlier will be evaluated in this light: is there something about American strategic culture that influences not only grand strategy itself, but the relative balance between grand strategy and foreign policy? Can any generalizable conclusions about the United States or state behaviour overall be made that aid the understanding of national foreign policy making?

**Research Question and Methodology**

This study has attempted to address these topics for several reasons. In part, this was due to the relative paucity of research in this particular area. It is also because the various actors, as much as the questions being asked of them, are of considerable importance: the historical and contemporary power of the United States offers a *prima facie* case for examination, as does the uncertain future trajectory of American influence and power. Where this trajectory will lead in highly dynamic, geopolitically complex, and economically ascendant regions like Southeast Asia or the Asia-Pacific requires close study. With particular reference to Asia, the ascent of China in global politics is clearly an enormous factor in nearly all considerations of American foreign policy. As a major regional power that is increasingly active on the international stage – and yet unquestionably faces enormous domestic challenges – Indonesia also faces an ambiguous future. That the relationship between the United States and Indonesia has varied considerably over time, and currently seems to once again be in a period of marked change, provides further justification for delving more deeply into this dynamic relationship.

With a few exceptions, the seemingly endless scholarship from a wide array of perspectives on state foreign policy formation, including that of the United States, has only occasionally addressed a straight-forward and core component of the field – how does grand strategy influence bilateral foreign policy, and vice versa? This question has served as the starting point for this project’s principal research question: what is the relationship between the grand strategy of the United States and American foreign policy towards Indonesia, and how has this relationship evolved over time? In noting
that the balance between these two levels is anything but static, it begs the question of what factors might influence and affect this balance. The proposed thesis has suggested that the strategic culture of the United States has influenced this balance in a way that traditional structural realism does not fully account for.

The US-Indonesian relationship, and more generally the strategic role of the United States in Asia, also matters a great deal. The United States has long played a pivotal role in the Asia-Pacific, particularly since the end of the Second World War. Bipolar competition with the Soviet Union and a divided Europe defined the post-war settlement for many Americans, but the consolidation of Communist Party control in China and concerns over Japan’s political and economic rehabilitation ensured continued and direct American engagement with the Asia-Pacific. Over seven decades later, the reasons for this presence have evolved, though with China’s increasing international power and profile an inescapable reality, the nature and the conduct of American foreign policy in Asia has been under challenge – politically and economically, but also ideationally – in a manner not experienced before. As the largest state in Southeast Asia and the traditional leader of ASEAN, Indonesia continues to be a centrally important and willing regional player. But its profile as well as its foreign policy continues to be defined by the myriad challenges inherent within the ongoing transition from authoritarian to democratic rule and ongoing efforts to raise economic standards for its population. Suharto’s comment in 1969 – that Indonesia “shall only be able to play an effective role if we ourselves are possessed of a great national [economic] vitality” – continues to heavily influence elite Indonesian opinion. For many Indonesians, strength abroad begins with continued resilience at home.⁴

In order to evaluate the primary research question, one must first have an understanding of what grand strategy encompasses. The theoretical chapter at the beginning of this study reviewed important developments in the relevant literature. This also included the concept of strategic culture as an explanatory intervening variable in the foreign policymaking process. In order to better understand how foreign policy towards Indonesia has evolved, a historical approach was taken, emphasizing the largely reactionary nature of American foreign policy. This will be

⁴ Quoted in Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983) .
discussed in greater depth shortly, but the reasons behind this reactionary process have much to do with the determination of the balance between the two levels of foreign policy discussed. Even when Indonesia has been comparatively important within American grand strategy – such as during the first two decades of the Cold War, or more recently in the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks – foreign policy has more often than not been made in response to events in Indonesia rather than anything else. Grand strategy has provided an important context for this foreign policy, and strategic culture has been a major factor in determining what form this foreign policy takes, but events within Indonesia remain a critical factor in this balance.

On the one hand, this can be considered a rather obvious observation – there would be little question that bilateral foreign policy consciously and necessarily reflects domestic events within the target country. But there is more to this than may seem initially obvious. During periods of relative neglect towards Indonesia from a strategic perspective, it would plausibly follow that events on the ground would define American foreign policy. But even during periods of Indonesia’s relative importance to the United States, local events determined a great deal of American foreign policy, up to and including the level of grand strategy. This has important implications for understanding foreign policy generally, as well as specifically that of the United States. But what is this balance, if it is even discoverable? Does strategic culture, as originally hypothesized, have a significant impact on foreign policy outcomes in a way that differs from other potential explanations? If it does, what does it tell us about grand strategy, the foreign policy process in the United States, American understandings of Indonesia, and the interaction between country-specific foreign policy and that of overall strategic concepts more broadly?

At any one point in time, this balance can be observed through evaluating the relative importance of Indonesia within overall American foreign policy. This is, admittedly, a somewhat imprecise and subjective measure. Determining where and how perceptions of Indonesia fit within this process of prioritization – the amount of strategic attention Indonesia receives – can go some way in determining the relative balance between grand strategy and bilateral foreign policy. One would expect that periods in which Indonesia has attracted more attention would see grand strategy play a larger role than bilateral foreign policy, while periods in which less overall attention
was devoted to Indonesia would see a commensurate increase in the importance of bilateral foreign policy. Once this balance between levels has been established, the question of the role played by American strategic culture in influencing this balance can be addressed more directly.

As suggested earlier, discussions of grand strategy have long been a major component of international relations scholarship, even as the constitutive means have changed considerably over time. Scholars have drawn attention to the practice of grand strategy in historical times, demonstrating the timeless importance of prioritizing national-level goals while also developing ideas on how to efficiently and effectively address them.\(^5\) Interest in grand strategy has been based on several factors, including the importance of national approaches to international politics, the structural and systemic implications of particular grand strategies, and the diverse approaches and theoretical paradigms that can be used to examine such “big picture” ideas.\(^6\) Not surprisingly, one of the factors leading to grand strategy’s staying power has been its very “grand-ness” of scale and scope. Faced with competing demands for attention and finite deployable resources, policymakers throughout time have been forced to prioritize national-level goals as well as ideas about how to efficiently and effectively realize them. Scholarship has followed such efforts with considerable interest.

This process has not shifted unilaterally over time. The proliferation and extreme destructiveness of nuclear weapons in the 1950s reinforced the prior dominance of military considerations in grand strategy, even as strategists of the interwar period and Second World War advocated a broader linkage between military means and political ends.\(^7\) At the height of the Cold War, the real threat of war

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between nuclear-armed Great Powers necessarily and directly impacted views of how to “cause security”, resulting in a privileged (and in some cases, exclusive) position for military considerations within grand strategy discussions. But by the later stages of the Cold War, and certainly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, grand strategy’s definitional scope broadened to include an increasing array of non-military means. If the construction of liberal international political and economic regimes (both key intellectual components of containment) took a backseat to abstract discussions of first-strike and missile throw-weight capabilities for much of the Cold War, the improbability of Great Power war since 1991 has reinvigorated discussions of grand strategy. There is little question that nuclear strategy remains a critical consideration, but it no longer commands the dominant position it once did.

Grand Strategy and Foreign Policy

With some exceptions, comparatively little work has focused on the actual mechanics of the relationship between grand strategy and foreign policy. What work has been done has principally described grand strategic failure and specific instances of disconnect between grand strategy and foreign policy – which tends to place emphasis upon failures of grand strategic outcome, rather than the mistakes of process that led to such failures. While such failures are clearly important, they are also relatively rare and occur most frequently in wartime settings. The decreasing likelihood of large-scale interstate war, and the concurrent diversification of the terms used to discuss grand strategy, suggest a significant lacuna in the current literature.

and Eisenhower Administration policies on these matters, both in terms of nuclear strategy overall and in efforts to diversify grand strategy beyond military-focused ends to include modernization and economic development theory as major components of the anti-Communist struggle. While such components existed before the 1960s, changing the strategic emphasis was an important development, particularly following the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the midst of this ongoing reevaluation of grand strategy’s role in advancing statecraft, Schelling argued for the importance of brinkmanship: “[u]nless we can manipulate the risk of general war and engage in competitive risk-taking with the Soviets, I don’t think we are going to learn to take care of Berlin, much less to take care of Indonesia and Finland when the time comes.” Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 45.

Key figures associated with the RAND Corporation, including Brodie, Schelling, and Albert Wohlstetter, had enormous impact on the evolution of American nuclear strategy throughout the 1950s. The level of abstraction needed to discuss such unimaginably horrific outcomes created a feeling that nuclear strategy had run its course. Limited war had to be considered, for the alternative was tantamount to national suicide. “[I]t was clear something had changed after Vietnam. It was not so much that the logic had been revealed as defective, it was the relevance of this body of thought that now came to be questioned. There was a sense that it was somehow out of touch with reality.” Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 44.
Particularly in the United States, questions of grand strategy in the post-Cold War era have consumed a tremendous amount of time, energy, and attention, in no small part because of the amount of relative and absolute American power following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Others have suggested that the United States’ efforts to determine a new grand strategy stem in part from the American messianic impulse that is more comfortable in addressing direct global challenges than ambiguous uncertainty. In this particular case, there also exists an important core within the debate – the fire, so to speak, that generates the voluminous amounts of smoke referenced throughout this study. The value of grand strategy is not just about setting goals and attempting to find ways to meet them in a messy and uncertain global arena, but rather about the prioritization of particular national goals in an environment of scarce resources and the future vision this process creates. As such, a state’s grand strategy exists even if particular goals are not consciously prioritized, or the means required to realize such goals are either unavailable or not underutilized.

It is with this point in mind that one must consider the relationship between foreign policy towards Indonesia and its impact upon American grand strategy. Overall, there is substantially greater convergence towards rather than divergence from the theoretical model, which is to say that grand strategic considerations have had a major impact on foreign policy towards Indonesia. American grand strategy, or the means used to achieve broad goals of national security, has been the primary determinant of American foreign policy towards Indonesia over the period examined. During the Cold War, containment had an understandably significant impact on American foreign policy towards Indonesia. Specifically, this meant taking efforts – in some cases, extreme efforts – in order to limit the power of the PKI and forestall

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10 Indeed, some have suggested that this was one reason for the failure of Clinton’s “democratic enlargement” concept to generate public support. While the elimination of chaos and uncertainty may have been one of the most pressing of the immediate post-Cold War international order, it was nonetheless too abstract and indirect to sufficiently replace containment as an organizing principal of grand strategy.

11 The Clinton Administration in particular was described as utilizing a consciously ad-hoc approach to grand strategy. After emphasizing the importance of human rights and democratic values, “…Clinton seemed content to preside over a largely reactive, crisis-management foreign policy, which for the most part was in fact successful at avoiding major blunders.” Lowell Dittmer, "East Asia in the "New Era" in World Politics," World Politics 5(2002): 42. Others have emphasized that this allowed Clinton to maintain maximum strategic flexibility. See Kathryn M. Olsen, "Democratic Enlargement's Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms: An Analysis of Clinton's Use of a Post-Cold War Symbolic Frame to Justify Military Interventions ″, Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2004).
the spread of Communism to the Indonesian archipelago. The inherent challenge in doing so effectively from Washington was not unique to Indonesia.

After sidelining Sukarno following the 1965 coup, Suharto effectively leveraged this concern over Communism’s spread to ensure wide latitude for himself in domestic and international affairs. From the perspective of the United States, once Suharto’s pro-Western orientation had been clearly established, Indonesia became one less thing to worry about. This was no small development, of course: many policymakers – throughout the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations – regularly spoke of Indonesia’s regional importance, which was accorded far greater significance than Vietnam. Indonesia now played a central role in the effort to limit the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia specifically and East Asia more broadly, even if this occurred under the continued guise of “non-alignment”. The uneasy interim between the Cold War’s conclusion and the Asian Financial Crisis resulted in an uncertain period in which the justification for continued support for Suharto initially maintained little strength, but threatening signs of future instability caused by Suharto’s waning power limited the applicability of vague American grand strategy principles of “democratic enlargement”.

It is significant that, in the case of Indonesia, American grand strategy largely complies with the predicted theoretical model, suggesting that grand strategy itself remains a central concept within the “big picture” explanation of foreign policy. But what explanatory value does this add? Given the importance of grand strategy in this balancing act, as well as the broadly consistent goals of containment throughout the Cold War, it is more enlightening to investigate this relationship from the perspective of foreign policy. Foreign policy, whether towards Indonesia or any other nation, is relatively consistent in the sense that it continues on over time, regardless of the degree of attention that nation receives in grand strategic terms. The real question in determining the relationship between these two levels of analysis, therefore, lies with grand strategy: at what times, and under what circumstances, did American grand strategy place greater value upon and pay closer attention to Indonesia? What are the

12 Discussing Indonesia at the height of US concern over Sukarno’s intentions, Robert Komer – a major figure in American policy towards Southeast Asia – clearly expressed this position: “We’ve strung [Sukarno] along…on the basic premise that if he swung too far left we’d lose the third largest country in Asia – whose strategic location and 100 million people make it a far greater prize than Vietnam.” Quoted in H.W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 166.
causal mechanisms for grand strategy’s relative rise or decline in impact upon America’s foreign policy towards Indonesia? The thesis suggests that Indonesia’s role within American grand strategy, which has waxed and waned considerably over time, has been substantially impacted by the distinctive strategic culture of the United States.

Broadly speaking, American foreign policy towards Indonesia during the Cold War can be divided into two distinct periods, with the obvious turning point being the critical juncture that proved so pivotal to Indonesia itself: the murky events of the 1965 coup/countercoup and Suharto’s ascension to power. Before this turning point, Indonesia had factored heavily in American grand strategy, mostly for reasons related to the threat of Communism and early Cold War geopolitics. Afterwards, following Suharto’s consolidation of power and the end of direct American involvement in Vietnam, Indonesia (and Southeast Asia more generally) became very much a secondary concern in US grand strategic considerations. It remained this way for the rest of the Cold War and most of the uncertain 1990s period. But first with the Asian Financial Crisis and later the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Indonesia suddenly became relevant again to Washington, even if the shape this relevance took was less certain. These trends, as well as the broader shift of geopolitical and economic focus to East Asia within American and global policy communities, strongly suggest this newfound relevance within American grand strategy is likely to continue.

During the early years of the Cold War, grand strategy considerations had a major impact on Indonesia, due to Indonesia being primarily understood in the context of everything else rather than as an important country in its own right. Indonesia was seen through initially post-colonial and later Cold War frameworks, owing in large part to the perceived importance and sensitive balance of events of Europe at this critical stage in the post-war period. But even within an Asian context, Indonesia was also seen as playing an important role in a larger goal of American grand strategy, the economic recovery and political rehabilitation of Japan. American leaders viewed Southeast Asia – and most importantly of all, Indonesia – as a critical support factor for Japanese recovery. That they spent the greater part of the Second

13 American support for Japanese recovery was the subject of considerable internal debate. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, head of the military U.S. occupation force in Japan, favored a “harsh treaty settlement that would have confined Japan to its home islands and allowed it to maintain only modest
World War opposing such economic interdependence from occurring in the form of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was an irony noted by many at the time.\(^{14}\)

Grand strategic issues had an outsized impact on US perceptions and policies towards Indonesia given the vulnerability of the region overall, a trend accelerated yet further by the crumbling French position in Indochina and the threat this posed to American interests in the region. The “lesson” of China was applied to Indonesia, in particular by Dulles to US Ambassador Hugh Cumming Jr., on several occasions: if a country was likely to fall under the sway of Communist pressure, it was more desirable to maintain a non-Communist beachhead or rump than the unitary structure of the state. In a more fundamental sense, though, there was a question of how to handle newly independent states, particularly ones that saw the world differently from Washington.\(^{15}\) This was encapsulated by Eisenhower’s quip about Indonesia, in which he wondered aloud “why the hell did we ever urge the Dutch to get out of Indonesia?”\(^{16}\) A roughly ten-year period beginning in the late 1950s represented the culmination of grand strategy’s dominance over foreign policy concerns as Indonesia lurched from one crisis to another: following the Permesta rebellion, final settlement of the West New Guinea issue with the Dutch, which in turn was followed by Konfrontasi and the enormous economic disruption that accompanied it. This was particularly relevant for Kennedy’s goal of changing the American relationship with the newly independent states of the developing world – a development that Sukarno’s erratic and irresponsible international behaviour (to American eyes) was seriously endangering.\(^{17}\) This eventually culminated in Sukarno’s “Year of Living Dangerously” amid an economic situation spiralling quickly out of control and the

defense capabilities.” Kennan, among others, argued for a post-war Japan that was not strong enough to threaten its neighbors, but that could also serve as an anti-Communist bulwark in the region. See Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010).

\(^{14}\) The high level of importance placed on Japan’s economic recovery and political rehabilitation dismayed regional allies like Australia and New Zealand; the ANZUS treaty was designed to alleviate concerns over potential Japanese revisionism. Cha, 14

\(^{15}\) As Matthew Jones has noted, “[t]his kind of fundamental ambivalence over whether to leave newly independent states and societies well alone, or to engage in forms of interventionism in the hope of preventing their succumbing to Communist influence was indicative of several overall trends in US foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s.” Jones, 300.

\(^{16}\) Quoted in Jones, 10.

\(^{17}\) Senior members of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were also very conscious of the heavy domestic political consequences that “losing Indonesia” might entail, quite aside from the national security implications. Zach Fredman, “”The Specter of an Expansionist China”: Kennedy Administration Assessments of Chinese Intentions in Vietnam,” *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 1 (2014).
extreme polarization of Indonesian society between PKI members and sympathizers on the one hand and more conservative elements, including the bulk of the army and Muslim groups, on the other. This crisis was eventually brought to an abrupt halt by the September 30 movement and the ensuing counter-reaction led by Suharto.

Explanation/Analysis

What do these findings mean, and how are they relevant to larger questions of American foreign policy and international relations scholarship? A key starting point is international relations theory. While they disagree on why (and how) exactly states decide to expand, realists of both offensive and defensive varieties argue that the ability of a state to do so is a critical first step. Perceptions of interests are far less relevant without the capability to do something about them. Power is the necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, condition for expansion of interests that leads to state expansion in realist accounts. Offensive realists suggest the opportunity to expand state power is sufficient.\(^\text{18}\) Defensive realists are less uniform in their predictions, but generally suggest that the balance of perceived threats, in combination with material ability to act, is the primary causal chain that leads to this expansion of interests.\(^\text{19}\) Can U.S. behaviour towards Indonesia, as well as the relationship between American grand strategy and bilateral foreign policy, be explained by either of these realist perspectives alone? Does American strategic culture offer supplementary explanatory value to these explanations or rationales for action?

The first two decades of the Cold War track relatively closely with realist perspectives, particularly defensive realism. American policy-makers were greatly concerned with Communist expansion in Asia. In the largely Manichean view of global politics that increasingly defined American views in the 1950s, reinforced by the loss of China and the Korean War, Indonesia was considered to be of enormous value. Substantially different American and Indonesian perspectives on regional and global politics inevitably caused considerable tension and difficulty in the relationship following Indonesian independence. Overall, the United States was fundamentally responding to various degrees of perceived threats – namely, potential Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, Cold War neutralism, and the economic and political consequences for Japan should an important source of raw materials be interrupted.

\(^\text{18}\) Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
The liberal aspects of containment were valued less than the *realpolitik* considerations required to prevent Indonesia from becoming Communist; while the three-note chord remained an important formulation of American grand strategy in Asia, physical and economic security concerns were paramount – and the enormous stakes of Cold War competition in Southeast Asia meant that value promotion was largely about keeping Indonesia non-Communist under whatever circumstances possible. The inflamed and highly unstable domestic situation within Indonesia throughout the 1950s that the US-supported Permesta rebellion reflected and contributed to directly influenced Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” and subsequent *konfrontasi* declarations. While Washington was eager to rebuild ties with non-Communist elements within Indonesia following Permesta, Sukarno’s autocratic turn fuelled concerns over his intentions and Indonesia’s non-Communist status. These perceived threats were prime reasons for Indonesia’s significance in American grand strategic considerations.

While the Kennedy Administration emphasized economic modernization as a pathway forward for developing states rather than Cold War alliances,\(^\text{20}\) in strategic terms the difference with previous Administrations towards Indonesia was not as significant as sometimes portrayed. Cleaning up the wreckage following the Permesta rebellion was a priority, as it likely would have been for any new administration.\(^\text{21}\) After a brief abatement in tensions following the successfully concluded negotiations over West New Guinea on pro-Indonesian terms, threats again dominated American perceptions of Indonesia. Sukarno’s bellicosity greatly concerned American policymakers interested in building Indonesia up as a non-Communist state within an unstable and dangerous neighborhood, especially given significant Communist insurgencies in Laos and Vietnam. If anything, the resolution of the West New Guinea issue came to serve as a dangerous precedent, coming as it did after

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\(^{21}\) Though Kennedy’s Administration certainly brought a new outlook and energy to the White House, the continuing damage caused by the West Papuan situation means that any post-Eisenhower President would have likely favored resolution. The deeply personal and mutual distrust between Eisenhower and Sukarno, however, meant that policy would be unlikely to occur until a new President arrived in Washington.
significant sabre-rattling by Sukarno towards the Dutch, Australia, the United States, and the West more generally.

Clearly, events related to the 1965 “coup” and its aftermath represent a key turning point in American perceptions of Indonesia. US policymakers demonstrated a notable lack of confidence about their ability to act decisively in support of anti-PKI forces.\(^{22}\) This came as a result of the relative lack of influence that the United States had at this time, a result of the deterioration of American influence in Indonesia while Sukarno delicately balanced the competing interests of the army and the PKI. But it was clear by later in 1966 that Suharto had clearly become the dominant figure in the new government, sidelining Sukarno and destroying the PKI while establishing the “New Order”. Suharto’s pro-Western orientation, staunch anti-Communism, and tightly controlled rule made a Communist takeover of Indonesia a near-impossibility within a few years of the 1965 coup. The 1967 establishment of ASEAN as a “neutral”, Western-aligned regional organization further alleviated concerns over Indonesia’s future path, a concern that had elevated Indonesia in American grand strategy considerations for the majority of the prior two decades since WWII.

America’s strategic focus on Southeast Asia began as a perceived threat. The “domino theory” suggested that American interests throughout the region would be imperilled should communism make inroads in Southeast Asia. It is vital to recall that Indonesia was considered to be the most important lynchpin within the region when it came to Communism. If Indonesia joined the Communist bloc – a very real concern for Washington, whether this occurred as a result of Sukarno’s actions, the efforts of the PKI, or some external pressure – then it was understood that the entire region would be at risk, not simply Indochina.\(^{23}\) There was little doubt at the time that in the challenging period immediately before Sukarno’s ouster, Indonesia was considered

\(^{22}\)See discussion in Chapter 3.

\(^{23}\)The concept of newly-independent and non-aligned states representing dominoes waiting to fall was widely shared and dominated American thinking about the developing world throughout the Cold War. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk neatly summarized this viewpoint in early 1951: “If Indochina were to fall [under Communist control]...Burma and Thailand would follow suit almost immediately. Thereafter, it would be difficult if not impossible for Indonesia, India and the others to remain outside the Soviet-dominated bloc.” Paul Claussen et al., eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific*, vol. VI, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), Doc. 8.
the more important of the two, a point obfuscated by the dominant role Vietnam has played in shaping American understandings of Southeast Asia then and now.\textsuperscript{24}

When it became clear that American troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam following Nixon’s announcement of “Vietnamization”, Indonesia had made an amazing transition in American eyes. The transition from a major front-line concern to an increasingly stable regime was assisted, of course, by major aid packages and support for Suharto’s rule. Suharto proved to be not only strongly anti-Communist, but the wildly erratic years of Sukarno’s rule and severe economic distress culminating in konfrontasi caused many to value the economic, social, and political stability of the New Order. Despite the near-total destruction of the PKI after 1965 and the shrinking of the political sphere under the New Order, the continuing fear of Communism heavily influenced American acquiescence to the controversial incorporation (via the controversial “Act of Free Choice”) of West New Guinea in 1969 and the 1975 invasion of East Timor. This latter action cannot be separated from the near-simultaneous successful incorporation of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, a point emphasized with considerable self-interest by Suharto. When Suharto raised the prospect of a potentially Communist-aligned independent East Timor, the Ford Administration felt there was little value in unnecessarily upsetting a key partner it was relying upon to help stabilize the region.\textsuperscript{25} A blind eye was thus turned to Indonesia’s violent invasion, but the geopolitical logic of the decision was at least understandable.

Withdrawal from Vietnam foreshadowed wider strategic retrenchment from Southeast Asia as “American policymakers no longer considered it a region of vital national security import; wider threat perceptions had changed too fundamentally to permit such a distortion.”\textsuperscript{26} Defensive realism would suggest that the relative absence of threats facing the United States allowed such a withdrawal to occur, once perceptions of Southeast Asia’s relative significance changed. There was little interest

\textsuperscript{24} “The Vietnam War, particularly for scholars of American foreign relations, has dominated studies of Western involvement in Southeast Asia during the 1960s. The destructiveness and significance of that conflict makes this entirely understandable, yet this emphasis has led to comparative neglect for the major events and upheavals taking place elsewhere in the region.” Jones, xi.

\textsuperscript{25} Kissinger remains the archetypical exponent of unsentimental realpolitik in the American tradition, suggesting that he was more inclined than most to turn a blind eye towards Suharto’s excesses in the name of geopolitical stability. Kissinger has no shortage of critics, but Hitchens is particularly caustic. Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger (London: Verso, 2001).

\textsuperscript{26} McMahon, 184.
in continued American involvement in Southeast Asia beyond economic and political support – despite the enormous lengths and unending justifications throughout the 1950s and 1960s about Southeast Asia’s signal importance to American strategic goals. Though the degree of withdrawal has been exaggerated at times, the widely expressed “Vietnam syndrome” saw a generalized reduction and interest in direct American activity overseas in latter part of the 1970s, particularly following Nixon’s “opening” to China.\(^{27}\) But there was also less immediate need for such action in Southeast Asia, as regional politics had largely confined potential Communist expansion to Indochina.\(^{28}\) While this would in due time led to its own form of tragedy – including the Cambodian killing fields – ASEAN served to prevent further Communist expansion after the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation solidified “ASEAN values”. Foreign policy, far more than grand strategy, continued to dominate throughout the 1980’s. When American attention did return to the region, such as during the ouster of Filipino leader Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, it was largely in response to particular crises rather than the result of sustained or renewed focus. Commenting near the end of the Cold War, Indonesia was rightfully described as being “invisible” to nearly all Americans.\(^{29}\)

This pattern continued throughout the 1990s, despite the increasingly obvious signs of the New Order’s domestic vulnerabilities. Sweeping statements about the importance of economic integration and continued growth in the Asia-Pacific served to mask the strategic uncertainty that dominate American perceptions. At the very least, Indonesia was considered a “known quantity”; under such conditions, the potential implications for American interests of China’s stance towards Taiwan or threatened belligerence by North Korea crowded out any real strategic discussion of Southeast Asia. The potential exception to this involved the South China Sea, but once again this issue was considered important for reasons other than Southeast Asia itself – namely, the possibly imperiling effect that naval tension with China could

\(^{27}\) While American perceptions of Southeast Asia’s strategic importance diminished, economic flows increased markedly. Between the sensitive years of 1970-76, American trade with ASEAN countries quadrupled and the value of American investments tripled. McMahon, 186-87.


\(^{29}\) Donald Emmerson, “Invisible Indonesia”, Foreign Affairs (Winter 1987/8).
have on continued American support for Taiwan or on generalized issues such as freedom of navigation. It would take time before the emphasis behind this concern shifted. In terms of grand strategy, the action was elsewhere.

But in time, American interest in the region returned. This reevaluation has come as a result primarily of two major crises: the Asian Financial Crisis and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Both events were critical in different ways, as the experience, reaction, and understanding of each crisis was obviously very different for both countries. While the consequences of the AFC were painfully real for Indonesians, in driving Suharto from power it also allowed for a reset of US-Indonesian relations that would have been highly unlikely to occur with such a strong exogenous shock. The Crisis also set in motion important characteristics that would become especially important shortly thereafter, when the 9/11 attacks did cause an enormous shift in American perceptions. The reaction of the Bush Administration to the events of 9/11 caused a fundamental shift in American impressions of Indonesia, particularly once the Bush Doctrine’s emphasis on democratic promotion within the Muslim world became widely felt. By setting into motion the democratic era, the AFC allowed for a closer relationship than would have likely occurred otherwise. This process also created conditions for East Timor’s eventual independence, another Cold War issue that had served as an obstacle to closer relations.

This shift reflects a number of factors, including Indonesia’s growing international profile, the impression of domestic political stability following the chaotic turmoil of the post-Suharto transition, Washington’s evolving understanding of Indonesia’s role in Southeast Asia, and the ongoing threat of terrorism. Jakarta had become central to American interests in the wider region, including over discussions on the future course of ASEAN and Asian regionalism more generally. Indonesia’s

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30 Both critics and supporters of the Bush Administration’s democracy promotion efforts have drawn attention to the uneven application of these policies, particularly the support given to so-called “friendly tyrants” in the Muslim world. Carothers, for instance, argues Bush should have committed more fully to democracy promotion; Jervis finds the emphasis on democracy promotion impractical and undesirable. See Thomas Carothers, “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush,” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007) and Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (2003). Smith is particularly critical of “liberal hawks” that support Bush’s approach in Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise (New York: Routledge, 2007). Bush and his aides regularly drew attention to Indonesia as an example of a moderate Muslim democracy. Wolfowitz, for one, called Indonesia “a model for moderation”, and worried that if indigenous terrorism was not confronted, “it’s going to have terrible consequences for [Indonesian] democracy.” Quoted in Smith, 471.
membership in the G20 group of states is an important marker of this growing international profile. Yudhoyono helped stabilize and professionalize Indonesian foreign policy following the uncertainty of the Wahid and Megawati years, despite the sort of periodic domestic political trouble to be expected in an emerging democracy with unsettled current and past issues of corruption, military accountability, judicial independence, and human rights (to name but a few). By and large, Jokowi has continued this trend, though notably far more discreetly on the international stage.

**Thesis Proposition Reviewed**

How and why has Indonesia’s significance to the United States changed over time? In order to examine this question, a neoclassical realist theoretical framework has been used to evaluate the changing role of Indonesia within American grand strategy, which can be understood as a proxy for Indonesia’s perceived significance to overall United States foreign policy. The thesis has suggested that American strategic culture, and in particular the liberal aspects of it that have played a major role since 1945, helps explain the changing role of Indonesia in American grand strategic considerations. Traditional structural realist predictions can explain some, but not all, of the observed behaviour; by serving as a filter on the way in which foreign policy is conducted, strategic culture has played a major role in determining Indonesia’s relative profile within American foreign policy. How well does this initial thesis hold up? Furthermore, what are the implications of this finding, both for the respective states being examined and international relations theory more generally?

As already discussed, Indonesia played a major role in American foreign policy considerations for most of the early Cold War; it ceased to do so in the 1970s as Communist expansion in Southeast Asia was deemed to be less of a threat, and continued until the twin crises of the AFC and 9/11 recast the terms of the relationship. Structural realism can explain reasonably well the Cold War situation, due to realism’s greater ability to describe bipolar or multipolar situations than unipolar ones. Concerned with the regional balance of power, the United States aimed to protect its ideological, economic, and geopolitical interests whenever it could from

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the existential threat of Communist expansion.\textsuperscript{32} It attempted to do this by using liberal means when possible, befitting the biases and preferences of American strategic culture, but as was often the case, this hardly prevented illiberal means from being frequently utilized when deemed necessary. The more difficult question relates to the overall impact of the 9/11 attacks on the global environment. The relative distribution of power was not notably changed in the international system, and a strong argument can be made that despite al Qaeda’s “non-state actor” status, the attacks served to reinforce the state-based nature of this system.\textsuperscript{33} The primary impact of the attacks, at least from a structural standpoint, was upon American perceptions of the global environment, an important but ultimately secondary variable when considering the international structure from a realist perspective.\textsuperscript{34} While the United States retained hegemonic power both before and after the attacks, and therefore retained an unparalleled ability to act in response to the attacks, this was also the case throughout the 1990s. How can this change be explained?

Strategic culture offers a tempting, and ultimately persuasive, explanation to this question. American strategic culture has served as a significant intervening variable upon the formulation of US grand strategy and in foreign policy towards Indonesia. It is not surprising, therefore, that the balance between these two levels of analysis has also been impacted by the underlying form of national strategic culture that provides the basis for both. In doing so, it helps explain deviations from structural realist models that do not take such variables into account. Given the importance of the liberal tendencies of American grand strategy – encapsulated in the “three-note chord” described in the previous chapter – two major events stick out. While Suharto’s regime had managed to capitalize upon American preoccupations elsewhere and tolerance for authoritarian tactics in exchange for stability, the 1990s created increased pressures on Indonesia as distaste for the New Order grew in volume and intensity.\textsuperscript{35} Though it took a long time (and the immediacy of the AFC) for

\textsuperscript{32} This is mostly due to the uncertain implications for realism’s basic premise, the balance of power, in an environment in which one state has such enormous material superiority. For a broad discussion of these implications, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., \textit{Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).


\textsuperscript{34} Robert Jervis, \textit{American Foreign Policy in a New Era} (New York: Routledge, 2005), 37-58.

perceptions of Suharto’s inherent weakness and vulnerabilities to outweigh the potential stabilizing factors he contributed, such a transition did occur. Secondly, the 9/11 attacks dramatically changed the outlook of the United States, with considerable implications for the international environment. This has provided the opportunity for Indonesia’s strategic importance to the United States to grow, given the direct challenge of counterterrorism within Southeast Asia. Without either the removal of prior obstacles or the presence of facilitating factors created by the attacks (namely, an activist foreign policy that superseded the more reserved realism of Bush’s pre-9/11 outlook), it is unlikely that this reevaluation would have occurred.

But while unquestionably 9/11 has provided a major spur to US-Indonesian relations in the form of greater coordination and support on counterterrorism measures, this concentrated focus has also obscured Washington’s larger shift in strategic interest towards the Asia-Pacific, a trend that began in the 1990s, continued during Bush’s second term in office, and advanced at an accelerated pace throughout Obama’s presidency. It was not a straight-line development, and was part of a heavily contested foreign policymaking environment across multiple administrations. Critics have pointed out the lack of commitment to the stated goals of the Obama “rebalancing” effort, and while such criticisms have some basis, a shift towards Asia is hardly the only major policy to suffer such a fate. This development could have greater strategic significance than the response to 9/11 over the long term, as it represents a deeper shift in perspective than the narrow measures related to the “War on Terror” or the more generalized importance of non-state and non-traditional actors. Clinton initiated this shift, and his successors have done even more to emphasize the continuing role of the United States as an Asia-Pacific power and signal the growing importance of Asia to international politics. The growing clout of China is a major element in this development, but so too are the growth of Asian regionalism and the continuing economic globalization of the Asia-Pacific.

The implications of these findings are substantial, and suggest potential future research opportunities in several different areas. In demonstrating the value of

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36 The most obvious (potential) exception to this would be the lasting impact of the Iraq war. While 9/11 was couched in terrorism-related language, strictly speaking Iraq is outside of the scope of the “War on Terror”. This point has been made forcefully by opponents of the war, and even supportive neoconservatives eager to opportunistically “remake” the Middle East view Iraq as a related but separate issue from terrorism.
incorporating domestic-level variables such as national strategic culture, this study has further extended the growing field of neoclassical realist-inspired theoretical inquiry. In doing so, it has provided evidence of a robust field of inquiry that can allow for scholars, policymakers, the general public, and others to better understand the complex, historically-oriented process of interaction between states. A similar model could be extended to other countries in order to determine if some other unexamined regional- or Indonesian-specific variable(s) could be influencing the thesis proposition. While this study has centred on the striking variation in American strategic attention towards Indonesia as the basis for applying this theoretical model, other countries that have also been subjected to significant variations in strategic attention could prove further insights regarding the influence of American strategic culture and Indonesia-specific events. Similarly, while the strategic culture of the United States is of particular interest due to the substantial direct and indirect impact it has upon the international environment, examinations of other national strategic cultures could provide interesting cases of comparison and contrast with the American model examined here. While the evidence provided indicates the lasting impact of the particular brand of American strategic culture described, this description is one of many possible efforts: it is noted that reasonable cases have been, are, and will be made that emphasise different elements of American strategic culture, with necessarily different conclusions. Lastly, the resulting impact of these cognitive biases upon the balance between grand strategy and bilateral foreign policy in and toward other countries could provide further theoretical examination opportunities beyond the case of the United States and Indonesia explored herein.

Implications

During the 1990s, Indonesia’s perceived importance to the United States did grow somewhat, but it did so at an uncertain and uneven pace. Congressional interest in East Timor, and to a lesser extent West Papua, in the aftermath of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacres caused restrictions to be placed on military cooperation, but in truth this remained a relatively modest program of more symbolic value than anything else. The ban itself served as a larger purpose, however, in signaling that the Cold War bargains made with Suharto – a trade of the New Order’s stability and staunch anti-Communism for American support of an unquestionably corrupt, authoritarian regime – were coming under increasing pressure and scepticism. Indonesia’s importance
related more to its economic performance than anything else, much like its fellow “Asian Tigers”. But as with other nations in the region, there exists a “fundamental cultural divide between Americans and Southeast Asians, a divide marked by the type of unfamiliarity, suspicion, and clash of business styles that militates against closer economic ties.” What was true in the economic sphere was also true politically, as frequently circular debates over “Asian Values” demonstrated that Southeast Asia’s absence from Washington’s grand strategy considerations.

Calls for a strategic reevaluation of Indonesia predated the Asian Financial Crisis, but it was the forces set loose by the crisis that unquestionably accelerated this process. The Clinton Administration was worried – unrealistically, according to some – about Indonesia’s potential disintegration amidst the enormous societal instability that accompanied Suharto’s fall from power. In a familiar sense, perceived threats drove Indonesia’s strategic significance. The democratic elections of 1999 were seen as an opportunity to reengage Indonesia, but the opportunity was largely lost for reasons intrinsic to both the Indonesia and American foreign policymaking processes at the time. The post-election political instability, the deeply corrosive nature of New Order rule on Indonesian institutions, and the erratic nature of Wahid’s rule all stunted this reevaluation from Indonesia’s side; from the US perspective, the ongoing fallout of Clinton’s impeachment trial, the war in Kosovo, and ongoing political fallout related to Indonesian actions in East Timor further contributed.

But importantly, the conditions for such a reconsideration of Indonesia’s relative importance to American grand strategy were present, and once Indonesian politics stabilized somewhat following the erratic interregnums of Habibie and Wahid governments, levels of engagement grew across numerous levels. During the early days of the Bush Administration, there were indications that Indonesia might play a more important role in American grand strategy, owing to Bush’s description of China as a “strategic competitor”. But the effects of the 9/11 attacks would transform American understandings of Indonesia’s strategic significance. With the reality of Indonesian-based terrorism reinforced by the 2002 Bali bombing and subsequent

37 McMahon, 213. He quotes former Ambassador to Singapore Robert D. Orr: “There needs to be a swift kick in the rear for American businesses. I just don’t think they understand what has happened in Southeast Asia”, referring to the pre-Asian Financial Crisis economic boom in the region.
attacks in Jakarta, the United States expanded its partnership with Indonesia. It took very little time for this to be expressed on the strategic level, with Southeast Asia described as a “Second Front” in the “War on Terror”. Like much of Bush’s foreign policy, dislike of the messenger obfuscated some of the realities of his counterterrorism message, namely the existence of regional terrorism and the potential offered by greater engagement on political and security levels. While these efforts created domestic political difficulties for Megawati that she was unable to adequately solve, it also indicated an approach to Indonesia by Washington of a fundamentally different character. Engagement increased, particularly following the 2002 Bali bombings and other acts of terrorism within Indonesia – and also served to undercut conservative, Islamist-oriented critics of Megawati that argued against closer US-Indonesian ties.

**Moving Forward**

This represented a significant and rather unique point in the six decades of American foreign policy towards an independent Indonesia. With the Cold War paradigm that defined so much of this relationship a historical relic itself, new challenges and opportunities are paramount. The recognition of Indonesia’s growing importance has been a crucial factor in changing American perceptions, as has democratic consolidation under Yudhoyono and Jokowi. From the American side, while threats do still exist – terrorism, corruption, and military reform still concern many – the balance has clearly gone toward a more opportunistic view of the relationship. It is extraordinary that so much of this has continued during the last decade, in which still nascent democratic and constitutional norms have become more established and significant security and political challenges between Jakarta and Washington remain. It is even more so when one considers Indonesian experiences of the preceding one: the horrors of the Asian Financial Crisis, the swirling uncertainty of the New Order’s collapse, the bloody end to the brutal occupation of East Timor, acts of domestic terrorism with links to international jihadism, and one of the most devastating natural disasters in recent history – all within a political system struggling to make sense of where it had come from, the current framework, and what the future might look like. If a key characteristic of the successful strategist is the ability to

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understand short-term events in the “big picture” context of a longer-term goals-oriented perspective, then the US-Indonesian relationship seems ripe with such opportunities.

One of the clear factors in influencing this changing relationship, particularly as it relates to grand strategy, is the rising profile and growing international role of China. It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the nature of American, Indonesian, or Chinese perspectives or strategic thought in depth, but it sufficient to suggest that the “rise of China”, particularly as it relates to a larger political, economic, and diplomatic profile for Beijing within Southeast Asia, has substantially impacted the logic and understanding of Jakarta’s and Washington’s actions in the region. At present, the future path of this development remains one of the most lively and contested debates in international politics. Both Jakarta and Washington, while extremely wary of the reputational and material costs associated with the appearance of ‘containing’ China, nonetheless see some value in preventing Southeast Asia from coming under anything approaching domination or even primacy from Beijing. In recent years Indonesia has adopted policies that have emphasized close ties with the rapidly-developing economy of China, while also encouraging security ties with the United States, a policy Goh describes as “omni-enmeshment”. She argues that “Southeast Asian regional security strategies disregard the artificial boundaries between military, economic, and political power; ignore the simplistic distinction drawn between engagement and containment or balancing; and fundamentally challenge the assumption that the management of regional order is the business of big players.”40 The mainland states of Indochina, with the notable exception of Vietnam, have generally sought closer ties with Beijing and seem more comfortable with the practical implications of growing Chinese influence, while maritime Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, has made clear efforts to develop closer relations with both Washington and Beijing in distinctive, individualized ways.

The relationship between the United States and China remains a tremendously complex one, based on innumerable economic, geopolitical, diplomatic, and military-related issues. There is the very real issue of power-transition theory, as China’s growing regional profile comes into conflict with American hegemony in the Asia-

Pacific. During the late 1990s some called for a policy towards China that utilized aspects of containment and engagement (termed “constrainment”) in order to limit the growth of Chinese power and ensure American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific while simultaneously engaging with Beijing economically.\textsuperscript{41} George W. Bush initially designated China as a “strategic competitor” (rather than a “strategic partner”, as Clinton had described China)\textsuperscript{42}, but during his second term China was instead urged to become a “responsible stakeholder”\textsuperscript{43} of the international community, with the bilateral “Senior Dialogue” (also known as the China-U.S. Strategic Dialogue) indicating a more conciliatory approach. Obama continued this policy, while also challenging particular aspects of China’s behaviour and formally introducing the “Pacific rebalancing” as a comprehensive policy reorientation. It remains heavily debated whether such a strategy towards China is sustainable or even conceptually feasible, given the deep, overlapping links between the two countries today and the far-ranging costs such an approach would almost certainly entail. Even as American grand strategists keep a close eye on developments within China, the developing relationship between Washington and Jakarta has a major role to play in this formulation. As with many of the domestic reforms and positive developments within Indonesia, on this issue the United States and Indonesia have broad overlap in their approaches to regional order, and as such it would make sense to see greater collaboration, taking into account certain diplomatic necessities, to further their respective goals.

In the current context, “the United States has identified Indonesia as an important emerging power and strategic actor in its wider region”, which in turn resulted in “the Bush Administration [seeking] to strengthen it as an autonomous counterweight [to China].”\textsuperscript{44} Obama’s foreign policy could be described in very similar, if not identical, terms. The United States, which continues to maintain a significant if diminishing lead in military capabilities, has perhaps the most to lose from an increasingly powerful China (at least in relative power terms). But like China,

it is extremely wary of the tremendous costs associated with open conflict. Asia-Pacific states, including Indonesia, will continue to face important choices regarding Sino-American competition, and the ultimate success or failure of this strategy will depend on three major factors: the overall effectiveness and persuasiveness of American policy (including dissuading negative Chinese counterreactions), the willingness of important Asian states such as Indonesia to acquiesce to such policies, and China’s ability to modify or oppose this strategy should it desire to do so. In this sense, American foreign policy towards Indonesia both stands on its own merits while clearly being part of a larger China-oriented strategy.

While some have concluded that Southeast Asia has become a zone of bilateral competition for influence, the major states of the region have acted principally to ensure maximum strategic independence from both powers. Both China and the United States seem to at least begrudgingly accept such efforts to this point, as the development of closer economic ties with Beijing and enhanced security links with Washington seems not to have served as a major inhibitor for either country to develop closer ties within Southeast Asia. In this sense, the region does bear at least a passing surface resemblance to the Cold War, at least in that smaller states have the opportunity to play both powers off each other for gain. Importantly, as Twining argues, “The United States is not working to contain China. Rather U.S. policymakers are employing a radically different strategy: to preserve Washington’s strategic position in the region by facilitating the ascent of friendly Asian centers of power that will both constrain any Chinese bid for hegemony and allow the United States to retain its position as Asia’s decisive strategic actor.”

If nothing else, the burgeoning relationship between the United States and Indonesia that flourished during the Bush/Obama and Yudhoyono/Jokowi presidencies seems more likely to continue than not. At the same time, there remains a number of outstanding issues between Washington and Jakarta that could serve as a limit upon the relationship. Where, how, and when this limit is reached is dependent on many different variables, not least of which is Indonesia’s growing levels of confidence on the world stage and seeming eagerness to extend its influence beyond

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Southeast Asia. While Jokowi’s foreign policy to date represents a self-conscious shift away from SBY’s international activity to a more domestically-oriented focus, importantly it does not represent a repudiation of his predecessor’s policies in any significant way. Should a major shift in Indonesian strategic thinking occur, the overall regional security, political, and strategic framework could easily become unsettled again. But due to the present compatibility between the respective visions of the United States and Indonesia, this seems unlikely to occur in the near future – at least from Jakarta’s perspective.

Perhaps the most important variable to the burgeoning strategic relationship between the United States and Indonesia is President Donald J. Trump. This work has for the most part consciously left future political prognostications to more qualified sources, and attempts to do so again here. The fact that Trump’s unexpected 2016 win over Hillary Clinton continues to upend traditional understandings of politics in domestic and foreign policy realms is both valid and less than revelatory, in the sense that the statement is clearly true but it offers little insight into how his unique political persona might reasonably impact current or determine future policies. His electoral promises, though vague and frequently contradictory, demonstrated a conscious repudiation of any standard definition of strategy (including the one used throughout this work). The appeal of his aggressively nationalist populism should not be underestimated, nor should the negative reactions that it (and his brusque, maddeningly informal communication style) has engendered be discounted. His widely touted “Muslim travel ban” inspired considerable opposition, domestically and internationally (including in Muslim-majority Indonesia), and its future remains in question. But the nativist sentiments in a polarized populace that Trump so effectively harnessed cannot be discounted in the United States any more than they can be in contemporary European politics.

To the degree that the Trump Administration has enunciated any comprehensive world view or strategic vision, withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership within his first days in office is arguably far more significant. The agreement was politically messy and, as even proponents concede, substantially flawed in important ways. But it also reflected an effort to advance the well-

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understood (if frequently contested) goals inherent to global free trade deals through a multilateral process and framework. The scope of the deal represented one of the most forceful statements of American commitment to the Asia-Pacific and to overall trade liberalization since the end of the Cold War. As is often the case with such deals, however, the overall benefits potentially enjoyed by many were less politically significant than the targeted difficulties faced by few. Whatever the potential virtues and vices of a complex deal like the TPP it had become a political orphan during the contentious presidential election: Democrats were extremely skeptical of the deal owing to key constituencies’ wariness towards international capital flows and the potentially negative impact of these flows upon wages, while Republicans recognized an opportunity to win support amongst disenchanted blue collar Democrats and independent voters by supporting a more nationalistic approach to trade while simultaneously denying the outgoing Obama Administration a major political victory.

There is an inherent tension within the Trump Administration between the more nativist-inclined “America First” wing and a more internationally-inclined group loosely (and derisively by right wing news outlets such as Breitbart News) described as “globalists” that more. The drama surrounding this tension has been a consistent theme of Trump’s presidency to this point, but it also has significant policy implications for his presidency in terms of his strategic approach and particular policies relating to Indonesia and Southeast Asia that he might institute. Significantly, Trump’s rejection of traditional political norms is the primary reason for his electoral success, but it also provides clear limits to his ability to effect significant change. Nonetheless, the impact of “Trumpism” on US foreign policy is especially difficult to predict precisely because of his personal unpredictability and non-traditional approach to the conduct of foreign policy. While elements of long-standing American strategic culture can be found within Trump’s approach, one of Trump’s primary appeals in precisely that he rejects long-established norms of behavior, rhetoric, and process. The globalist/populist nationalist tension may be an oversimplification of inherent splits within the traditional Republican foreign policy establishment that have long been brewing, but in regards to Trump’s interactions with the rest of the world, the unmistakable fissure within the White House’s upper echelons of leadership clearly represents one of the most important issues to be resolved.
If there is a silver lining to the global pessimism that greeted Trump’s unexpected win, it may lie in Trump himself. As a self-described master of “the art of the deal”, Trump brings a consciously transactional approach to American foreign policy that has no comparable precedent. His unwillingness to indicate any broad foreign policy strategy, grand or otherwise, is strikingly unique in the context of recent American politics. His “America first” approach has already proven to be deeply unsettling politically, but his avowedly anti-ideological stance towards the practice of strategy represents a strategy itself – the active choice made by not choosing, as referenced by Sartre to start this chapter. As such, the elements of American strategic culture that have so heavily influenced the development and practice of both grand strategy and bilateral foreign policy over time have not disappeared, even if the emphasis or direction has been redirected. Furthermore, while Trump’s personality and brashness may serve as an upper limit on what can be expected from American foreign policy as viewed from Jakarta or Southeast Asia, his emphasis upon negotiation as a strategic end in its own right rather than a process to be endured could serve to consolidate the many gains made in the US-Indonesian relationship in recent years.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has evaluated the relative balance between foreign policy and grand strategy and the way in which this balance has shifted over time in the case of the United States’ approach to Indonesia. It has done so by examining the relative profile of Indonesia within American grand strategy over time, while taking into account the dynamic environment in which these changes have occurred. For the two decades after World War II, Indonesia factored heavily into American strategic considerations, particularly in the years immediately preceding the murky events of late 1965. This was driven by early Cold War era fears of Indonesia deciding to join the communist bloc, particularly as American observers noted the growing political strength of the PKI and Sukarno’s favouring of the PKI in the long-standing struggle for influence with the military. Sukarno’s ongoing international provocations were doubly threatening, due to the destabilizing regional effect of *konfrontasi* as well as the threatening consequences it held for American allies in the region and the growing military commitment to South Vietnam. Sukarno’s ouster, the destruction of the PKI and suspected sympathizers, the pro-Western orientation of the New Order, and the
larger strategic withdrawal from Southeast Asia by the United States in the late Cold War all contributed as the region and Indonesia faded from discussions of grand strategy for the rest of the Cold War. Under such conditions, American grand strategy was largely silent on the issue of Indonesia, meaning that bilateral foreign policy dominated Washington’s approach to Indonesia.

The shocks to the international system caused by the Asian Financial Crisis and the 9/11 attacks introduced dynamics that have resulted in Indonesia emerging with renewed prominence within American grand strategy discussions. Without both events, it is doubtful that this change in perceptions of Indonesia’s strategic value would have occurred. While these opportunities provided the exogenous shocks to US approaches to international politics, this also reflects the reality of American unipolarity. Whereas perceptions of threat were largely responsible for Indonesia’s importance during the early Cold War, in large part because of the bipolar, zero-sum nature of international politics at the time, in recent years American strategists have increasingly emphasized opportunities as a justification for Indonesia’s renewed importance.

American policymakers do have significant concerns over Indonesia’s future path, but the liberal assumptions and tenets of American strategic culture, and the influence this has upon US grand strategy, have been major factors behind this changing perception of Indonesia. They also suggest that current trends in this strategic reassessment are much more likely to continue on something approaching the present trajectory than they are to stagnate or reverse. In each aspect of the three-note chord of American grand strategy in Asia – physical security, economic well-being, and value promotion – optimism about Indonesia’s future path, and the way this could positively influence American national interests, have been driving forces behind this reevaluation. In turn, and perhaps most importantly, this has important theoretical implications, particularly as it relates to the manner in which American grand strategy and foreign policy towards a pivotal nation like Indonesia are conceived and formulated.
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